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A basic theme of this thesis is that different approaches to
psychology arc legitimated by different philosophies of science or
wider philosophical perspectives. Several influential contemporary
arguments about whether and how a scientific psychology ought to be
pursued are first introduced. Next the attempt to reconstruct the
recent history of the discipline in line with T.S. Kuhn*s theory of
science is critically discussed as is that theory itself. This leads
to a case study of the influence of Logical Positivism on Behaviourism,
illustrating the historical importance of philosophy of science for
psychology. The case study also provides the background for the
examination of Karl Popper* s philosophy of science and its associated
methodology. Historical objections to Popper* s epistemology are then
discussed in some detail, with special attention paid to Imre
Lakatos*s Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Popper*s
views are defended against these objections but substantially modified
in response to normative criticisms by Nicholas Maxwell. The different
approaches to psychology, already discussed, are then evaluated in
the light of this modified Popperian philosophy of science. The
mentalist programme, as articulated by Noam Chomsky, is given a
qualified endorsement but the claim that it vindicates rationalist
epistemology is rejected. Finally, in a more speculative vein, Popper's
metaphysical theory of Worlds 1, 2 and 3 is examined in the light of
various criticisms and an interactionist alternative to mentalism is
given favourable consideration.
Chapter One
Approaches to a Scientific Psychology
The pioneers of rationalism inveighed
against the traditional dogmas* ridiculed
popular superstitions* campaigned against
priests and sorcerers* and oastigated
them for fostering and preying upon the
ignorance of the masses - hoping that a
final victory of science would banish for
ever the evils of unreason and organised
deception* Little did they suspect that
a Trojan Hoarse would appear in the camp
of enlightenment, full of streamlined




Social Sciences as Sorcery
Introduction
Arguments over the aims and achievements of psychology are as
diverse and polemical today as they have ever been. The consensus, such
as it was, over the discipline's proper subject matter, problems, aims
and methods has been steadily eroded during the past two decades by an
increasing number of penetrating philosophical and methodological
critiques. So fragmented has academic psychology become that there is
even disagreement as to whether there is such a lack of oonsensus. We
shall see, however, that conflicting answers are still given by
professional psychologists to such basic questions as whether the subject
is the science of behaviour or a science of mind or whether it can be
a science at all.
V/e shall also see that some eminent and experienced researchers,
disillusioned by what they see as chronic failure to progress, talk
of a'crisis in psychology*. If there is a crisis then it would seem
1 Andreski, S. (1974) p249
to have been there from the start, especially if constant disputes
over fundamental issues are taken to mark its presence. Indeed it is
2
now just a half century since Karl Buhler's famous work with that title
first appeared and from that time to this no psychological movement has
ever had an exclusive hold on the allegiance of the discipline. Even
when the behaviourist hegemony was firmly established in the Anglo-
American world it was engaged in constant skirmishes with rival approaches,
from psychoanalysis to Gestalt psychology. How behaviourism, despised
and denounced by its critics as a demeaning and pretentious pseudo-
science, aggressively defended and promoted by its more loyal adherents
in a vigorous, if vain, rearguard action has declined in influence to
be but one perspective among many.
A major issue to be considered in this thesis is whether
behaviourism or any other putative soience of mind or behaviour,
irrespective of its degree of support within contemporary psychology
meets or can be so formulated as to comply with the minimal intellectual
criteria demanded of any empirical science. Or, in other words, can a
scientific psychology be a rational enterprise?
The search for an answer to this question will require an extensive
investigation of the issues which dominate debate in contemporary
philosophy of science, a discipline itself so tormented by internicine
strife that some would even have it turn to psychology for help in
settling its own fundamental difficulties. Twentieth century philosophy
of science, we shall see in the next chapter, has very largely determined
the course of modern psychology and it is from that field, I will argue,
that the key to a resolution of current conflicts in psychology can
be found. However, the attempt to fine a satisfactory answer to the
2 Buhler, K. (1927)
above question is made doubly difficult by the failure of the
philosophers of science to agree on a satisfactory notion of what
exactly would constitute a rational enterprise.
To begin my enquiry I will now review what I take to be the most
important arguments and counter-arguments within and about psychology
that have appeared in recent debates over the status of the discipline.
I shall be particularly interested in the answers which different
theorists have given or might legitimately be expected to give to the
following questions Should psychology, taken as a conscious attempt
to apply the methods of natural science to problems of human experience
and behaviour, now be abandoned as a naive if well-intentioned failure
or oan it be reconstructed as a viable, coherent and successful
empirical science? In the interests of explication I shall consider
the different standpoints in a sequence and only refer to critioisms
each has made of the other where clarity demands. My intention is, at
this stage, primarily to map out a field of operations or range of
viewpoints which will then be studied more critically in later chapters
after a comparative study of the different evaluative criteria whioh
competing philosophies of science provide for the assessment of
scientific theories. However, I will attempt in this survey to spell
out tacit or explicit philosophical assumptions underlying these
different standpoints? these assumptions- epistemological, linguistic,
methodological - often play a very important role in psychological
theories, not least among those whose proponents deny any philosophical
debts whatsoever.
Behaviourism
Put at its simplest this view is that psychology is the science
of behaviour. That is the form in whioh it was launched in 1915 by
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John B. Watson and, depending on one's sympathies, it can he said to
have undergone progressively more sophisticated and precise
reformulations during the past sixty years or to have suffered from
that ignominious fate of, what Flew'* (in another context) described in
a celebrated phrase as, 'death by a thousand qualifications*.
Today, behaviourism is a term used to refer to several distinct
philosophical doctrines and associated psychological positions. These
usages reflect the historical development of the movement, especially
the consequences of its intimate involvement with the Logical Positivism
of the Vienna Circle and later, that philosophy's American descendant,
Logical Empiricism. In a 'case study' illustrating the implications of
the philosophy of science for theorising and research in psychology I
will document, at some length, in the next chapter, the influence of
these philosophies on behaviourism. Here I will attempt to explain
what behaviourism signifies in current psychology.
In a recent essay, notable mainly for its high polemics,
H.J. Eysenck^ distinguishes three usages of the term, two of whioh he
considers relatively unimportant to the psychologist. The first,
metaphysical behaviourism, is but a disguised version of old-style
materialism which can be dismissed, he says, 'like so many other
metaphysical problems ... for it ... seems pretty murky, insoluble and
rather meaningless.'5 The second usage, analytic (or logical)
behaviourism, says Fysenok, describes a 'very useful* way of solving
a pseudo-problem like the exiBtenoe of mind or consciousness by means
of a linguistic purge. More interesting for my purposes is the third
position namely, methodological behaviourism, a specifically psychological
standpoint of which Eysenck wholeheartedly approves.
5 Flow, A.N. and Maclntyre, A. (1955)
4 Hysenck, H.J. (1972)
5 n n .. p288
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Mind, consciousness, mental events, private awareness and related
notions cannot, on this view, be investigated by the methods of science.
Because Eysenck's position, as he himself characterises it, has been
directly attacked by contemporary cognitive psychologists it will be
best to state his position in his own words.
*
... we must agree with J.B. Watson and his many
followers that our primary datum is behaviour, not
consciousness, and that our laws must be laws about
observable behaviour, not about non-observable states
of consciousness. This does not imply (although some
behaviourists write as if it did) that states of
consciousness do not existj as T.R. Miles puts it,
•the case of the methodological behaviourist is
rather that if there are such things as minds or
mental events they oannot as a matter of methodology
be regarded as proper objects for scientific study1.
Such a statement is subject to disproof and is hence
a meaningful soientifio statementj all you have to
do if you do not agree with the statement and wish
to disprove it, is to put forward a method which
would render mental states suitable for scientific
study.* 6
Eysenck further claims that 'almost all psychologists are now
7
behaviourists in the methodological sense.*1
It is scarcely surprising that Eysenck can make this further olaim
because, with the above formulation, he is able to characterise as
methodological behaviourists a great variety of psychologists who would
objeot to the view that they are behaviourists. The confusion arises
from an ambiguity in the use of the terms 'mind* and 'mental events*.
The confusion can be dispelled if we anticipate some of the
conclusions of the oaso study to follow. Behaviourism, as developed by
Watson, was a science of behaviour advanced in opposition to the
conception of psychology as the science of mind or consciousness.
Watson, as is well known, attacked the idea of a science of mind - where
that is taken to mean a science of conscious mental events - and the
6 Eysenok, H.J. (1972) p292
7 " ww p297
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associated introspective method. Vatson was thus anti-mentalist.
Behaviourism as influenced by the logical positivists and logical
empiricists however, was much more than an anti-mentalist doctrine.
It became the representative in psychology of those philosophies of
scieno© and, as such, was wedded to a variety of principles about the
status of theoretical terms, the nature of explanation, observation
languages, confirmation procedures and other views dealt with in the
case study. As it evolved this philosophically-supported behaviourism
continually modified the initial Watsonian formulation and relaxed the
anti-mentalist strictures. Mental terms were readmitted as legitimate
provided they could be fully defined in terms of the (allegedly,
objective) observation language. later, mental terms were held to be
only partially definable in this language and, later still, even that
greatly modified position was abandoned so that it was no longer held
that mental terms could be provided with logically necessary and
sufficient criteria of application in the observation language.
To some extent the point at whioh behaviourism is so qualified
and modified that it is something else is a matter of stipulation. I
shall turn to that point in a moment. The issue at this point is that
the 'mental terms' readmitted into what I call philosophically-supported
behaviourism could, in principle, refer either to conscious or
unconscious processes or events. The emphasis was on the nature of
their 'logical connection' to the observable behaviour; behaviourism
was thus permitted to include reference to the mental and even to
conscious mental events provided that the theoretical terms which
mediated that reference were used in conformity to the methodological
principles of the day. During the I94u's and 1950*3, behaviourists
were much preoccupied with questions concerning these 'logical
connections*. Thus their laws were not just about public observable
—6—
behaviour but were also about what Eyaenck oalls "non-observable states
0
of consciousness" - provided, and only provided, the empiricist
criteria of significance for the use of such terms were so respected.
Methodological behaviourism, as defined by Eysenok (quoting Miles),
most closely resembles Watsonian behaviourism in its anti-raentalism.
When he says that "minds or mental events cannot as a matter of
9
methodology be regarded as proper objects for scientific study*' he is
objecting to a science of mind or consciousness, as conceived of before
Watson. He does not, I take it, claim that minds or mental events
cannot be studied in the sense in whioh they were readmitted into the
philosophically-supported varieties of behaviourism. For each one of
these varieties was just as opposed as Itysenck is to any attempt to
oonstruct a science of mind or consciousness per se, a science which
flouts the empiricists* methodological demands. Thus methodological
behaviourism is a dootrine that was held by all those behaviourists of
the 1940*s and 1950's who accepted the various conceptions of empirical
significance for mental terms as introduced by the philosophers. But
Eysenck* s usage is confusing for his term equally applies to those
psychologists who consider themselves anti-behaviourist by virtue of
their rejection of such empiricist significance criteria but who do
not wish to espouse a science of mind or mental events, where such
expressions are taken to be synonomous with the traditional conception
of a science of consciousness. Modern mentalists, we shall see later
in this ohapter, steer a middle course between adoption of what they
take to be an empirically indiaciplined science of consciousness and
commitment to recent empiricist constraints on psychological theories.
And since they thus oppose what they correctly take to be behaviourist
methodology they would, appropriately, reject the suggestion that they
8 Eysenok, H.J. (1972) p292
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are •methodological behaviourists'. la conclusion, then, I rejeot
this usage of •methodological behaviourism1 for it fails to expreBS
the doctrines that have characterised behaviourism during the past
three decades and because it is confusing in that it embraces
psychologists who are, if they are anything, anti-behaviourists.
Judged in terms of the number of its adherents the most important
version of contemporary behaviourism is, perhaps, that of B.F. Skinner.
This is something of an anomaly in that it is based on a once-
fashionable philosophy of scienoe nov/ long abandoned by its originators
namely, operationism. •Behaviourism has been*, writes Skinner with
approval, '(at least to behaviourists) nothing more than a thorougb-
10
going operational analysis of traditional mentalistio concepts.*
Skinner is equally opposed to attempts to explain behaviour by
reference either to physiology or to mental events, conscious or
unconscious. He is particularly hostile to such allegedly unscientific
approaches as that of Earl Popper, inherent in such statements as:
•What we want is to understand how such non-physical
tilings as purposes, deliberations, plans, decisions,
theories, tensions and values can play a part in
bringing about physios,! changes in the physical
world.' 11
The history of science teaches us, Skinner suggests, that such
seemingly reasonable ' common sense1 approaches to the problems of human
behaviour will prove a dead end. He writes:
•We can follow the path taken by physios and
biology by turning directly to the relation
between behaviour and the environment and
neglecting supposed mediating states of mind.
Physics did not advance by looking more olosely
at the jubilance of a falling body, or biology
by looking at the nature of vital spirits, end
we do not need to try to discover what personalities,
10 Skinner, B.F. (1945) p271
11 Popper, K.H. (1972) p229
nmQnm
* states of mind, feelings, traits of character,
plans, purposes, intentions or the other perquisites
of autonomous man really are in order to get on with
a scientific analysis of behaviour.1 12
In fact this scientific analysis of behaviour is, he says, well
established and there is an urgent need to press ahead, to probe
further the nature of environmental control of behaviour. Radical
behaviourism is, in the words of two of its contemporary advocates,
Boakes and Halliday^, 'by far the most promising approach to the
understanding of behaviour* • To the question whether psychology can
be recontructed as a viable, coherent and successful emprieial science
they would, I presume, reply that a reconstruction is unnecessary for
it is these things already.
Just as radical behaviourism reflected operationist standards so
weaker versions of behaviourism were developed in response to
modifications of those standards. So, for example, when logical
empiricism was refined to require merely that theoretical terms be
such that logically necessary and sufficient conditions of application
be specified in observation language a parallel situation arose in
psychology; mental terms were held to be legitimate entities in
behaviourist theories provided that logically neoessary and sufficient
conditions of application wane specified in terms of overt behaviour.
Before its eventual demise logical empiricism underwent continual
attenuation which, in turn, gave rise to numerous versions of weak
behaviourism. It is, I have said, partly a stipulativ© affair when we
can corxeotly say behaviourism is so qualified that it is not
behaviourism any longer.
Fodorx^ has suggested, after noting the variety of these weak
12 Skinner, B.F. (1975) p2Q
13 Boakes, R.A. and Ralliday, M.S. (1970) p373
14 Fodor, J.A. (1968)
behaviourist formulations, that we employ the following criterion:
♦To qualify as a behaviourist in the broad sense
of that term that I shall employ, one need only
bolieve that the following proposition expresses
a necessary truth: For each mental predicate
that can be employed in a psychological explanation,
there must be at least one description of behaviour
to which it bears a logical connection. I shall
henceforth refer to this proposition as P.* ^5
I intend to use Fodor's definition of a minimal behaviourism because,
unlike ifysenok's usage of methodological behaviourism, it respects
important distinctions between thosa psychologists who call themselves
behaviourists and those who do not. Fodor himself, we shall see later
in this chapter, opposes a traditional science of mind in the sense
of a science of consciousness yet does not think that a sufficient
reason to merit being labelled a behaviourist. For he also opposes
even the very weak behaviourist requirement that each mental event be
logically connected to a description of behaviour. .Another reason for
aooepting this definition is that when the terms 1logical connection'
and 'description of behaviour' are interpreted in different ways it
enables us to account for the heterogeneity and complexity of
historical behaviourism.
Finally, the epistemological and methodological sources of
support for behaviourism will oe discussed in the case study in the
next chapter.
Apostasy
One of psychology's most virulent critics during the past decade
has been the distinguished American ex-behaviourist Sigraund Koch. His
disillusionment with the possibility of a successful scientific
16
psychology, or as he oalls it his 'apostasy' , set in after he produced
15 Fodor, J.A. (1968) P51
'
16 Koch, S. (1974) p3
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a systematic critique of the work of Clark Hull. 1 Though Koch now
boasts that that critique 'is probably the most mercilessly sustained
18
analysis of a psychological theory on record' he also thinks that
critical analysis is unlikely to persuade psychologists to abandon
their efforts. Hence, the violence of his apostasy has culminated in
a fierce polemic in which he suggests that psychology students are
the victims of a oruel confidence trick when they are informed that
they are studying a coherent discipline or set of specialties. He
writes I
'Whether as a 'science' or any kind of ooherent
discipline devoted to the empirical study of man
psychology has been misconceived. Though a massive
hundred-year effort to erect a discipline given
to the positive study of man has here and there
turned up a germane fact or thrown off a epark of
insight, these 'victories* have had an adventitious
relation to the programmes believed to inspire them,
and their sum total over time is overwhelmingly
counterbalanced by the harvest of pseudo-knowledge
that has now been reaped.' 19
'Many legitimate and important domains of psychological
study, then, can be called 'science' in no significant
sense and oontinued application of this misleading
metaphor can only vitiate, distort or pervert research
effort ... I am saying that in fields as close to the
heart of psychological studies as perception, cognition,
motivation and learning, and certainly social
psychology, psyehopathology, and personology, and,
of course, aesthetics, the study of 'creativity* and
the empirical study of phenomena relevant to the
domains of the extant humanities - that in all these
areas such concepts as 'law', 'experiment',
'measurement', 'variable', 'control', 'theory', do
not behave sufficiently like their homonyms in the
established sciences to justify their extension to
them of the term 'science'. 20
Alas, Koch here fails to provide arguments which would justify
his conclusions. He does not illustrate how psychology - which he
17 Koch, S. (1954)
18 " " (1974) P4
19 M " M p6
20 " " " p2*5
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seems to identify with behaviourism in its various forms - fails to
meet the canons of scientific method as they are applied in the
established natural sciences. And apart from a passing reference to
Mddiael Polanyi's philosophy of science Eoch's own views on the nature
of science remain a mystery. Thus, despite Koch*s eminence and
despite the possibility, whioh I am prepared to believe, that he is
only one among many professional psychologists disenchanted with what
they take to he the sterility of behaviourism I shall move on to
consider some other long-standing opponents of psychology whose arguments
are, at least, a little more explicit.
A Priorism
The idea of a scientific psychology is, according to some
philosophers simply a contradiction in terms. If it is psychology it
is not science; if it is science it is not psychology. Thus it is only
to be expected, they argue, that behaviourism in all its forms and all
other efforts to oonstruot a science of psychology will prove dismal
failures. For they will all be exercises in conceptual confusion.
Wittgenstein has inspired many such a priorist attacks on psychology
and other social sciences. Though he did not himself offer a formal
argument against the possibility of a science of psychology he did
write, at the very end of his Philosophical Investigationsi
'The confusion and barrenness of psychology is
not to be explained by calling it a 'young scienoe';
its state is not comparable with that of physics,
for instance in its beginnings. (Bather with that
of certain branches of mathematics. Set Theory)
For in psychology there are experimental methods and
conceptual confusions.' 21
Fortunately we have a better idea of what Wittgenstein intended thanks
21 Wittgenstein, L (1958) p2J2
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to the work of Winch in his The Idea of a Social Science. Though,
as its title suggests, Winch was not primarily concerned with psychology
much of his case would, if successful, prove very damaging to the
credibility of any science of psychology.
The basic mistake which social scientists make, he says, is that
they assume that all explanations have the same logical form. That is
to say they assume that the principles of explanation which hold for
the natural soiences can be applied, sinrpliciter, to the human social
realm. So psychologists, for example, will recognise that human beings
are highly complex organisms and will consequently devise complicated
experiments to probe the underlying laws of behaviour. But they would
insist, he argues, that the recaloitrant issues involved are merely
empirical. Failure to find the presumed and desired laws is taken to
reflect lack of ingenuity and calls for more sophisticated research or
intensification of effort. Only time will tell, psychologists believe,
how successful their efforts are likely to be.
Such an approach is doomed from the outset, says Winch, for the
issues involved are not empirical at all; they are, he argues,
conceptual. And he writesj
•It is not a question of what empirical research
may show to be the case but of what philosophical
analysis reveals about what it makes sense to say.
I want to show that the notion of a human society
involves a scheme of concepts which is logically
incompatible with the kinds of explanation offered
in the natural sciences.1 ^3
As members of a human society individual human beings cannot be
understood in terms of the concepts of natural science. Though human
beings are more complex than other organisms they are not .just more
complex. He adds:
22 Winch, P. (1958)
25 " " " P72
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'For what is from one point of view, a change in
the degree of complexity is, from another point
of view, a difference in kind: the concepts which
we apply to the more complex behaviour are logioally
different from those we apply to the less complex.* 24
Now though hAs thesis is largely devoted to showing that human
social action is qualitatively different from events in the natural
world it appears to hold equally for our understanding of animal
25
aotions. For Winch asks us to consider a oat *writhing in pain'.
If we were to describe the cat*s reactions, his very complex gyrations
in purely mechanical terms, using a set of space-time co-ordinates -
much as we would describe the motion of a stone hurtling through the
air - then we would have described what was going on Just as much as
the statement that the oat was 'writhing in pain'. Winch continues:
'But the one statement could not be substituted for
the other. The statement which includes the concept
of writhing says something which no statement of the
other sort could approximate to. The concept of
writhing belongs to a quite different framework from
that of the concept of movement in terms of space-time
co-ordinates j and it is the former rather than the
latter whioh is appropriate to the conception of the
cat as an animate creature. Anyone who thought that
a study of the mechanics of the movement of animate
creatures would throw light on the concept of
animate life would be the victim of a conceptual
misunderstanding. * 2
Winoh's argument rests on the alleged differences between the
principles of explanation in the natural sciences and those appropriate
to understanding social action. If it could be shown that his view
of how the natural sciences work - how they explain physical events -
is untenable, or that his account of what is involved in understanding
social life is flawed, or both, then his thesis would be correspondingly
weakened or undermined.
24 Winch, P. (1958) P72
25 n « « p74
26 w« ww
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It is interesting that Winch develops his case against a natural
science of psychology in opposition to the views of John Stuart Mill.
He approaches his opponents in this way, he says, because Mill's
position 'underlies the pronouncements of a large proportion of
27
contemporary social scientists' and because 'some rather more
sophisticated interpretations of the social studies as sciences ... can
be best understood as attempts to remedy some of the more obvious
?8
defects in Mill's position.' What is revealing about tills is that
Winch is attacking the application of a positivist conception of
29
natural science to human behaviour. And he suggests that the only
alternative to such a conception is the neo-Wittgensteinian analysis
of social life whioh he himself advocates.
Thus, for example, in criticising Mill's approach to what he
called the 'moral sciences' Winch notes the attempt to make motive
explanations a species of causal explanation. And he adds:
'The conception he (Mill) wishes to advocate,
though he is not very explicit, seems to be
something like this. A motive is a specific
mental ocdurrence (in a Cartesian sense of
'mental* implying that it belongs wholly to
the realm of consciousness) ... what we can do,
Mill argues, is to study the causal relation
between motives, considered as purely conscious
events and the aotions to which they give rise.*
A contemporary positivist version of Mill's position is found, says
Winch, in that of the social psychologist T.M. Newcombe. For Newcombe,
as for Mill, motives are a species of causal explanation. However,
Hewcombe differs from Mill in his further claim that these motives can
be identified with physiological states of the organism. (Mil, says
Winch, regards that claim as non-proven.) Newcombe is forced to his
radical reductionist conclusion because, Winch argues, the only apparent
27 Winch, P. (1958) P<$6
23 H «t It II
29 Positivism is briefly examined in the case study, in Chapter Two
50 Winch, P. (1958) p79
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alternatives seem unacceptable - namely, that a motive is either a
♦figment of the imagination* or that it is but a 'synonym' for the very
behaviour it is alleged to cause.
Both Mill and Newcombe misunderstand the role of motives in
social life, according to Winch. And he implies that such
misunderstanding is a consequence of their attempt to apply the
principles of natural science to the problems involved in explaining
human behaviour. Some psychologists deny, we shall see in a moment,
that we must accept either of the alternatives Winch presents. They
deny, in other words, that we must agree with either Mill's or ilewcombe's
analysis on the one hand, or that we need accept Winch's own positive
arguments on the other. In short, they argue that it is possible to
implement a coherent scientific psychology and doing that entails the
rejection of these spurious alternatives.
It involves rejection, first, of the claim that a science of
psychology is required, for example, to describe the behaviour of the
writhing cat in terms of movement in space and time. This demand is
seen to be the consequence of a quite -unnecessary and, it is argued,
indefensible empiricist account of science. Part of this account tries
to isolate the 'inductive risk* allegedly involved in all scientific
theorising from the observation language which is, on this acoount,
the base on which theory is supposedly grounded. Hence, an attempt is
made to purge the so-called basic observation language of theory, to
make it somehow neutral, obviouB and indubitably fundamental. Different
psychologists recommend various alternatives to this empiricist
formulation, as we shall see. The point I wish to make here is that
psychological theories and theories about psychology are very often
tied up with tacit, but very potent, ideas about what a scientific
theory must look like. Winch seems to assume, or so it appears from
-16-
his examples, that a scientific theory is limited to an observation
language that meets such empiricist demands. Such an assumption is
unnecessary, soma argue; indeed they say it inhibits the emergence of
truly explanatory theories. So, in effect, they are saying that it is
Winch, in his equation of science with the positivist interpretation
of science, who is himself the victim of a conceptual misunderstanding.
And it is that misunderstanding, they continue, which leads him
to claim that his own neo-Wittgensteinian philosophy is the only
acceptable alternative which the social scientist possesses. An
adequate treatment of this philosophy would require a thesis in itself
so I shall here merely sketch Winch*s positive argument. He begins
with the espousal, of a form of the famous Wittgensteinian objection
to the possibility of a private language, an objection based on the
view that language use ia a special case of rule-following behaviour.
Learning the definition of a word, learning to use the word correctly
is, he argues, the equivalent of learning a rule. A crucial move in
the argument, a move which numerous philosophers have criticised, is
taken by Winch when he writes:
*
... the notion of following a rule is logically
inseparable from the notion of making a mistake.
If it is possible to say of someone that he is
following a rule that means that one can ask
whether he is doing what he does correctly or not.
Otherwise there is no foothold in his behaviour
in which the notion of a rule can take a grip;
there is then no sense in describing his behaviour
in that way, since everything he does is as good
as anything else he might do, whereas the point of
the concept of a rule is that it should enable us
to evaluate what is being done.* 31
Next, Winch generalises this familiar argument from its employment in
the attempted elucidation of language use to show, or try to show, how
31 Winch, P. (1958) P32
it can illuminate the nature of human action. Just as learning the
definition of a word is to learn a rule governing its future use so,
t
he says, •action with a sense ... commits the agent to behaving in one
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way rather than another in the future1.^ To illustrate the analogy
Winch asks us to consider a person placing a slip of paper "between the
pages of a book. The person can be said to be 'using a bookmark*,
says Winch, only if he acts with the idea of using the slip to determine
where he shall start re-reading. He then adds*
'The notion of being committed by what I do now
to doing something else in the future is identical
in form with the connection between a definition
and the subsequent use of the word defined ... It
follows that I can only be committed in the future
by what I do now if my present act is the application
of a rule. Now ... this is possible only where the
act in question has a relation to a social context:
this must be true even of the most private acts, if,
that is, they are meaningful.' 33
All meaningful behaviour is social, he concludes, sinoe it can be
meaningful only if governed by rules - and rule3 presuppose a social
setting.
Assuming then that the behaviour of human beings is typically
meaningful behaviour Winch proceeds to argue that the kinds of
explanation found in natural soienoe are 'logically incompatible* with
those appropriate to understanding human action. He oontinues by
noting that a regularity or uniformity is the constant recurrence of
the same kind of event on the same kind of occasion. Statements of
uniformities presuppose, he says, judgements of identity. And this is
where he attempts to drive an impenetrable wedge between the 'logics'
of natural and social science, for a natural scientist can identify
successive events as the same or different merely by reference to
32 Winch, P. (1958) p32
33 n n ft p50
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criteria of identity provided by the natural science involved, say
physics. The social scientist, in contrast, must recognise that the
criteria of identity vhioh his science provides are secondary to those
which govern the actions of the agents being studied. The social
scientist cannot identify two successive social events as *the same*,
whether they be strikes, baptisms, auotions or whatever, merely by
appealing to the criteria of his social science. The criteria which
the participants employ in their social life take priority. If an
observer ignores what the actors conceive themselves to be doing, says
Winch, then he is no longer a social scientist. For the events he is
studying have been stripped of their social character. To illustrate
the point Winch considers the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican
and argues:
*
... the appropriate criteria for deciding whether
the actions of these two men were of the same kind
or not belong to religion itself.1 54
But if an observer esohews a positivist orientation and instead
investigates the theories, ideas, propositions eto which the actors-
being-studied actually employ then, Winch says, he is no longer a
social scientist. He writes:
*
... what the sociological observer has presented to
his senses is not at all people holding certain
theories, believing in certain propositions, but
people making certain movements and sounds. Indeed,
even describing them as •people* really goes too far,
whioh may explain the popularity of the sociological
and social psychological jargon word •organism*:
but organisms, as opposed to people, do not believe
propositions or embrace theories. To describe what
is observed by the sociologist in terms of notions
like 'proposition* and 'theory* is already to have
taken the deoision to apply a set of concepts
incompatible with the 'external', *experimental*
point of view. To refuse to desoribe what is
observed in such terms, on the other hand, involves
not treating it as having social significance. It
34 Winch, P. (1958) p87
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•follows that the understanding of society cannot
be observational and experimental in one widely
accepted sense.* 35
The study of social life, he concludes, is more properly the preserve
of the philosopher where that is taken to mean elucidation of • forms
of life».
Winch is led to this conclusion by his own analysis of the
relation between philosophy and, in this case, science. Philosophy,
a la Wittgenstein, leaves everything as it is. It is, says Winch, a
peculiarly uncommitted form of enquiry in contrast to science or
religion, for example, which are each committed forms of enquiry.
Science is but one way of making the world intelligible f religion is
another. Each has criteria of intelligibility or criteria of logic
pecutys^ir to itself. »Criteria of logic1, says Winch, 'are not a direct
gift of God, but arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context
36
of, ways of living or modes of social life. • A scientist is committed
to the criteria of logic peculiar to science by virtue of his immersion
37
in a scientific community.'' Since criteria of logic are only
intelligible in the context of a way of life it follows, for Winch,
that they cannot be applied to modes of social life as such.
Given his commitment to the criteria of one way of life it is
disastrous for the scientist, he argues, to try to use his criteria
of logic *in the investigation of a human sooiety, whose very nature
is to consist in different and competing ways of life, each offering a
different account of the intelligibility of things To do this is
35 Winch, P. (1958) pllO
56 " » " plOO
37 The close similarity between this Wittgensteinian view of
the nature of science and the more recent, influential account of
Thomas Kuhn (1962) will be discussed in Chapter Two.
38 Winch, P. (1958) pl03
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to misunderstand the nature of science. No, suoh is properly the job
of philosophy; its raison d'etre is the elucidation and comparison of
the ways in which different intellectual disciplines, different 'forms
of life' make the world intelligible. Part of this job is, says Winch,
to be 'alert to deflate the pretensions of any form of enquiry to
enshrine the essence of intelligibility as such, to possess the key to
XQ
reality*. Part of the philosopher's job, then, is to prevent the
social scientist imposing the criteria of logic which science recognises
on other 'forms of life' and judging their own criteria against the
standards of soience. Where the scientist is committed to seeing his
criteria of logic triumph by making everying intelligible to science,
the philosopher, on the other hand, is uncommitted in that he has no
axe to grind for one form of life rather than another. The philosopher
reoognises that 'intelligibility takes many and varied forms'^ and
consequently must remind the scientist that his form of life is on a
par with its competitors. The philosopher, on this view, embraces and
enforces a total relativism. Finally, given that even the apparently
most 'private' human activity is, as Winch lias argued, supposedly
parasitic on a social context the general argument against a social
science applies with undiminished force to any putative science of
psychology. It is simply a conceptual blunder, on this view, to apply
the 'criteria of logic* appropriate to soience to the 'forms of life'
which constitute human activity. Hence, a scientific psychology is
held to be, in plain language, sheer nonsense.
Since what is actual is possible the best reply to '/inch is to
point to a coherent, flourishing science of psychology tliat avoids the
dilemma he presented. Some psychologists do just that, I have suggested,
39 Winch, P. (1950) Pl03
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rejecting both the positivist view of science which leads to describing
behaviour in terms of movement and the alleged alternative, namely
Winch*s neo-Wittgensteinian view. They agree that it is important to
discover the rules, intentions, plans, criteria etc which agents use
in their private and social behaviour; and they agree among themselves,
at least, that descriptions of behaviour must make reference to the
mental state which that behaviour is meant to express. But they deny
that in so doing they axe forced to violate legitimate canons of
scientific methodology. Winch*s argument is, they imply, a non-sequitur
for he has only argued against a positivist-hehaviourist approach to
psychology. What is of value in Winoh*s case can be incorporated, they
suggest, in a non-positivist psychology.
In conclusion, I want, again, to draw attention to the fact that
arguments within and about psychology are closely associated with
philosophies of science or, in this oase, a more general philosophy.
These philosophies dictate the criteria which are used to settle such
questions as whether psychology is possible and, if possible, how it
should be carried on. Hence, I suggest, it is essential to debate the
merits of such criteria in any discussion of the status of psychology.
Kentalism
Associated in particular with the pioneering work of Noam Chomsky
mentalism, also known as *New Mentalism* or 'New Rationalism*, is now
generally used to characterise the activities of the influential
psyoholinguistio and cognitive psychology movements. The principles
of the mentalist movement in psychology have been clearly articulated
by Podor^, whose criterion for defining a minimal behaviourism I have
already discussed. In faot, mentalism is defined by Podor as the
41 Podor, J.A. (1968)
denial of proposition P. (See Page 10) In other words, the mentalist
denies what a minimal behaviourist asserts, namely that for each mental
predicate employed in a psychological theory there is at least one
ip
description of behaviour to which it bears a logical connection.
Mentalism is to be sharply distinguished from traditional dualism
which asserts that mind and matter are substances of different logical
kinds. Mental predicates apply, according to a dualist, to an
ontologically distinct substance called mind which is irreducibly
different from the substance matter to which behavioural and/or
physical predicates apply.
Dualists are unlikely to be and in some cases cannot be - as a
matter of logic - behaviourists. Hence, they are likely to be
mentalists. But there is no reason why mentalists are likely to be
dualists, for mentalism is compatible with either dualism or traditional
materialism. This requires some clarification for there is considerable
and continuing confusion over these issues. A.R. Luria, for instance,
opposes Chomsky1 s research programme because *17th century philosophy,
with its dualistic approach is more appealing to him (Chomsky) than
objective, materialist epistemology with its socio-historioal searchings
43
for data.*^ It is simply a mistake, I believe and will later argue,
to view Chomsky as a Cartesian.
Dualists are unlikely behaviourists because anyone who holds
that mental and behavioural predicates apply to logically distinct
kinds of substance will probably not envisage a logical connection
between the distinct kinds of predicates. Dualism is logically
incompatible with oertain kinds of behaviourism - for example, radical
behaviourism. It is logically Impossible to hold both that mental and
42 Fodor, J.A. (1968) p55
43 Luria, A.R. (1976) P380
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behavioural predicates apply to different kinds of substance and at
the same time claim that the mental can be eliminated in favour of
behavioural terms.
Mentalists, however, need not be dualists for it is quite
reasonable to hold that mental and behavioural predicates are not
logically connected and yet hold that they apply to substances of the
same kind. Thus mentalists might be dualists; but they equally well
might be materialists. And in fact the leading mentalists in
contemporary psychology and linguistics do subscribe to materialism
in this sense. They subscribe to some version of the Identity Theory,
the doctrine that mind and brain states are contingently identical.
Mentalists, then, are generally committed to physicalism in that
they hold each mental event contingently identical to a brain or
neural event. The cognitive psychologist, on this view, postulates
abstract mechanisms which are held to mediate the production of the
behaviour to be explained. Row, in opposition to the behaviourist,
the mentalist recognises that these postulated mechanisms are often
very complex and thus cannot be 'tied* to observable behaviour in any
simple, direct way. That is not to say that such mechanisms are not
empirically constrained; the mentalist simply asserts that there is
no reason why in constructing his theories the psychologist should
shackle himself with farther empirical constraints than does, say, the
physioist. The mechanisms which are held to determine a person*b
behaviour are, he says, much too abstract to have behavioural criteria
of application for each postulated entity. Even the *weak behaviourist*
demand that each mental term be logically connected to behavioural
terms is, says Podor, a much too severe constraint. He writes;
'
... we may regard a commitment to behaviourism as
involving a speculation about the complexity of
those phenomena that psychological explanations
-24-
'will have to account for ... if it is possible to
demonstrate the occurrence of psychological
phenomena for which the simplest available
explanation requires us to hypothesize the
occurrence of mental events that do not exhibit
behavioural correlates, then, since even the
weakest variety of behaviourism requires at least
that such correlates exist for each type of mental
event, we shall be in a situation of forced choice.
In particular, we shall be required either to abandon
the explanation or else to abandon the methodological
principle that forbids explanation of that type.' 44
The methodological principle in question is, says Fodor, but a
consequence of the discredited operationalist account of scientific
theories. Hence it should be abandoned and the explanation retained.
In embracing physicalism the mentalists are admitting that
psychological theories are, in the last resort, about physical systems.
But this does not in any way commit them to the view that the laws of
psychology, whatever they may be, will in the end be reducible to the
laws of physios. Physics is the basio scienoe in the sense that
psychology is about physical systems but that does not licence the
classical reductionist inference, associated with the 'Unity of
Science' movement stemming from the Vienna Circle, that psychology
will eventually be replaced by an ideal physics. The traditional
reductionist programme, which views the sciences as a hierarchical
system resting on physics, is - say the mentalists - not to be defended
on ontological grounds. If physicalism is true it provides no support
for the classical reductionist aim of reducing psychology to physics.
Psychological or classical or radical reduotionism is defined
by Fodor as the conjunction of physicalism (the claim that every
psychological event is a physical event) and 'the assumption that
there are natural kind predicates in an ideally completed physics
which correspond to each natural kind predicate in an ideally completed
44 Fodor, J. (1968) p79j Fodor, J. (1975) pl/2
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special science* (eg psychology).^ In short, the claim is that every
kind is or is co-extensive with a physioal kind. Since reductionism,
thus defined, is an empirical claim it cannot be dismissed a priori
but there are, says Fodor, three good reasons why it seems highly
unlikely to be true.
The first reason is that *interesting generalisations (eg
A6
counterfactual supporting generalisations)1 can often be made about
events with very different physical descriptions. Second, he says,
whether the physical descriptions of the events described by such
generalisations have anything in common is very often irrelevant; and
third, 'the special sciences are very much in the business of formulating
generalisations of this kind' To illustrate the point he asks us
to consider that a law of the special science of economics is true -
namely, Gresham's Law which deals with monetary exchanges. Fodor says
he will accept that every event which consists of a 'monetary exchange*
has some true physioal description - eg an ounce of gold moved from A
to B - but that any physical description of all such monetary exchanges
would be 'wildly disjunctive'.^ It is a logioal possibility, he
admits, that a kind like 'monetary exchange' could turn out to be
co-extensive with a physioal kind but it would be 'an accident on a
AO
cosmic scale.' Similarly, while he assumes that for each psychological
45 Fodor, J. (1975) Pl5* To explain his usage of 'natural kind'
Fodor notes that every science employs a taxonomy consisting of theoretical
and observational predicates with which it classifies events; events fall
under the laws of a science by virtue of satisfying its predicates. Now,
not every true description cf an event, he says, falls under a scientific
law; predicates which express such true descriptions, he says, are not
natural kind predicates. However, he adds: '... roughly, the kind
predicates of a science are the ones whose terms are the bound variables
in its proper laws. I am inclined to Say this even in my present state
of ignorance, accepting the consequence that it makes the murky notion
of a kind viciously dependent on the equally murky notions of law and
theory. There is no firm footing here.' pl4
46 Fodor, J. (1975) pl5
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event there is some corresponding neurological event it is also, in
his view, highly improbable that psychological kinds could turn out to
be co-extensive with neurologioal kinds.
Fodor's case should be distinguished from that of another leading
mentalist and cognitive psychologist, N.S. Sutherland. In his paper
Is the Brain a Physical System?"^ he begins by stressing that even if
the brain is a physical system the psychologist may need to use new
concepts and principles in explaining behaviour} this is analogous to
the procedures adopted in the physical sciences, he says, where new
concepts and principles were once employed to explain, for example,
the behaviour of the thermostat, of a gas or of the stars. He continues:
•These three systems are, however, all mechanistic
systems and the principles used in explaining the
behaviour of the whole system can be inferred from
a knowledge of the laws governing the component
parts of the system together with a knowledge of
how these component parts are organised. Our olaim
is not that the explanation of behaviour does not
involve new principles but only that if the brain
is a physical system then these new principles are
reducible to the laws governing the behaviour of
elementary particles in the same way that the laws
governing the molar behaviour of a gas are reducible
to laws governing the behaviour of the molecules
that compose it.* 51
It presumably follows from this that the brain is not a physical system
if the new principles are not reducible to the laws of physics in the
same way as the gas laws were found reducible to the laws governing
the behaviour of the molecules of which the gas is composed. In
taking this line it is likely that Sutherland is going to have to
admit that the brain is not a physical system. I say likely because
only empirical evidence could decide this issue. It had to be
empirically discovered that the gas laws were in fact reducible to
50 Sutherland, H.S. (1970)
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molecular laws; it was a logical possibility that they were not so
reducible. Similarly, it will have to be discovered whether
psychological laws can be reduced in the same way to molecular laws;
it is a logical possibility that they cannot be. Indeed, according
to Fodor as we have seen, it is highly improbable that such a reduction
will ever take place. If Fodor is correct Sutherland will have to
infer that the brain is not a physical system. Fodor, however, may
in that event continue to make the physicalist claim beoause that claim
is, for him, independent of possible future reductions. Reduotionism
would be a sufficient but it is not a necessary condition, in his view,
for the truth of physioalism.
An account of the behaviour of an organism is greatly impoverished,
mentalists say, if that behaviour is described in terms of movement.
For it loses sight of the fact that the sequence of behaviour is
significant in so far as it is the expression of some mental state.
When a man writes his name, sings a song or plays football he is not
just moving his fingers, his vocal chords or his feet. Any
psychological theory whioh attempts to explain what is going on will
have to determine the intention, plan, rule or ooncept that the person
meant his behaviour to satisfy. To this extent the mentalist endorses
Winch's objection to the behaviourist's descriptions in terms of movement.
However, by breaking free of logical empiricist constraints, the
mentalist proceeds to specify the concepts that the person (or organism)
possesses and tries to discover the mechanisms whereby those conoepts
are put to use.
Mentalists decline to fight on the ground defended by earlier
generations of mentalists? they do not attempt to make conscious
mental states the subject matter of psychology nor do they plead for
28-
special epistsmological status for the associated method of introspection.
In fact they recognise that the mental processes which underlie
behaviour are generally as mysterious to the person employing them as
they aire to the experimenter.
Perhaps the olosest intellectual predecessors of contemporary
mentalists were the Gestaltists who emphasised the distinction, among
others, between the proximal and the distal stimulus. To explain a
person's behaviour, they argued, it is necessary to determine what
properties he takes any physical stimulus to have. Conversely, to
find out what the behaviour means it is necessary, mentalists emphasise,
to find out what desoription it was intended to satisfy. Mentalists
differ from Gestaltists, however, in that they have developed much more
precise and sophisticated theories with which to specify the nature of
the representations or descriptions with whioh an organism categorises
his experience} conversely, they use the same theories to specify the
descriptions behavioural output is intended to fall under. Theoretical
linguistics, especially transformational generative grammar, has made
an enormous contribution to the mentalists' efforts to achieve their
goals, by providing an acoount of sentence structure. This account,
some claim, provides a systematic and detailed characterisation of the
categories or concepts a person uses in the perception and production
of language. Psyoholinguistios will be, if successful, a model for all
oognitive psychology - or so some mentalists argue.
Cognitive theories in general treat psychological phenomena -
perception, decision making, concept learning etc - as computational
processes taking place in a representational system or, as Fodor calls
52
it, a 'language of thought'. ' As I intend to examine contemporary
52 Fodor, J. (1975)
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mentalism at some length in Chapter Five I will, in conclusion, note
here just one further aspect of this approach.
Cognitive psychology, by analogy with computer processes, views
mental activity as a series of transformations of information carried
out in the representational system. In doing so it cuts aoross
distinctions found both necessary and important in common sense and in
disciplines other than psychology. As I have noted already, it does
not insist on making conscious events the subject matter of
investigation. Instead, it recognises that some of the mental states
it characterises are conscious while others are not. Nor does
mentalism insist on distinctions between what happens to an organism
and what the organism does - though it recognises that such distinctions
may be very important in, say, a court of law. Fodor writesj
•... the ordinary distinction between what the
organism does, knows, thinks and dreams, and
what happens to and in its nervous system, doe3
not seem to be frightfully important. The natural
kinds, for purposes of theory construction, appear
to include some things that the organism does, some
things that happen in the nervous system of the
organism, and some things that happen in its
environment. It is simply no good for philosophers
to urge that, since this sort of theory does not
draw the usual distinctions, the theory must be a
muddle. It cannot be an objection to a theory that
there are some distinctions it does not make; if
it were, it would be an objection to every theory.*53
Hence the mentalist may agree that the philosophical distinction
between actions and happenings merits the vast literature on the topic
but as far as he is concerned the distinction is not a psychological
one.
Interaction!sm
Interactionists hold, at least, that private conscious mental
53 Fodor, J. (1975) P53
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states exist and causally determine behaviour. It is the business of
any soience of psychology, they argue, to discover generalisations
relating such mental events to behaviour.
Interactionists do not really form a unified position for, the
above claims apart, there is considerable variation in the range of
54
further theses they adopt. Some, like Beloff, are dualists in that
they award distinct ontological status to both mind and matter. Others
are pluralists like Popper^ who confers full ontological credentials
not just on matter and mind but also on theories, poems, symphonies
and other products of the human mind. There are interactionists like
56
Whiteley who recognise that consciousness is an ineliminable feature
of the human mind, yet eschew the label 'dualist1 on the assumption
that it implies that a study of mind can form no part of science.
However, if we drop that assumption there is no reason why Whiteley
should not be co-opted to the dualist club. At any rate he is an
interactionist whose arguments illustrate how this position contrasts
with the other standpoints considered so far.
First of all, Whiteley is oonoemed to defend the idea of a
science of conscious mind against the Wittgensteinian private language
argument, a form of which we have already seen employed by Winch.
Wittgenstein attacked the idea of a sense datum language, a language
which oould be held to describe an individual's private experiences.
The first part of this argument equates learning the definition of a
term, learning to use the term correctly with the learning of a rule.
If there are rules there must, the argument continues, be a difference
between using them correctly and incorrectly. How, in a public
language there are public rules and conventions governing the use of
54 Beloff, J. (1962), (1976)
55 Popper, K.R. (1972)
56 Whiteley, C.H. (1975)
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the terms in the language. These rules and conventions enable one
person to check whether or not another person has learned to use a
term correctly. If, standing in Princes Street in Edinburgh I point
to the Scott Monument and say 'Waverley Station*, I could obviously
be said to have made a mistake. I would not be using the rule governing
the use of *Waverley Station' correctly.
There can be no private language, according to Wittgenstein,
because, in oontrast to the above situation, there is no way by which
another person could ensure that I was employing a term correctly when
I used it to refer to a private experience. Hence, it is alleged,
there is no difference between using the term correctly and using it
incorrectly. But if that is the case it follows that there is no sense
in saying that I am using a rule at all. Nor, therefore, is there any
sense in saying I am using private rules in a private language.
The gist of Whiteley's reply to this argument is that it is a
non-sequitur. To begin, he acknowledges that Wittgenstein's acoount
of language use as a special case of rule-following constitutes an
advance on previous behaviourist theories of language. However, the
fact that there are no public rules or conventions which can be used
to check that I am using a term correctly when I use it to describe a
private mental experience only means that there is no way by which
another person can know for certain whether the term is being correctly
applied. The absence of public rules and conventions does not licence
the inference that there is in fact no difference for me between using
the term correctly and using it incorrectly. Hence, says Whiteley, it
does not follow that there is no sense in saying I am using a private
rule. Nor does it follow that I cannot be using a private language.
Whiteley identifies the flaw in Wittgenstein's argument by
considering the famous dictums 'An *inner process* stands in need of
-52-
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outward criteria.,y' The word 'criteria' can be used in two different
ways, he says. It can mean either 'the necessary and sufficient
53
conditions for the correot application of a descriptive term'-^ or
•the evidence or clues which may be relied on to assure us that the
59
term is being correotly applied.' The trouble arises when these two
senses of 'criteria', which often amount to very different things, are
confused. In particular, it is a serious error, says Whiteley, to
argue that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct
application of a term like, say, 'pain' are or include publicly
observable behaviour. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the
correct use of the word 'pain*, he says, are simply that the person
concerned be aware of this private experience. There may or there may
not be observable *pain-behaviour' which would constitute evidence
that the term is being oorrectly applied. Such evidence is a necessary
condition for checking my usage of the term but it is not necessary
for such usage. Says Whiteley:
'The confounding of these two sorts of criteria
is a relio of the verification principle, which
the later Wittgenstein and his followers do not
explicitly accept and may explicitly repudiate,
but often employ tacitly without acknowledgement.
I think it is the main source of the persistent
tendency towards behaviourism in contemporary
analyses of mental terms.'
Having defused the Wittgensteinian objection^1 he asserts not only
57 Wittgenstein, L. (1958) pl53
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61 It is interesting to note that Whiteley's rebuttal of the
private language argument - a rebuttal with which I am in full agreement -
is also employed by Fodor, although for very different purposes. He is
ooncemed to defend, in his aptly titled book The Language of Thought (1975)
not the idea of a sense datum language but the notion of a private
representational language in tema3 of which an organism speoifies the
stimuli it encounters and the description it intends its behaviour to
satisfy. p55» He argues: 'The private language argument - at least as
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that we can inform one another about events that are necessarily
private but that statements about such events are, contra behaviourism,
legitimate data for science. Let us now examine his defence of this
claim.
It is often argued, lie points out, that private, conscious mental
states are not suitable for scientific study because they cannot be
checked by other people. 'The practical consequence of this view for
the study of mind is1, he says, Hhat this should be a study of
behaviour only.*02 Behaviourism is the only alternative, he suggests,
to a psychology of conscious mental events. This is clear from his
reference to the doctrine that a science of conscious mind is
impossible. He writes:
•It also seems to say that in strictly scientific
discourse no animal can be described as pursuing,
fleeing, hiding, courting, or challenging, and
no person as buying or selling, bringing a lawsuit,
making a gift, teasing or befriending; for none of
these words is a pure description of behaviour.»
(My emphasis) &T
Whiteley then prooeeds, by way of defending a science of conscious mind,
I have been construing it - isn,t really any good. For, as many
philosophers have pointed out, the most the argument shows is that
unless there are public procedures for telling whether a term is
coherently applied, there will be no way of knowing whether it is
coherently applied. But it doesn't follow that there wouldn't in fact
be a difference between applying the term coherently and applying it at
random. A fortiori, it doesn't follow that there isn't any sense to
claiming that there is a difference between applying the term coherently
and applying it at random. These consequences would, perhaps, follow
on the verificationist principle that an assertion can't be sensible
unless there is some way of telling whether it is true, but surely there
is nothing to be said for that principle.' p70. The fact that the
private language argument has no force does not mean, however, that
psychology must make use of a sense datum language - or so we have seen
the mentalist maintain. His hypothesis is that both conscious and
unconscious mental states will provide, if suitably characterised, a
satisfactory account of the determinants of action.
62 Whiteley, C.H. (1973) plB
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to argue that behaviourism is 1internally inconsistent and impossible
to carry out.'^ Before discussing these further arguments it is
worth noting, again, that mentalists object to the view that behaviourism
and dualism (here, science of conscious mind) exhaust the possibilities
facing the psychologist. The argument is usually presented the other
way round, with the behaviourist claiming that he has the only viable
65
alternative to dualism. Either way, the mentalist replies, the
argument ignores the via media.
Against the behaviourist Vhiteley argues that all science rests
on experience and not just on the experience of one investigator. The
publicity of science lies in the fact that each investigator treats
what his colleagues say as reliable testimony as to what they have
observed. Hence, Vhiteley argues, there is no justification for the
distinction drawn by behaviourists between their fellow-observers
(whose testimony they accept) and their fellow-human experimental
subjects (whoso testimony they ignore). And so, he concludes, there
is no justification for excluding reports of private experiences taken
as reliable descriptions of those experiences.
Different philosophies of science award different epistemic status
64 Vhiteley, C.H. (1973) pl9
65 The most recent assertion of this behaviourist claim that I
have seen was made by Blackman (1976). Any psychologist, he wrote,
who says that 'what counts' is not just observable behaviour but the
causes which lie behind the behaviourist is faced with an awkward dilemma.
Such a psychologist will be forced, he argued, either to give up science
or to give up psychology. If 'what counts' is held to be private,
subjective mental events then, sinoe they allegedly cannot be studied
by scientific method (acoording to Blackman), they cannot play any part
in a scientifio psychology. If 'what counts' is held, on the other hand,
to be the biological causes of behaviour then the discovery of those
causes is properly the task of the physiologist, neurologist, etc in
Blackman*s view. The only 'scientifically respectable* (p3l) option,
he maintained, is Watsonian behaviourism.
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to introspective reports. What one makes of this dispute between the
dualist and the behaviourist will depend on the criteria one's
philosophy of science provides. I will return to this issue later in
the thesis but I shall now, in conclusion, note an objection to his
position which Whiteley does not mention. Rather there are two
objections, one of an empirical nature, the other philosophical. First,
it is quite possible that a taxonomy based on consciousness will not
yield significant generalisations. Indeed, it might be argued that
old-style mentalism failed to find them and there is no reason to
expect more today. Of course, this is not to say in advance that such
a science of conscious mind is doomed to failure. New-style mentalists
suggest that a taxonomy based on conscious, semi-conscious and unconscious
states of mind are more likely to provide a natural kind for a
psychological theory. Second and more important is the objection that
if the dualist were to find laws relating conscious mental states to
either behaviour or other conscious mental states that would not explain
anything. We would still need an explanatory theory. This objection
has been raised by Chomsky against dualism. He writes:
»... the proposals of the Cartesians were themselves
of no real substance; the phenomena in question are
not explained satisfactorily by attributing them to
an 'active principle' called 'mind*, the properties
of which are not developed in any coherent or
comprehensive way.' 66
Teleology
Not every dualist tries to defend claims about the uniqueness of
man by employing ontologioal arguments in favour of the existence of
mind or consciousness. More influential in recent times than the
traditional dualism is a view that man is special not in terms of the
stuff of which he is allegedly made but in terms of the laws by which
66 Chomsky, N. (1972) pl4
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his activities are to be understood. This position, what I call
methodological dualism, asserts that there is a fundamental divide over
methods between the physical and biological scienoes on the one hand,
and the behavioural and social sciences on the other.
This methodological dualism, which opposes in different ways
the approaches to psychology already examined, has been developed with
great sophistication and at length by Georg Henrlk von Wright^ and it
is his argument that I propose to examine in this section. His book,
Explanation and Understanding, derives its title from a distinction,
attributed to the nineteenth century German historian-philosopher
J.G. Droyson, between Erklaren and Verstehen. It was held that erklaren
('explanation1) is the method appropriate to the study of nature while
verstehen ('understanding') was deemed suitable to the study of man.
In his attempt to give philosophical muscle to this dichotomy
von Wright advances a complex, if schematic, argument which cuts deep
into the philosophy of action, the philosophy of history and problems
surrounding the nature of causality, natural necessity and determinism.
It may be foolhardy to attempt a brief summary of his position but since
it introduces issues which will be dealt with in later chapters and
is, itself, an interesting argument I will try.
Two traditions in the history of ideas, he says, can be identified
in terms of their different views on the criteria which a scientifio
explanation must meet if it is to be held worthy of respect. These
traditions, the 'galilean' and the 'aristotelian', have been at
loggerheads for centuries with the first asserting that only causal or
mechanistic explanations were satisfactory, the latter choosing to
defend a teleological or finalistio conception of explanations. Since
67 von Wright, G.H. (1971)
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the mid-nineteenth century the dispute between these traditions, says
von Wright, has been a central issue in the philosophy of science.
The galilean tradition has received its most refined presentation,
he says, at the hands of the neo-positivists of the Logical Empiricist
movement. Positivism has been, traditionally, an ardent supporter of
methodological monism and, in particular, of the view that all
scientific explanations must be causal in nature. Teleological
explanations, which are typically of the form *A occurred in order that
B would be achieved* are, on the positivist account, held to be
ultimately reducible to causal explanations in which, in this case,
necessary and sufficient conditions for A*s occurrence can be specified.
von Wright agrees that the galilean tradition soored a major victory
68
when Bosenbleuth, Wiener and Bigelow , in their classic paper of 1943 -
•Behaviour, Purpose and Teleology*- showed how teleological explanations
in biology could be eliminated in favour of causal accounts. However,
von Wright contests the claim, which galileans are prone to make, that
intentional (ariatotelian) explanations in the behavioural and social
sciences will also be eliminable in favour of causal explanations.
Before examining von Wright*s arguments in favour of methodological
dualism I wish to draw attention to a criticism of his identification
of methodological monism (or naturalism) with positivism. Such an
69
equation, says Giedymin , is both parochial and misleading. It is
parochial since it is, he says, inapplicable to all those philosophers
and scientists who have never expressed any systematic views on the
aims and methods of social science yet who accept characteristically
positivist positions. It is misleading, he says, since it does not
allow for the fact that many of the positivists* leading critics have
68 Eosenbleuth, A., Wiener, H,, and Bigelow, J. (1943)
69 Giedymin, J. (1975) p284
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themselves been methodological monists. For example, Popper has been
a life-long opponent of positivism, says Giedymin, yet he advocates a
methodological monism. Consequently, it is unhelpful to view the
galilean-cansalist position as positivist| not every methodological
monist is a positivistj nor is every positivist committed to
methodological monism.
Giedymin's criticism of von Wright is very similar to the
mental!sts* criticisms of Winch, which we have already discussed. In
both cases von Wright and Winch identify the methods of natural science
with a positivist interpretation of natural science and it is this
mistaken equation, so runs the criticism, whioh leads each to develop
his own alternative. Since both claim that the methods of natural
soience oblige the psychologist to describe human behaviour in terms
of movement they recommend, respectively and independently, that the
social scientist does Wittgensteinian philosophy or develops a distinct
methodology appropriate to -understanding human action. The mentalist
opposes both positions, as we have seen, by simply denying that natural
science must be positivistically interpreted and further denying that
behaviour must be described as movement.
Ton Wright does not say that it is impossible to advance a causal
account of behaviour. He merely argues that such an account will be
an explanation of movement, not action. And it is action, where that
is taken to be behaviour linked to intentionality, which is the proper
subject matter of the behavioural sciences. Social life, human
behaviour, even *private' actions are different in kind from movement
since they are thoroughly imbued with intentionality. Aetions-qua-
actions, he argues, are non-causal. Hence he seems to hold - though
it is not clear how he defends his adoption of - some version of the
Compatibility Thesis. This asserts that the same sequence of behaviour
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can be causally explained in terms of movement and non-cauaally,
teleologically explained in terns of actions. In other words, von
Wright seems to claim that scientists of all kinds do not explain events
but rather explain descriptions of events.
Nothing is to be gained in this debate, he suggests, by linguistio
legislation. In everyday life, oourt-rooms, psychiatric wards,
economic institutes and a myriad other situations people explain their
behaviour in terms of causes. *1 killed him because he hit me*, 'I
bought it because it was cheap* etc are perfectly legitimate ways of
talking provided, says von Wright, we do not think that this usage of
•cause* is the same as its usage and employment in the natural sciences.
He calls this usage *quasi-causal* to indioate that it is not really a
causal explanation at all; it is but a disguised form of teleologioal
explanation. By the same token quasi-teleological explanations, such
as those which explain the workings of a thermostat or biological
evolution in terms of end-results or goals, are really causal
70
explanations in disguise. Psychologists, then, are free to employ
causal language but they must realise, he says, that they are not
using causal concepts.
The argument that actions-qua-actions are not causally explicable
is developed in two stages. First, von Wright borrows the Aristotelian
notion of practical Inference (or syllogism) as resurrected by
71
Anscombe and then suggests that thiB notion can be employed as an
explanation model for actions. Second, in a crucial move for his
methodological dualist thesis, he defends a refined version of what has
beoome known as the Logical Connection Argument to prove that
explanations which meet the requirements of the practical inference model
are non-causal.
70 von Wright, G.H. (1971) p200
71 Ansoombe, G.E.M. (1957)
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One way of reconstructing the main idea in the practical
syllogism, he says, is the following!
'The starting point or major premise of the syllogism
mentions some wanted thing or end of aotionj the
minor premise relates some action to this thing,
roughly as a means to the end; the conclusion
finally consists in use of this means to secure
that end. Thus, as in a theoretical inference the
affirmation of the premises leads of necessity to
the affirmation of the conclusion, in a practical
inference assent to the premises entails action in
accordance with them.' 72
A practical syllogism, in its simplest form, has the following structure:
(Pi) A intends to bring about P.
A considers that he cannot bring about P
unless he does a.
Therefore A sets himself to do a.
This schema of practical inference is, von Wright says, that of a
teleological explanation "turned upside down". Normally the starting
point in a teleologioal explanation is the fact that someone has
performed an action or started to perform an action. If asked 'Why?',
the answer is simply 'In order to bring about P'. This explanation
assumes that the agent considers the behaviour causally relevant to the
bringing about of P and that the bringing about of P is what he is
aiming at or intending with his behaviour. In von Wright's opinion:
•Practical reasoning is of great importance to the
explanation and understanding of action. It is a
tenet of the present work that the practical
syllogism provides the sciences of man with something
long missing from their methodology: an explanation
model in its own right which is a definite alternative
to the subsumption-theoretio covering law model.
Broadly speaking what the subsumption-theoretic
model is to causal explanation and explanation in
the natural sciences, the practioal syllogism is to
72 von Wright, G.H. (l97l) p27
*teleological explanation and explanation in history
and the social sciences.• 73
Methodological monists, whether positivist or antipositivist,
argue in reply that actions can he causally explained. Hence, they
suggest that von Wright's practical syllogisms or inference schemes
can he recast in causal form. Indeed, we have seen that mentalists
attempt to do just this. Both the intention (major premise in Pi) and
the cognitive belief (minor premise) oan he so characterised, on that
view, so that they can he seen to play a causal role in the production
of behaviour.^
Before examining von Wright's version of the Logical Connection
Argument and his associated argument that actions cannot he causally
75
explained I want to draw attention to a oriticism made by Weinryb.1
It is, simply, that practical inferences are not inferences at all.
To infer, says Weinryb, is to find the logical consequences of a given
set of statements. It is misleading for von Wright, he says, to use
the term inference since he admits that it is possible for an agent to
have both an intention to do something and the required beliefs and
yet do nothing. To quote von Wright j
•... the premises of a practical inference do not
with logical necessity entail behaviour. They do
not entail the "existence" of a conclusion to
match them. The syllogism when leading up to
action is "praotical" and not a piece of logical
73 von Wright, G.H. (1971) p27. Von Wright's claim that the
aubsumption-theoretic oovering law model of causal explanation is
typical of the natural sciences is to be expected in the light of his
positivist orientation. For details of this model of explanation and
its development see Suppe, F. (1974)? positivism is further discussed
in Chapter Two, Part Two.
74 Fodor, we have seen (p30)» denied that action, taken to mean
conscious intentional behaviour as opposed to unoonscious, unintentional
behaviour, iB a psychological concept. I think that von v/right's
usage of action oan, however, be reoonoiled with mentalism. For,
according to von Wright, not all actions result from conscious
intentions? he also construes as action intentional behaviour which is
not, however, the result of conscious intention. p35
75 Weinryb, E. (1974) P531
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'demonstration. It is only when action is already
there and a practical argument is constructed to
explain or Justify it that we have a logically
conclusive argument. The necessity of the practical
inference schema is, one could say, a necessity
conceived ex post actu.1 76
With this von Wright not only contradicts his earlier claim that the
premises of a practical inference do entail action but offers a very
weak alternative methodology for the social sciences in comparison
with that which he takes to be appropriate for natural science.
In essence the Logical Connection Argument is this, (l) In a
Humean causal connection the cause and effect are necessarily logically
independent of one another. (2) An intention is never logically
independent of the action which it is meant to explain. (3) Therefore
an intention can never be the cause of an aotion. It is then, by
this argument, simply a conceptual blunder to 'explain' actions as
caused by intentions. Cartesian dualists and interactionists like
Whiteley make just such blunders, on this view, as do holders of the
mind-brain Identity Theory for the latter believe that mental states
such as intentions can be contingently identified with states or
processes in the body or the brain. (So this Logical Connection
Argument can also be employed against those mentalists who also
subscribe to the Identity Theory.)
Though von Wright thinks that those who advocate the Logical
77
Connection Argument are "substantially right"11 he does not think
the above presentation convincing. For, while he is prepared to defend
the first premise he thinks the second is not proven and thus
proceeds to develop an alternative formulation of it. In passing,
however, I wish to point out that von Wright's acceptance of the first
76 von Wright, G.H. (1971) pH7
77 « « P77
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premise, the Eumean demand for the logical independence of cause and
effect is neither justified ncr explained. And it certainly calls
for explanation in the light of the fact that an entire chapter of
his book is devoted to combatting the Eumean (positivist) conception
78
of causality. He does not explain how his opposition to the
positivist view of causation squares with his espousal of the
positivist requirement of logical independence. The above presentation
of the argument is unsatisfactory, says von Wright, because it does
not follow from the fact that acts of will, intentions and other
mental events can only be defined by making reference to their objects
(ie intended results of actions), that they could not, nevertheless,
be (Humean) causes of behaviour. 'The logical dependence of the
specific character of the will on the nature of its object is1, he says,
1 fully compatible with the logical independence of the occurrence of
79
an act of will of this character from the realization of its object.11
There may, in other words, be a contingent relation between intentions
and the occurrence of what fulfills them even though it is necessary
to characterise intentions through reference to their objects.
Yon Wright's novel attempt to bolster up the second premise of
the Logical Connection Argument is in terms of verification and his
reasoning is in the form of a kind of Catch-22. To verify the
conclusion of a practical syllogism it is, he says, neoessary to verify
78 The thrust of the second chapter of von Wright (1971) is
to show that the notion of cause is dependent on the concept of action.
'We cannot understand causation, nor the distinction between nomic
connections and accidental uniformities of nature, without resorting to
ideas about doing things and intentionally interfering with the course
of nature.' p65. 'We can be as certain of the truth of causal laws as
we can be of our abilities to do and bring about things.' p73. For
criticism arguing that the notion of action is dependent upon the notion
of cause see Kim, J. (1972) and Brittan, G.G. (1972).
79 von Wright, G.H. (1971) p94
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the major premise, ie a description of the agent's intentions? to
verify the major premise, however, it is necessary to verify the
conclusion, ie a description of the agent's actions. It is impossible
to verify either the conclusion or the premises of a praotical
inference independently of each other and consequently, he concludes,
the facts which one tries to establish are not logically independent
of one another. Hence, an intention cannot be a (Humean) cause of
behaviour. 'In this mutual dependence of the verification of premises
and the verification of conclusions in practical syllogisms consists,'
80
he says, 'the truth of the Logical Connection Argument.'
The first part of von Wright's argument runs like this: if an
agent performs an action it is not possible for an observer to say with
certainty that the actor did, in fact, perform the action; the agent
might well be unaware that his behavioural movements are taken to
signify action or he might even have taken himself to perform some
other action. Says von Wright:
'We must also establish that what took place
was intentional on A's part, and not something
that he brought about only accidentally, by
mistake, or even against his will. We must show
that A's behaviour, the movement which we see his
body go through, is intentional under the description
"doing a".' 81
In case A fails to perform a, he says, we need, a fortiori, to verify
the fact that A had the intention to perform a. In sum, whether A
performs or fails to perform a., 'we shall also have to establish the
intentional character of the behaviour or of the accomplishment, that
it is "aiming" at a certain achievement, independently of whether it
82
accomplishes it or not.' To verify the conclusion of a practical
80 von Wright, G.H. (1971) pll6
81 " " " " pl08
82 " " " " pl09
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syllogism, therefore, it is necessary, he argues, to verify the major
premise.
Next, von Wright turns to the claim that the verification of the
premises in a practical syllogism depends on the verification of the
conclusion. There is, first, a discussion of the alleged impossibility
of gaining direct access to another person1s inner states or intentions.
This is followed by an argument to the effect that I do not even have
accesB to my own intentions - independently of my behaviour. But, as
QZ
Weinryb has pointed out, von Wright provides no support for his above
claim and merely asserts that he has established that verifying the
descriptions of other people*s intentions depends on verifying the
descriptions of the actual actions which are explained by these
intentions. Thus, in conclusion, von Wright has not substantiated his
version of the Logical Connection Argument and so, says Weinryb, he
has not justified his thesis that intentions cannot be offered as
causal explanations of actions.
Even if von Wright had provided arguments to support the second
leg of his thesis he would still not have made a convincing case for
the Logical Connection Argument. For, says Weinryb, in his espousal
of the first part of Ms version of the Logical Connection Argument
von Wright blurs an important distinction wMch he has himself made
in other parts of Ms book, the distinction between • intentional acting*
and 'having an intention to do a certain thing*. Von Wright had
warned:
•One must distinguish between intentional acting
and intention to do a certain thing. Everything
wMch we intend to do and also actually do we do
intentionally. But it cannot be said that we
intend to do everything we do intentionally.• "4
If we accept tMs distinction it is possible, ways Weinryb, to
83 Weinryb, E. (1974) P355
84 von Wright, G.H. (1971) p89
distinguish between the criteria for considering an action as
intentional and the criteria for deteoting an intention in the agent.
Against von Wright he writes:
•If this distinction is kept, then the term
•Intentionality', so often used by him, becomes
ambiguous. Anyway von Wright*s argument from the
fact that the conclusion of a practical inference
must describe an intentional action to the assertion
that, therefore, its verification depends on
ascertaining the presence in the agent of a specific
intention is, even on his own assumptions, a non
sequitur.' 85
Veinryb correctly concludes that von Wright, having ultimately failed
to provide a coherent defence of his thesis of interdependence of
verifiability of premisses and conclusion in a practical inference,
has not shown the Logical Connection Argument to be 'substantially
right'. Consequently, he has not made out a convincing case for
methodological dualism nor eliminated the possibility of a causal
explanation of intentional behaviour.
More influential among psychologists than von Wright's view have
been those of the philosopher Charles Taylor who attempted to
rehabilitate teleological-purposive explanations as scientifically
respectable in psychology. 'The "Galilean spirit",' he wrote in his
book, The Explanation of Behaviour, 'has been abroad in psychology
for quite some time, and, if it hasn't produced anything very solid in
experimental psychology this may be because current approaches are
,86wrong.'
The key to Taylor's argument lies in the word 'may' for, unlike
von Wright, he does not think it a priori impossible that action or
intentional beliaviour will be eventually explained in mechanistic-causal
terms. In reply to criticism he has made his position clears
85 Weinryb, E. (1971) P356
86 Taylor, C. (1964) p272
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'I don't believe that there is any argument in
principle which can show that mechanistic
explanation is impossible, that in other words
such an explanation is 'inconceivable' ...
there is no necessary incompatibility between
our describing and explaining behaviour by purpose
in ordinary life or in the context of scientific
theories of teleological-intentional type (like,
for example, psychoanalysis) on one hand, and our
being able to give a mechanistic neurophysiologies!
account of them on the other ... I believe that
such a mechanistio explanation would be related
to our ordinary purposive ones on the model of ...
•deeper level* explanations.' 87
Taylor's espousal of methodological dualism is, therefore, much less
radical than von Wright's and may be viewed as little more than a short-
term research strategy. He advocates peaceful co-existence between
both mechanist and purposive explanations provided 'that they are related
88
as more and less basic explanations.* Psychologists are recommended
to try to establish teleologioal and intentional laws in the first
instanae and this would help, he says, in the further search for a
global mechanist theory. Methodological dualism may, then, on this
view, eventually lead to a methodological monism.
Ifnmfl.nj.affl
All of the arguments and counter-arguments reviewed so far
reflect the debate about the status of psychology as it has been
conducted within professional academic psychology and philosophy. I
cannot pretend that the positions considered exhaust either what is
important or interesting in the relevant literature but I do claim that
they are representative of the range of conflicting views within and
about psychology. However, there is another strain in contemporary
thinking on these matters, whioh we might loosely call 'humanist*, that
87 Taylor, C. (1970) pQ9
88 « " " p94
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often finds its meet forceful expression outside acadenia. Humanists
try, in diverse ways, to defend and develop an image of man as an
autonomous, conscious, creative moral agent - an image which is
threatened, they claim, hy the march of scientific knowledge. These
modem humanists, therefore, unlike their forebears, aim their fire not
so much at organised religion as at organised science. Psychology,
in particular, when viewed as the application of the scientific method
to the study of man, is singled out as a pernicious enemy of the
humanist vision.
Pre-eminent among such humanist works is Arthur Koestler's fierce
89
polemic against behaviourism, The Ghost in the ISaohine. He attempts
in what seems, at times, almost a moral crusade to reassert man's
freedom and dignity against the 'pseudo-science* of ratomorphic
90
psychology. Unlike other humanists Koestler's strategy is to advocate
a better scientific theory and produce evidential support for it which
simultaneously vindicates our own assessments of human nature. Alas,
as Gellner^3" has pointed out, any scientific explanation must be
unacceptable to a humanist for such an explanation will be both
de-humanising and morally offensive. This fact, he suggests, is
recognised by many other humanists who oppose scientific psychology -
for example, by both Ryle and Wittgenstein. Instead of offering better
scientific explanations than do the behaviourists they deny that any
explanations are called for at all. Hence, in a much quoted passage,
Pyle wrote:
'Let the psychologist tell us why we are deceived;
but we can tell ourselves and him why we are not
deceived. The ... diagnosis of our mental impotences
requires special research methods. The explanation
89 Koestler, A. (1971)
90 " " M p33
91 Gellner, E. (1974) Pl06
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•of the exhibition of our mental competences often
requires nothing but ordinary good sense.* 92
But, Gellner replies, not only do mental competences oall for
scientific explanation but such explanations have already been
advanced by Chomsky and others. And the salient feature of such
explanations, he says, is that they postulate impersonal structures,
theoretical mechanisms whose operations cut through commonsense and
destroy the very notions in terms of which we conceive our own identity.
93
•Cognition and identity,* he says, *are incompatible.* As we shall
see, however, thiB is not a consequence of the mentalist position that
Chomsky would be prepared to accept. He holds out a theory of human
nature whioh, while scientifically respectable, allegedly conforms to
the traditionalist, rationalist conception of man as a free, creative
agent. Accordingly he would, I suspect, he more in sympathy with
Eoestler than Gellner. But these are issues to which I will return.
92
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Chapter Two
Psychology and the Philosophy of Science
Part One: The Kuhnian Proposal
Scientific psychology, then, is a priori a contradiction in
terms, a special kind of science with its own unique brand of
teleological non-causal explanation, a dismal and expensive failure,
a well-founded and fast developing science of behaviour, a demeaning
and dehumanising pseudoscience or, finally, it is, at last, becoming
an experimental mechanism which is both empirically disciplined and
capable of revealing the complexity and richness of the mental
mechanisms which cause behaviour. Paced with such diversity of
argument over the most fundamental issues relating to contemporary
psychology the problem is how we are to decide which, if any, of these
conflicting standpoints is correct or, at least, preferable. If we
are to be able to defend a decision to adopt one or other of these
views we will, clearly, be obliged to point to tenable criteria against
which the competitors are adjudged. Different criteria will motivate
different decisions.
These criteria are often provided by general philosophical
perspectives or by what has come to be called •philosophy of science*.
Some people oppose all attempts to construct a scientific psychology,
we have seen, on the grounds of the alleged inability of scientific
method to get to grips with mental phenomena or human action. Implicit
in such arguments which derive from a more comprehensive philosophy
is a •philosophy of eoience' which denies that mind, action, intention
and other specified concepts belong to the same sphere of discourse
or *form of life* as natural science. Alternatively, we have seen
that some assert that behaviour alone, publicly observable and hence,
so runs the argument, objectively describable in contrast to private,
subjective mental experience, can form part of the scientific
enterprise. In this case the philosophy of science is usually
explicitly stated, namely one or other version of logical empiricism.
Indeed, according to Skinner"1"i
'Behaviourism, with the accent on the last syllable,
is not the scientific study of behaviour but a
philosophy of science concerned with the subject
matter and methods of psychology.'
A good part of this chapter will be concerned with showing that
different philosophies of science provide the basis for different
judgements about psychology. Accordingly we need to debate the merits
of current philosophies of science.
Historically, psychology has been enormously influenced by
developments within philosophy of science, especially in this century.
As they struggled to construct a viable science psychologists were
continually looking over their shoulders in search of those pearls of
wisdom, the presumed canons of scientific method formalised and
advertised by their contemporary colleagues in the tradition which was
to become philosophy of science. That this is something of an
oversimplification we shall see later in this chapter where
behaviourism's intimate involvement in the career of logical empiricism
provides a case study of the influence a philosophy of science can
have on a psychological movement. Such a case study will have the
added benefits of providing background information necessary for an
understanding of the sources of the ferment in current philosophy of
science and it will also introduce, in the context in which they were
formulated, the ideas of Karl Popper whose work is the topic of the
next chapter.
1 Skinner, B.F. (1964) P79
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Contemporary discussions about psychology1 s proper course of
development can be illuminated, I will argue, by such a case study.
It can throw light, for example, on a recent proposal which suggests
that psychology can best be understood if viewed through the
per^/ctive on scientific theorising provided by the historian and
sociologist of science Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn's widely influential
philosophy of science played a very significant role in logical
2
empiricism's decline. In line with Kuhn's account Palermo claims
that 'experimental psychology has had two paradigms already, with the
appropriate scientific revolution between them', and that the
discipline may very well be enjoying yet another revolution at present,
with a switch away from an anomaly-ridden behaviourism to a new paradigm
of cognitive psychology or psycholinguists based on the pioneering
work of the linguist-psychologist IToam Chomsky. Palermo has less to
say about the effect such a reconstruction would have on the practice
of psychology if it were seriously considered - but more of that later.
Let us, therefore, examine the issues involved in the debate Palermo
has started before we turn to the case study to see what lessons it
holds out for the student of psychology and its relation to current
philosophy of science.
Psychology's first Kuhnian paradigm, says Palermo, emerged during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and was centred on
the work of Wundt and his followers in Germany. This paradigm, he
says, was characterised by its subject matter and its method. In
Kuhnian language, within Wundtian 'normal science' the task of the
psychology student was to study Immediate experience (subject matter)
by the (method) of pure introspection. Wundt's paradigm, according to
2 Palermo, D.S. (1971) p!38
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Palermo, was self-oonsoiously contrasted with the paradigms of the
natural soienoes which studied wlxat was termed mediate experience by
the method of inspection. During the reign of the alleged Vundtian
paradigm the 'act psychology* of the day agreed with the use of the
introspeotive method but opposed, lie says, the aim of analysing
immediate experience into its constituent elements. Nevertheless,
Wundt dominated psychology, says Palermo, until Watson's famous
'revolutionary statement' launched behaviourism as 'the new paradigm
for experimental psychology - at least, for American experimental
3
psychology.*
If behaviourism was psychology's second paradigm, as Palermo
claims, then he is, on his own admission, obliged to find the source
of pre-revolutionary crisis because 'as Kuhn has noted, revolution can
only succeed in the presence of a crisis.*^ Consequently Palermo
offers three reasons why Wundt• s paradiga ran into crisis. The first,
he says, is the unreliability of the introspective method.
'Bach laboratory found, in the introspeotive reports
of its own subjects, the kind of data which the
scientist in the laboratory was looking for to support
his theoretical conception of the contents of
consciousness. This, of course, is not out of line
with the typical efforts of normal science, but
the fact that experiments in one laboratory could „
not be replicated in others made the prooedure suspect.'5
The second reason for the crisis was the gradual realisation by
animal psychologists that *lt seemed unnecessary to bring in
consciousness to describe or account for (their) results.'0 Given
that Wundt' s paradign centred on immediate experienoe the animal
psychologists felt obliged to anthropomoiphise and thus postulate
3 Palermo, D.S. (1971) pl40
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animal experiences on analogy with their own} by embracing behaviourism
they were immediately freed from what they came to see as unnecessary
complications. Third, the Wundtian paradigm ran into crisis, he says,
because it was incapable of making any contribution to education or
mental health - primary concerns of many American psychologists in
the pragmatic tradition. Punctionalism failed to conquer Wundtian
psychology because it •had no strong evangelical spokesman to make
7
its case*' for a discipline that would have greater influence on
practical affairs. Thanks largely to Watson*s oharisma behaviourism
triumphed over Wundtian structuralism and such would-be-paradigms as
Gestalt theory which lacked a propagandist of WatBon* s talent - or
such, at least, is Palermo's reading of the birth of behaviourism.
When the majority of practitioners within the discipline lined
up behind Watson, Palermo continues, the behaviourist revolution was,
ipso facto, triumphant. And despite initial opposition - *true to
8
Kuhn*s analysis of the other sciences* , he says, such is only to be
expected - behaviourist normal scienoe was soon in full swing.
'The research efforts of Tolman, Guthrie, Bill and
their followers marked the period of normal science
within the behaviourist paradigm. Data were collaoted
at fever pitch. Different theoretical points of view
led to controversy, but all played the game of
psychology by essentially the same ground rules:
all accepted the behaviourist paradigm and thought
little of questioning the paradigm.* 9
In time, of course, the expected Kuhnian anomalies soon started to
appear and as the paradigm-defined puzzles failed to yield to
paradigmatic solutions so disenchantment grew and is still growing. In
fact, says Palermo, all of the historical and social elements central
to a Kuhnian revolution are now visible in psychology. 'There seems
7 Palermo, D.S. (1971) pl43
8 W M tt II
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little doubt1, he concludes, 'that experimental psychology is ripe
for a revolution - if it is not, in fact, currently in the midst of
,10one,1
Sharp and effective criticism of Palermo's account was rapidly
11 12
and independently advanced by Warren and Brlskman . Parochialism
coupled with distorted vision, says Warren, is the source of Palermo's
misapplication of Kuhn. Parochialism leads Palermo to ignore large
areas of psychology and perceive in behaviourism a paradigm which
triumphed over Wundtian mentalism. Before Watson published his
revolutionary manifesto, says Warren, psychology was a diverse
enterprise constituted by many unrelated fields of study. These
included, he says, in the years from the turn of the oentury to the
First World War, Gestalt psychology in Germany, Freud's psychoanalysis
emerging in Austria, the discovery of the conditioned reflex in
Russia, Binet's invention of psychological tests in Franoe and the
first appearance of social psychology textbooks in the United States.
It is true, says Warren, that behaviourism became the dominant movement
in America but it did not triumph over a single, unitary Wundtian
paradigm.
'There has never been a unitary discipline of
psychology with one major paradigm at a time. At
any one time there has been a fair number of
paradigms, each of which commanded the allegiance
of many psychologists. It is only by parochial
limitation to the American scene that Palermo can
perceive paradigmatic science.' 13
Warren further argues that even when behaviourism became the dominant
movement in American psychology it did not eliminate competitors or
totally supplant its predecessors. Gestaltism, ethology, psychometrics,
and 'almost every other European development was given a lease of life
10 Palermo, D.S. (1971) pl55
11 Warren, N. (1971)
12 Briskmn, L.3. (1972)
13 Warren, N. (1971) P410
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in the ?Tew World*he nays, during the supposed heyday of "behaviourist
normal science. Palermo*s distorted vision, he suggests, leads him
to ignore these features of the discipline as well. Since a Kuhnian
paradigm is supposed to he all-pervasive within a discipline, especially
during the normal science period, Warren concludes that behaviourism
does not meet the appropriate Kuhnian criteria. ITor does it, he says,
square with Kuhn*s formulation in another important respect. A new
pnradign's success lies, in part, in its ability to provide solutions
for those problems which proved intractable- to the old paradigm* s
methods and techniques. Behaviourism, soys Warren, solved no problems
which supposedly embarrassed its predecessors. Vatson merely excluded
mind, he says, and with it the associated introspective method by fiat;
there was no scientific growth in the implementation of behaviourism.
So behaviourism, he concludes, was not a paradigm
Warren*s criticisms do not, however, extend to the Kuhnian theory
of science itself. He merely opposes the extension of Kuhn arguing,
instead, that psychology is in a pre-paradigaatic state. The desired
15
first paradign, which would signal the *onset of maturity* , has yet
to emerge. Palermo * s analysis leaves him dismayed because he had
thou^rt psychology was at last becoming 'more of a unitary
international science - more the kind of enterprise on which Kuhn's
«■ /
theory could genuinely be brought to bear.* ^ Instead it looks as if
they are as divided as ever. But he is insistent that the establishment
of a Kuhnian paradigm would be an advance. He writes;
•It is desirable ... that psychologists be an
esoteric, closed community which advances its
14 Warren, N. (1971) P410
15 " " M p413
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*30181100 within a common paradigm - with, of
course, the inevitable revolutions arising out
of normal science.' VI
Like Warren, Briskman's strategy is to unveil a number of historical
claims, some in conflict with Palermo's, which do not square with the
m-ii-Hna.1 requirements of any Kuhnian analysis. Thus he challenged the
identification of what he calls Wundtian introspectionism with a
Kuhnian paradigm. Wundtian structuralism, as it is more usually called,
was characterised by Palermo merely by its subject matter and
18
methodology. This is insufficient, Briskman pointed out, to
constitute a paradigm in Kuhn's sense - though what would be sufficient
was admitted to be problematic. We have seen Palermo admit that Wundt
was opposed by 'act psychology' over the proper subject matter for
study. Such disagreement, says Briskman, is not compatible with the
Kuhnian requirement of unanimity within a discipline on fundamental
issues like what the discipline is about. Thus he writes:
•Basically one cannot help but feel that as employed
in such oases the notion of a 'paradigm' serves
more to conceal than to reveal; that it serves as
an excuse for not having to analyse the historical
situation in all its rich complexity.' V)
Similarly, Briskman argues that the three reasons offered by
Palermo in his attempt to explain the 'crisis* within the alleged
l/undtian paradigm do not square with Kuhn's account of crisis in science.
For Kuhn a crisis results from the failure of normal science, which is
carried on within a paradigm, to solve the puzzles which the paradiga
defines. For Palermo, by contrast, the 'crisis* resulted from three
factors which, Briskman suggests, could only sound irrelevant to any
member of the supposed Wundtian paradigm. Take Palermo's first reason
17 Warren, N. (1971) P413
18 Briskman, L.B. (1972) p88
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for the •crisis* - the unreliability of the introspective method.
Since the Wundtian *paradigm* was supposed, by Palermo, to be defined
in contrast to the paradigms of the natural sciences Briskraan rightly
stresses that anyone working within a Wundtian paradigm, had there been
one, would ignore standards of experimental reliability imported from
another paradigm - in this case, a paradigm in the natural sciences.
He would ignore, downgrade in significance or merely learn to live with
the fact - if it is a fact - that experiments conducted with the
method of pure introspection could not be replicated from one
laboratory to another. It would certainly not lead him to abandon
Wundtian psychology. It could similarly be easily shown, Briskraan
adds, that the other two reasons offered by Palermo to account for the
Wundtian crisis are also inadequate. The concerns of animal
psychologists and American prafpatists could not provoke a *cr!sis*
within Wundtian psychology.
In denying paradigm-status to behaviourism Briakman's argument is
complementary to Warren* s. Whereas Warren had drawn attention to the
variety of psychological movements thriving inside America and outside
both before and during behaviourism* s career Briakman detailed the
disagreements within the behaviourist movement itself. Palermo's
assertion that 'the research efforts of Tolman, Guthrie, Hull and their
students marked the period of normal science within the behaviourist
20
paradigm* he described as 'sheer nonsense and an extremely good
indication that Palermo has fallen so in love with Euhnian ideas that
21
he has lost touch with the reality of his subject.* Normal scienoe,
as characterised by Kuhn, only begins when debate over fundamentals
comes to an end, Briskman correctly pointed out. Behaviourism, however,
20 Palermo, U.S. (1971) pl44
21 Briskman, L.B. (1972) p91
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was characterised by persistent disputes over such fundamental issues
as what the organism actually learns, the mechanism by which he learns
and especially over the role of reinforcement in learning. He
concludesi
♦These are not simply minor disagreements? rather
they concern fundamental issues for the
conceptualisation of learning processes. In other
words there really has never been anything like
behaviourist normal science, at least not if the
work of Tolman, Guthrie and Bull are meant to
mark it.* 22
In his paper Briskman restricts his comments, by and large, to Palermo*s
application of Kuhn's theory to psychology rather than mounting a
direct assault on that theory itself. Be does point out, however, that
2^5
Kuhn'a analysis displays a * fundamental weakness* in failing to
2A
recognise, as noted by Feyerabend % that a 'crisis* in any paradigm
may result only as a consequence of the emergence of a competing paradigm
or theory, consciously developed In advance of any breakdown in the
old paradigm. Briskman ends his paper by sketching a reconstruction
of behaviourism in terms of the mothodological-cum-nataphysical
research programmes, familiar to students of Lakatos*s philosophy of
science, which I shall examine in Chapter Four.
Both Warren and Briskman, then, base their objections to Palermo
on what they take to be a serious discrepancy between the facts of
history and the criteria which they take Kuhn to specify for the
existence of normal science, paradigms, crises and so on. To be
effective any reply to these criticisms is obliged either to show that
the historical claims are false or that Kuhn*s analysis is different
from Kuhn as understood by these two writers or both. If Kuhn*a theory
is still to be applied to psychology then some indication should be
provided that satisfactory answers to the objections raised to Kuhn's
22 Briskman, L.B. (1972) p92
23 n n it p89
24 Feyerabend, P. (19^5)
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account are forthcoming. In a lengthy article which attempts to counter
2«j
the criticisms reviewed here Weimer and Palermo assert that "both
Warren*3 and Briskman's arguments are, from Euhn*s point of view,
based on misconceptions. Ead they understood Kuhn correctly, they
imply, these critics would not have objected as they did. Despite
Kuhn*s popularity, they warn, *there is evidence of considerable
misunderstanding*^0 - a claim which they themselves then proceed to
exemplify, as we shall see. It will be necessary to discuss Kuhn's
theory itself, to identify his distinctive doctrines, to review the
counterarguments to those doctrines and to measure their weight in
order to judge whether Weimer and Palermo are embarrassed by either
Warren or Brisknan or both. But first let us examine the reply Weimer
and Palermo have made to their opponents.
We can best appreciate their line of attack by focusing on the
way they deal with Warren*s objection that psychology is, aooording
to Kuhn, a pro-paradigmatic science. Warren notes that it was the
difference which Kuhn perceived between the physical and social
sciences that led him to introduce the notion of paradigm in the
first place. Warren even quotes Kuhn*s remarks on this in the preface
to the latter*s 19&2 essays
'The practice of astronomy, physics, chemistry or
biology normally fails to evoke the controversies
over fundamentals that today often seem endemio
among, say, psychologists or sociologists. Attempting
to discover the source of that difference led me to
recognise the role in scientific research of what I
have since called "paradigms".* ^7
Warren argued, in brief, that sinoe psychology was pre-paradigmatic it
obviously could never have had a parkign. To this Weimer and Palermo
/V
reply, quite simply, that this *is not now compatible with Kuhn*s
25 Weimer, W.B. and Palermo, D.S. (1973)
26 " " " " " " p211
27 Warren, N. (1971) P4Q8
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position.* Hence if Warren wishes to claim that psychology has
never had a paradigm, they reply, it will not suffioe merely to quote
Kuhn "but rather require that he show how psychology*s various movements
fail to meet the Kuhnian criteria for paradigms. It is clear from
this that Weimer and Palermo are not supporting the extension of Kuhn'a
initial theory to psychology, as carried out by Palermo, but are
defending the application of the more cautious, modified Kuhnian theory
as developed by 19&9*
A similar strategy is employed in dealing with the criticisms
that neither structuralism nor behaviourism held unanimous support
within psychology and consequently the discipline of psychology never
had an all-pervasive paradigm. It will be remembered that Palermo had
provoked these criticisms with the olaim that 'experimental psychology
has had two paradigms already, with the appropriate scientific
29
revolution between them.1 Such a claim, it is now admitted» is
simply a misreading of Kuhn for paradigms do not characterise entire
disciplines at any specific moment. Instead Weimer and Palermo
emphasise that, according to Kuhn, there may be several competing
paradigms within a discipline at any one moment, each of them involved
in normal science activity. Hence, it is no argument against the
claim that behaviourism and structuralism were paradigms to point to
contemporaneous psychologists opposed to each of these respective
movements. And with the recognition that paradigms are not all-
pervasive the obstacles to a Kuhnian analysis are removed. They writei
'A genuine problem that faces a 'paradigm' analysis
in any discipline is that of isolating the relevant
research oommunity, as the sociological unit of
analysis; paradigms are the possession of. and the
governors of. a group of practitioners - not a
discipline. With this realisation, the charge of
28 Weimer, V.B. and Palermo, D.S. (1973) p215
29 Palermo, D.S. (1971) p!38
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parochialism vanishes, and the real problem of
isolating relevant research communities emerges.*''
Given this emphasis on permitted diversity within a discipline and
combined with the greatly liberalised notion or, perhaps more
accurately, more explicit characterisation of the already liberal
notion of a paradigm, discussed below, it is a wonder that the authors
still wish to claim that psychology has had only two paradigms to
date or, possibly, three. Piagetians, Gibsonians, Freudians,
Skinnerians - to name but a few - all form groups with their own
distinctive set of commitments which, with a little ingenuity, could
easily be presented as plausible paradigms. Before looking at Weimer*s
31
and Palermo*s other arguments it is only fair to note that Warren
has rightly rejected their argument based on a revised version of
Kuhnian theory. Palermo's case, says Warren, was based on Kuhn*s
initial theory and the fact that Kuhn has changed his views does not
correct Palermo*s mistakes. On that original theory psychology could
not be said to have a paradigm.
To the objection that behaviourism was not a paradigm because it
was racked by disputes over fundamentals Weimer and Palermo reply here,
too, that this is another misconception. Within any single paradigm
during a period of normal science, they say, *there is plenty of room
for controversy, including in certain cases, "debate over fundamentals".
Such controversy, however, is merely over theoretical issues within
the paradigm and 'what is "fundamental to the paradigm" is not
33
questioned during normal research.*y More specifically, the furious
debates between Tolman, Guthrie, Hull and their followers, they now
claim, were merely theoretical disputes but did not call the
behaviourist paradigm into question.
30 Weimer, W.B. and Palermo, D.S. (1975) p2l6
31 Warren, N. (1974)
32 Weimer, W.B. and Palermo, D.S. (1975) p217
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To the objection that behaviourism was not a paradigm because it
solved none of the problems that troubled its predecessor, merely-
banishing them by fiat, Veimer and Palermo provide no reply at all.
So let us finally consider what they have to say to their critics on
the role of 'crisis* in Kuhnian theory.
Palermo offered three reasons for the crisis in Vundtian
structuralism prior to the behaviourist revolution asserting that there
was indeed a crisis because 'revolution can only succeed in the
34
presence of a crisis.* While Briskman replied that these three
reasons could not be fitted into Kuhn's analysis he did agree, quoting
Feyerabend in criticism of Kuhn, that for Kuhn alternative theories
(hence, revolutions) emerge or triumph only after the previous paradigm
has run into crisis. Again, Veimer and Palermo reply that this is
another misconception stating:
'Kuhn has not insisted that crises were indispensable
precursors to revolutions.' 55
As this is offered as a correction of Palermo and his critics and is
also advanced as a restatement of one of the constant claims of Kuhn's
argument it shows, ironically, that Veimer and Palermo have missed
one of the central doctrines of the entire theory. Kuhn clearly
states that in the absence of crisis a new paradigm-candidate will not
initiate a revolution.
In sum, however, the general strategy of Weimer's and Palermo's
reply is that their critics have both misunderstood Kuhn's original
theory and have ignored subsequent clarifications and modificati.ons of
his views. Thus, they say, the critics dismiss a legitimate and
potentially useful reconstruction of the history of modern psychology.
34 Palermo, D.S. (1971) pl40
35 Veimer, W.B. and Palermo, D.S. (1973) p237 (footnote a)
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Immediately the question arises whether these authors or their
critics are correct and has one or other side in the dispute misread
Kuhn. The fact that the disagreements result from different
interpretations of Kuhn is not very surprising for the theory is
ambiguous, necessarily elusive, in part self-contradictory and
admittedly incomplete. Nevertheless, Weimer and Palermo do misread
Kuhn as well.
Thomas S. Kuhn's Theory of Science
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions^ Kuhn, a physicist by
training and a historian of science by profession, launched a vigorous
attack on the then dominant, traditional conception of scientific
method as developed over thirty years by the logical empiricists and
stemming from the work of the Vienna Circle. Since the rise and fall
of that movement will be documented, in some detail, in the case study
it will suffice here to say that Kuhn was challenging the view of
science as a cumulative, progressive, knowledge-building enterprise
whose theories could be given precise and exhaustive logical
formulations and grounded on solid empirical foundations by equally
precise and complete rules of interpretation. Logical empiricists were
concerned with the ideal, finished product of scientific thinking
rather than the theory in its half-articulated form or, indeed, in any
other stage of development. History of science, accordingly, was
deemed on this view as irrelevant to philosophy of science for how a
theory was generated and nurtured to its adult expression, while of
possible intrinsic interest, could throw no light on its epistemological
status. Such was one effect of the influential distinction, introduced
36 Kuhn, T.S. (1962)
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"by Reichenbach , between 'the context of discovery' and 'the context
of justification*.
This distinction and associated positivist dichotomies, such as
the theoretical-observational divide, were brushed aside by Kuhn as
38
'extraordinarily problematic* when applied to the facts of history.
'Rather than being elementary logical or methodological
distinctions, which would thus be prior to the
analysis of scientific knowledge, they now seem
integral parts of a traditional set of substantive
answers to the very questions upon which they have
been deployed.' 39
History of science was not merely relevant to philosophy of soienoe, be
argued, but oould, if taken seriously, result in a decisive
transformation in the popular, accepted picture of soienoe. It oould
lead us to replace the propaganda which presented science as a linear,
4
ever-growing body of established knowledge with a cyclic account of
considerable complexity wherein consensus fragments, chaos takes over
and peace returns only after periodic and inevitable revolutions in
the most basic concepts of each and every science. In taking this
view, Kuhn was firmly embedded in a tradition which, originating with
Duhem, had reinstated the old, abandoned theories of former generations
as much less than error, prejudice, superstition and ignorance if not
equally meritorious as their successors.
The Cambridge historian, Herbert Butterfield, partially
anticipated Kuhn's theory back in 1949 when he opposed the idea that
science was an awe-inspiring serieB of suocess-stories, ingenious
discoveries and careful fact-gathering. Looked at from a historical
perspective, he said, science exhibits an uneven and fitful course of
development with sudden leaps of insight following long periods of
37 Reichenbach, H. (1938)
38 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) p9
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stagnation thanks to the scientist donning, as it were, 'a different
kind of thinking cap* with which he handles *the same bundle of data
as before, but placing them in a new system of relations with one
another by giving them a different framework. *^
This *thinking cap* idea is, in Kuhn's theory, inoluded in the
much more elaborate oancept of 'paradigm*, a term which has perhaps
received oloser scrutiny than any other in modem philosophy of
science. This is understandable for the 'paradigm* is central to
Kuhn*s theory and the theory itself has been turned into something of
a cult with a ritual search for paradigms, crises, revolutions and
other Kuhnian phenomena in such varied disciplines as economics,
bibliography, anthropology and linguistics. Kuhn's use of paradigm is
a reflection of his sociologioal-cum-historical approach to soience.
Philosophers of science traditionally offer what are called •rational
reconstructions* of scientific theories which are not meant to
coincide with what the actual scientists, in the laboratory as it were,
took themselves to be doing. These reconstructions spell out exactly
which propositions are involved in each theory, how they relate to
each other, to evidence marshalled in what are called 'basic
statements* or some such, and so the philosophers attempt to explain
the content of each theory. Kuhn, in contrast, uses the idea of a
paradigm to convey what he takes to be an important omission from the
traditional account, namely that there are global and fundamental
presuppositions of a highly intricate nature whioh unite the scientists
working within a tradition.
Nowhere in his essay does Kuhn define a paradigm for the very
good reason that it is part of his thesis that a paradigm cannot be
40 Butterfield, H. (1949) pi
expressed in words. He does, however, offer many partial characterisations
of a paradigm to get his message across. Paradigms are initially
introduced as •universally recognised scientific achievements that
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of
practitioners.If we look at science, says Kuhn, we are struck by
the fact that for long periods scientists are amazingly united in what
they take to be important problems, how those problems ought to be
tackled and what a solution to those problems would look like. Kuhn
introduces the notion of a paradigm to emphasise this unity on
AO
fundamentals, this unquestioning commitment to •global* presuppositions.
What happens, he says, is that some particular scientific achievement
is:
•... sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring
group of adherents away from competing modes of
scientific activity. Simultaneously, it (is)
sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems
for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve.
Achievements that share these two characteristics
I shall henceforth refer to as •paradigms*, a term
that relates olosely to •normal science'. By
choosing it, I mean to surest that some accepted
examples of actual scientific practice - examples
which include law, theory, application and
instrumentation together - provide models from whioh
spring particular ooherent traditions of scientific
research.' 45
normal soienoe springs, he says, from commitment to a paradigm; once
committed the scientist is provided with a pair of blinkers which
simultaneously focuses attention on specific, relatively esoteric
puzzles for detailed investigation and blinds the scientist to problems
which are not defined by the paradigm. Kuhn refers to paradigm
•puzzles* because, by analogy with jig-saw puzzles, the scientist is
convinced that there is indeed a solution if only he is sufficiently
41 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) plO
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ingenious or lucky to hit upon it. Failure to find the solution
reflects direotly on the researcher in contrast to any potential
problem solver; failure to solve a problem, says Kuhn, is not likely
to reflect badly on a student if there is no guaranteed solution to
the problem. The initial promise of the paradigm is tested during
normal science, the activity in which most scientists are professionally
engaged most of the time. Normal science is, he says, constituted by
•mopping-up operations'^ which extend 'the knowledge of those facts
that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing
the extent of the match between these facts and the paradigm's
45
predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself.'^'
Normal science is 'an attempt to force nature into the preformed and
relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies.
But there is more to paradigms than this. It is true, says Kuhn,
that members of the same paradigm share largely the same rules and
standards for scientific practice. But they also share something
deeper, more fundamental, something that cannot be put into words.
•Normal science is a highly determined activity, but
it need not be entirely determined by rules. That is
why ... I introduced shared paradigms rather than
shared rules, assumptions, and points of view as the
source of the coherence for normal research traditions.
Rules, I suggest, derive from paradigms, but paradigms
can guide research even in the absence of rules.' 47
When the historian looks at a scientific tradition, says Kuhn, he
experiences an acute difficulty if he tries to express in prepositional
form the rules and principles which every member of the tradition
subscribes to. It is doubtful if the historian could ever produce a
set of rules that would win universal support from the members of that
44 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) p24
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tradition. This leads Kuhn to argue that behind the open diversity
of opinion on what the rules and principles are lies an invisible
uniformity, a harmony of inexpressible commitments that binds paradigm
members together. The rules which each paradigm-member can state
ylQ
are abstractions from this hidden inexpressible paradigm. Without
such a paradigm a scientific tradition would not exist.
•Scientists can agree that a Newton, Lavoisier,
Maxwell or Einstein has produced an apparently
permanent solution to a group of outstanding
problems and still disagree, sometimes without
being aware of it, about the particular abstract
characteristics that make those solutions permanent.
They can, that is, agree in their identification of
a paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting
to produoe a full interpretation or rationalisation
of it. Lack of a standard interpretation or of an
agreed reduction to rules will not prevent a paradigm
from guiding research. Normal science can be
determined in part by the direct inspection of
paradigms, a process that is often aided by but does
not depend upon the formulation of rules and
assumptions. Indeed, the existence of a paradigm
need not even imply that any full set of rules exists.*4
A good indication of what Kuhn intends to convey in his use of the
paradigm idea is seen in a reference lie makes to a *very similar theme*
developed by the philosopher-scientist Michael Polanyi. Scientific
knowledge, according to Polanyi, is personal; it has an ineluctable,
subjective element which he calls *tacit knowledge*. Science is a
continuation of perception, he says. Perception takes place through
the unconsicbus integration of formerly disparate phenomena; scientific
knowledge grows through a similar integration of hitherto unknown
coherences in nature. *Our recognition of these coherences is largely
48 Euhn is inconsistent on the within-paradigm agreement or
disagreement on rules and standards. At times he says that members
share the same rules (pll). At times, he says that they do not (p44)«
49 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) p44
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based,* he writes, •like perception is, on clues of which we are not
focally aware and which are indeed often unidentifiable.• What we
take to be scientific knowledge is ultimately but a personal decision.
Knowledge is, then, a psychological response by an individual
scientist, a response resulting from perceptual or intellectual
processes of which the scientist is unaware. Kuhn's theory differs
from Polanyi,B in that scientific knowledge is not identified with a
decision by the individual scientist but with the social activities
of the community that shares the paradigm. Polanyi* b thesis is
psychologicalj Kuhn*a iB sociological. Knowledge is, respectively,
what the individual or the group take it to be. On both accounts
scientific knowledge is ultimately unfathomable.
In stressing the social basis of science Kuhn acknowledges the
similarity between his own views and those of the Wittgenstien of the
52
Philosophical Investigations. Consideration of how a child learns to
use the word •game* leads Wittgenstein to deny that there is a set of
characteristics applicable to all and only members of what we come to
oall games. The child learns to apply the term correctly because he
sees what Wittgenstein calls, for short, •family resemblances* between
the event in question and previous activities which he has learned to
call •games1. Something similar, says Kuhn, may happen when a
scientist is introduced to a paradigm; in an elusive manner the new
recruit learns to recognise which problems may yield to solutions
similar to those he has studied through immersion in the paradigm. The
scientist does not learn an explicit set of rules with which to
recognise a problem or with which he can produce a solution; yet he can
still recognise problems and produce solutions which he knows are
51 Polanyi, M. (1972) p49
52 Wittgenstein, L. (1958)
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legitimate. In Wittgensteinian language, the scientist knows more
than he can say. Says Kuhn:
•That scientists do not usually ask or debate what
makes a particular problem or solution legitimate
tempts us to suppose that, at least intuitively, they
know the answer. But it may only indicate that
neither the question nor the answer is felt to be
relevant to their research. Paradigms may be prior
to, more binding, and more complete than any set of
rules for research that could be unequivocally
abstracted from them.1 53
In the case of both child and scientist the knowledge is acquired,
according to these theorists, through involvement in a complex, social
process which cannot be fully articulated. Kuhn thus admits that his
theory is elusive in so far as he cannot spell out exactly what a
paradigm consists of; he believes that psychology and especially the
study of perceptual processes may eventually provide further
illumination of how a paradigm determines a scientist's thought.
Paradigms also play a central role in Kuhn* s account of the
dynamics of scientific change. Truce to his sociological perspective
this change results, he says, not from the intentional aotivity of the
individual scientist but from the unintentional effects of individual
paradigm-members each attempting to solve specific puzzles.
•The scientific enterprise as a whole does from time
to time prove useful, open up new territory, display
order, and test long-accepted belief. Nevertheless,
the individual engaged on a normal research programme
is almost never doing any one of these things. Once
engaged, his motivation is of a rather different sort.
What then challenges him is the conviction that, if
only he is skilful enough, he will succeed in solving
a puzzle that no one before has solved or solved so
well.» 54
In brief, Kuhn argues that once a group of scientists is drawn to work
on what the members take to be a promising scientific achievement they
53 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) p46
54 " " p38
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attract, as the newly initiated normal scieno© gets up steam, more
and more support from fellow scientists. However, because the
commitments which all paradigm-members share retain, in Kubn*s words,
55
•an element of the arbitrary1 it is inevitable that sooner or later
the paradigm will run into trouble. When the paradigm*s predictions
do not square with experimental results we have what Kuhn calls
•anomalies*• Such anomalies are, at first, set aside as likely to
yield to further, more ingenious research but if, after an unspecified
time, they remain recalcitrant to repeated efforts to eliminate them
then the paradign has run, he says, into orisis. At this point what
agreement there was over the riles which ought to govern scientific
practice is fractured and the individual members are forced into a
radical rethink of the most fundamental issues, puzzle-solving ceases
and polemics or philosophy often take over. A battle ensues between
rival paradigm-candidates and normal science emerges once again only
after one of the rivals attracts enough support to repeat the process
already outlines.
Before studying the difficulties which arise from Kuhn*s theory
I would first like to resolve the dispute between Weimer and Palermo
and their critics, a dispute resulting, as we have seen, from differing
interpretations of Kubn*s theory. First of all there is disagreement
over the admissibility or otherwise of more than one paradigm within a
discipline at any one time. Weimer and Palermo, it will be remembered,
assert that paradigms do not belong to a discipline but to a community
of practitioners. Their opponents hold that a discipline is supposed
to have only one paradigm, at least during a normal science period -
hence behaviourism, they continue, was not a Kuhnian paradigm. There
55 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) p5
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is some support for Weimer and Palermo in Kuhn's original essay. In
introducing the paradigm idea Kuhn, we have seen, asserted that it
belonged to a oomraunity of practitioners. And this is a view he has
emphasised in his later writings. However, there is much more
support for the alternative interpretation that a paradigm is all-
pervasive within a discipline during a normal scienoe period. This is
evident both from the examples of paradigms Kuhn uses in the history
of science and from the account of paradigm formation and change which
occupies most of the initial argument. For example, he writes that
once a successful normal science period is under way, 1... the
profession will have solved problems that its members could scarcely
have imagined and would never have undertaken without commitment to
57
the paradigm.1 ' Or, referring to a new paradigm*s redefinition of
scientific problems and standards, he saysi * Other problems, including
many that had previously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical,
as the concern of another discipline or sometimes as just too
56
problematic to be worth the time.• But the imperialism attributed
to paradigms within disciplines is most clearly seen in Kuhn»s view
of scientific revolutions.
♦At the start a new candidate for paradigm may have
few supporters, and on occasions the supporters* motives
may be suspect. Nevertheless, if they are competent,
they will improve it, explore its possibilities, and
show what it would be like to belong to the community
guided by it ... More scientists will then be converted
and the exploration of the new paradigm will go on ...
Still more men, convinced the new view's fruitfulness,
will adopt the new mode of practising normal science,
until at last only a few elderly hold-outs remain.
And even they, we cannot say, are wrong. Though the
historian can always find men - Priestley, for instance -
who were unreasonable to resist for as long as they did,
he will not find a point at which resistance becomes
56 Kuhn, T.S. (1972)
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•illogical or unscientific. At most he may wish to
say that the man who continues to resist after his
whole profession has been oonverted has ipso facto
ceased to be a scientist.1 59
The entire thrust of his argument is that science progresses in a
cyclical manner from one paradigm to another with each successful
paradigm defining the issues for the discipline concerned and excluding
as not part of the discipline those individuals who refuse, despite
being in a tiny minority, to throw in the towel. Since Kuhn*s is a
descriptive and not (at least initially) a normative theory of science
he is not concerned to justify or defend such exclusion. Kuhn offers
no logical arguments against the views of this minority - indeed, as
we can see, it is part of his theory that there oan be no such arguments.
Thus, if a paradigm was defined by, or constituted by, a set of
propositions or logical arguments there could be no objection to the
view that a discipline may, on Kuhn's theory, possess more than one
paradigm. But as a paradigm is such that it cannot be defined and is
used, albeit vaguely, to describe scientific activity as a social
process we must accept that Kuhn's thesis allots each discipline one
paradigm during a normal science period. Peripheral malcontents who
refuse to accept the paradigm do not themselves form another paradigm
until the predecessor has run into crisis und they win over defecting
revolutionaries. Consequently it is only by ignoring a central feature
of Rutin's theory that Veiiaer and Palermo oan claim that structuralism
and behaviourism were psychology's first two paradigns.
Consider now another issue which divides Weimer and Palermo from
their critics, namely the role of a crisis in Kuhn'H theory. This
dispute can easily be resolved for Weimer and Palermo are, quite simply,
mistaken in their claim that 'Ruhn has not insisted that crises were
59 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) pl59
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indispensable precursors to revolutions.'^ The short answer to this
is that Kuhn has insisted, over and over again, that crisis is a
necessary, if not sufficient, condition for a revolution. Thus he writes:
♦If awareness of anomaly plays a role in the emergence
of new sorts of phenomena, it should suxprise no one
that a similar but more profound awareness is
prerequisite to all acceptable changes of theory. On
this point historical evidence is, I think, entirely
unequivocal.' 61
Kuhn immediately goes on to argue that Ptolemaic astronomy was 'a
scandal' before Copernicus, Aristotle's theory of motion wbb 'in
difficulties' before Galileo, the wave theory of light followed the
discovery of anomalies in Newton's theory; in sum, he writes:
'... in all these cases except that of Newton the
awareness of anomaly had lasted so long and penetrated
so deep that one can appropriately describe the fields
affected by it as in a state of growing crisis.' b2
Further, he claims that a new theory or paradigm-candidate will only
get attention if the paradigm it hopes to replace has run into a state
of crisis. It often happens, he says, that when a new paradigm does
emerge triumphant from a period of extraordinary scienoe it is found
to have been anticipated by a theory which was ignored simply because
it had not made its debut during a breakdown in normal soienoe. So
Aristarchus' anticipation of Copernicus was ignored because 'the vastly
63
more reasonable geocentric system' had no difficulties that a
heliocentric system would solve. Emphasising the role of crisis he
says:
*... these examples share another characteristic that
may help to make the case for the role of crisis
impressive: the solution to each of them had been at
least partially anticipated during a period when there
was no crisis in the corresponding science; and in
the absence of crisis those anticipations had been
ignored.' 64
60 Weimer, W.B. and Palermo, D.S. (1973) p237
61 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) p67
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Not oply does Kuhn argue that a crisis is a prerequisite to a
revolution but he insists that that crisis must be generated from
within normal science. As Palermo's critics pointed out the reasons
he offered for structuralism1s alleged crisis all point to origins
outBide normal science. Again, only by distorting Kuhn'a theory can
it be applied to structuralist psychology.
Finally, let us examine the dispute between Weimer and Palermo
and their opponents on whether there can be 'debate over fundamentals'
within a paradigm. Controversy is permitted, according to Weimer and
Palermo, provided that 'what is "fundamental to the paradigm" is not
65
questioned during normal research.• This allows them to characterise
behaviourism as a paradigm with controversy raging over fundamental
theoretical issues, but fundamental issues not basic to the paradigm.
However, Weimer and Palermo go even further and allow controversy over
the commitments which, as they put it, 'constitute the sociological
66
and/or metaphysical usage of paradiga.'0 They write*
•Researchers may share the same paradigm even though
they need not accept exactly the same commitments, and
even if they do not interpret those commitments which
they do accept in a uniform manner. There is thus room
for considerable disagreement within the paradigm. Assent
to a sociological paradigm is never an all-or-none
matter across individuals* one researcher's position
on the relevant cluster of commitments may be totally
unique with respect to another researcher's, yet they
may both share the 'same* paradign.• °7
Given that they agree that "what is fundamental to the paradigm" is
not questioned during normal research and that both explicit paradigm
commitments as well as theoretical issues may be disputed it is odd
that Weimer and Palermo do not claim that what is fundamental to the
65 Weimer, W.B. and Palermo, D.S. (1975) p217
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paradigm is the invisible, inexpressible web of presuppositions which
are prior to any open, expressed commitments or theories. Unlike
Kuhn they ignore this presumed hidden uniformity lying behind all
paradigm articulations and offer, instead., a characterisation of both
structuralism and behaviourism in terms of a duster of commitments.u
But suoh a characterisation is, for Kuhn, impossible. Even if it were
possible the admission that individuals who are held to belong to the
•same1 paradigm can openly disagree about suoh commitments robs the
paradigm of any explanatory value it may have. For then it can be
attributed to a group which shares specified views and equally to an
individual who disagrees with that group.
It is difficult to settle this dispute with finality because it
is not at all clear what is and what is not fundamental to a paradigm
in Kuhn*3 theory. Hence, it is not clear what kinds of dispute are
permissible between individuals who are said to belong to the 1 same*
paradigm. Nevertheless, the emphasis in Kuhn'b theory is on agreement
on problems, methods, and solutions resulting from shared presuppositions
imbibed through communal research based on a substantive scientific
achievement. Weimer and Palermo, in contrast, tolerate and even
emphasise disagreement within a paradigm as a result of minimising the
primary Xuhnian usage of paradigm-as-exemplar.As Mackenzie^ has
68 In this attempt Weimer and Palermo ignore the implication of
their own position on permitted controversy over commitments between
members of the same paradigm. If people who disagree on commitments can
be said to belong to the same paradigm it is strange that these authors
should go on to writet 'No structural psychologist could deny
associationism ... and remain within the *New Psychology' * (paradigm).
(1973) P222
69 Kuhn now distinguishes between two senses of paradigm which,
he says, were originally confused. These are, respectively, the sense
of paradigm as exemplar or concrete scientific achievement accepted by
a community and as a disciplinary matrix or shared presuppositions which
aocount for the relatively unproblematio nature of scientific
judgements over problems, methods and acceptable solutions.
70 Mackenzie, B.D. (1972)
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noted, in criticism of Pal rmo, behaviourism can ot >e co :>strued as a
paradigm becaus it was not based on a major sci tific achievement
or exemplar; by focusing on the seco dary usage of paradigm as a set
of commitments or disciplinary matrix to which the members are only
loosely attached and by minimising the primary usage of paradigm Weimer
and Palermo are led astray. In stun, only by distorting Kuhn's theory
can it be made to apply to the heterogeneous activities that constituted
neobehaviourism.
In conclusion, therefore, the extension of Kuhn*s theory to
psychology, as outlined by Palermo and later modified by Weimer and
Palermo, is rejeoted. Both accounts advance flawed versions of Kuhn
which, as we have seen, misunderstand the role of crisis, the
exclusiveness of paradigms within disciplines, the extent of fundamental
agreement and the source of that agreement. In defending the theory
against Weimer and Palermo*s interpretation of it I do not wish to
suggest that, accurately presented, it would prove enlightening or
useful to contemporary psychologists. On the contrary, Kuhn*s theory -
if taken seriously by psychologists - is a recipe for confusion and
combined with its associated methodological implications would lead to
a demand for conformity to those confused doctrines. To defend my
assertion I now turn to examine the problems raised by the theory itself.
Is Kuhn simply offering a description of what he thinks
scientists have actually done in the past or is he advancing a
methodological prescription as to what science ought to be like? Is
Kuhn suggesting to scientists that they ought to behave in certain
ways? Several of Kuhn's readers have admitted to considerable
puzzlement as to how his work should be read. Among these readers is
the self-styled epistemological anarchist Paul Feyerabend. He reports
that many social scientists have taken Kuhn to he telling them how they
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might turn their struggling, factious and apparently stagnant fields
into mature science which would then be on a similar footing with the
envied natural sciences. Says Feyerabend:
•The recipe, according to these people, is to restrict
criticism, to reduce the number of comprehensive
theories to one, and to create a normal science that
has this one theory as its paradigm. Students must
be prevented from speculating along different lines
and the more restless colleagues must be made to
conform and 'to do serious work*. Is this what Kuhn
wants to achieve?1 71
Feyerabend goes on to resolve his own puzzlement by concluding that
Kuhn intends his theory to be an ambiguous one so that he can, at one
and the same time, 'give solid, objective, historical support to value
judgements which he just as many other people seem to regard as
72
arbitrary and subjective1 and leave himself a safe second line of
retreat to the claim that his view is purely descriptive and no implied
derivation of values from facts is intended.
In response to criticism Kuhn has made his position clear. He says;
'The structure of my argument is simple and, I think,
unexceptionable; scientists behave in the following
ways; those modes of behaviour have (here theory
enters) the following essential functions; in the
absence of an alternative mode that would serve
similar functions, scientists should behave
essentially as they do if their concern is to
improve scientific knowledge.' 73
In other words Kuhn denies that his theory is ambiguous, intentionally
or otherwise and claims, merely to 'tell it as it is'. He is well
aware that he evaluates the behaviour he claims to have uncovered and
in the light of that evaluation, given certain aims, he recommends that
scientists ought to behave in the way he described. Now this analysis
of what Kuhn is doing is open to serious criticism which, in effect,
71 Feyerabend, P. (1972) pl98
72 M " " pl99
73 Kuhn, T.S. (1972) p257
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denies that he is primarily advancing historical discoveries with a
methodology based upon them and asserts instead that Kuhn is, in
reality, proposing a philosophy of science based on an incoherent,
dogmatically held theory of meaning. The structure of his argument,
I suggest, is not as simple as he suggests and every part of it is
unsatisfactory.
Consider, first, the claim that he is merely describing the
behaviour of scientists. Before Kuhn can study any scientist or
scientific event in the past he must, initially, employ some standard
or criterion which allows him to classify the person or event concerned
as part of the history of science. Before he can do history of science
he thus needs a philosophy of science or, less grandly, some intuitive
notion to help him decide what is and what is not part of scientific
history. Using this tacit standard to select his material for more
detailed study Kuhn then goes on to argue that scientists join
paradigms, practise normal science, work themselves into a crisis
before being converted during revolutions and so on. These are part
of the oonrplex explanatory theory which Kuhn offers to account for the
phenomena he is investigating. He is not merely describing the
behaviour of scientists and making startling factual discoveries; he
is both proposing a criterion of what constitutes scientific activity
and offering a theoretical analysis of that activity.
Long before Kuhn,s essay was written this entire approach to the
study of science was attacked by Popper^, directing his fire against
those who sought to show that historically a principle of induction
was used in science. This naturalistic approach to the problem of
method in science, as he termed it, tries to solve its problems by
studying the actual behaviour of scientists or the actual procedures
74 Popper, K.R. (1934)
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of •science1. This is a mistake, he wrote:
•What I oall •methodology* should not be taken for an
empirioal science. I do not believe that it is possible
to decide, by using the methods of an enrpirical science,
such controversial questions as whether science
actually uses a principle of induction or not. And my
doubts increase when I remember that what is to be
called a •science* and who is to be called a •scientist*
must always remain a matter of convention or decision.
... Thus X reject the naturalistic view. It is uncritical.
Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe
themselves to have discovered a fact, they have only
proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to
turn into a dogma.* 75
Popper is here arguing that history of science cannot yield the kind
of results Kuhn is olaiming to have found. Embedded in the historian*s
or sociologists approach is a theoretical standpoint which prevents
him from directly examining the • facts of history*. In short, Popper
denies that there are neutral historical facts which can be directly
inspected to find out whether science uses a principle of induction,
exhibits cyclical revolutions or works by a method of conjectures and
refutations. Which •facts* are selected for study and what is regarded
as significant - what is learned from history - depends on the criteria
or conventions which are built into the observer*s perspective.
A very similar line of argument has been followed, though
independently, by Kuhn*s critics. They have asserted that paradigms,
normal science, crises and the other phenomena Kuhn has *discovered*
do not exist at all and are merely reflections of his own philosophical
perspective. The linohpin of Kuhn*s thesis, the paradigm, has been
the focus of the attaok but some investigators have turned their
criticism to other aspects. Thus Feyerabend^° objects to the
periodicity in Kuhn*s account with normal science dominating a paradigm
before it gives way to extraordinary or orisiB science. Dissent,
75 Popper, K.R. (1959) P52/53
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proliferation of competing theories, recourse to fundamentals and other
allegedly crisis features are, he says, present throughout science and
exist alongisde what he - Feyerabend - calls boring, uncritical normal
science activity. However, I shall concentrate on the paradigm idea
whioh, we have seen, is introduced by Kuhn to solve what he sees as
a dilemma. On the one hand, he is struck by the amazing uniformity
among scientists working within a tradition on what are the important
problems to be solved, the legitimate methods to be employed and the
solutions which will be acceptable; on the other hand, he experiences
acute difficulty in finding a form of words to summarise the tradition
in a way which he feels would satisfy every member of it. Each
scientist expresses the theory they are all working on in a slightly
different way from everyone else. Clearly, Kuhn concludes in what is
a crucial move in his argument, behind this open diversity there is
a deeper, more fundamental, invisible, inexpressible •paradigm* of
which each scientist*s formulation is an *articulation* or partial
expression.
Kuhn then allots this paradigm a key role in his account of
scientific change. Paradigms define the standards and rules whioh
govern research during •normal science*. Different paradigms provide
different standards and rulesj thus they direct their members to
different puzzles and differ in the solutions they deem •scientific*.
Reflecting the Wittgensteinian nature of a paradigm as a social
pxooess or *fozm of life* for a community Kuhn paints a vivid picture
of pre-revolutionary debatex
•To the extent, as significant as it is incomplete, that
two scientific schools disagree about what is a problem
and what is a solution, they will inevitably talk
through each other when debating the relative merits of
their respective paradigms. In the partially circular
arguments that regularly result, each paradigm will be
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' shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it
dictates for itself and to fall short of a few of
those dictated by its opponent. There are other
reasons too, for the incompleteness of logical contact
that consistently characterises paradigm debates.' 77
This 'incompleteness of logical contact', characteristic of 'forms of
life', leads Kuhn to the conclusion that different paradigms are often
• incommensurable •
Scientists can settle their problems by discussion and reference
to the same standards only when they belong to the same paradigm. But
a cool, disinterested appraisal of two paradigms is not possible.
Since each person argues from within his own framework he is unable,
79
says Kuhn, to provide 'logically or even probabilistically compelling'
reasons why a paradigm should be adopted or abandoned. There iB no
possibility of choosing between paradigms by reference to overarching
standards.^
Typically scientists arguing across the paradigm divide talk past
one another and what is good reasoning or sound argument for one cuts
no ice with the other. Thus, Kuhn insists, argument does not play a
decisive role in persuading a member of an old, crisis-ridden paradigm
to join a new one. He repeatedly claims that the scientist is merely
converted to the new way of seeing things which the parvenu provides.
Just as a paradigm cannot be reduoed to a list of logical propositions
so conversion cannot be reduoed to a set of arguments. 'The competition
between paradigms,' he says, 'is not the sort of battle that can be
Q1
resolved by proofs'. With this not-yet-understood conversion
sequence the upshot of Kuhn's argument is a complete relativism wliioh
77 Kuhn, T.S. (19^2) pllO
78 '♦ « " pll2
79 '• " » p94
80 « " MM
81 " M " pl48
-84-
he presents, reluctantly and with attempts at modification, as a
historical revelation.
82
Shapere argued, in a highly critical review, that such
relativism is a consequence not of an investigation of the history of
science but of KUhn's own theoretical approach. Shapere drew attention
to the necessity of paradigms as the sine qua non of research, according
to Kuhn. 'Such views,1 wrote Shapere, 'appear too strongly and
confidently held to have been extracted from a mere investigation of
liow things have happened.' Paradigms tell us more about Kuhn, he
implied, than they do about science. They tell us, in Shapere*s view,
about Kuhn's theory of meaning. Where the logical empiricists had
emphasised meaning-invarianoe, the unproblematic use of the same
concepts in different theories, Kuhn emphasises meaning-variance - the
view that a concept has two radically different meanings in different
paradigms - with a similar, fatal excess. This theory of meaning
emerges olearly, says Shapere, with the assertion that different
paradigms are incommensurable. In Shapere*s words:
'Two expressions or sets of expressions must either have
precisely the same meaning or else must be utterly and
completely different. If theories are not meaning-
invariant over the history of their development and
incorporation into wider and deeper theories, then those
successive theories (paradigms) cannot really be compared
at all, despite apparent similarities which must
therefore be dismissed as irrelevant and superficial.
If the concept of the history of science as a process
of "development-by-acoumulation" is incorrect, the only
alternative is that it must be a completely noncumulative
process of replacement.' 84
The corollary of the claim that there is absolute difference between
paradigms is that there is absolute sameness or uniformity within a
paradigm. Thus Kuhn assumes that there is a deep and fundamental unity
82 Shapere, D. (19&4)
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lying behind the surface differences between individuals in a
scientific tradition. Indeed, we have seen that he claims there oould
not be a tradition without such unity. Thus Kuhn assumes that
communication is only possible between individuals who are agreed on
fundamentals. This is the logical thesis of relativism and it thus
is built into Kuhn*s theory of science in the guise of the paradigm.
As Popper had argued, the naturalistic approach to the study of method
in science leads to the •discovery* of those very conventions or
theories which the historian brings to his task.
One of the oddest features of Kuhn*s essay is the claim that
paradigms can be *direotly inspected* (see quotation on page 70 above)
by the scientists who join them and by the historian who studies them.
It is odd because one of the basic motives for using the paradigm,
as Shapere points out, is to deny that any scientist can ever study
neutral observational data directly. All data are examined through a
paradigm. Yet the historian or sociologist, it is olaimed, can
dispense with paradigms or metaparadigms in his own research. Why
Kuhn should liberate the historian of soienoe from the constraints he
places on other empirical investigators is not clear. But he gives no
reason why it should bo possible to inspect and identify paradigms
directly if it is impossible to similarly examine other empirical
phenomena.
)
In summary, then, when Kuhn claims that the first part of his
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argument is simply that * scientists behave in the following ways*
he distorts what he is in faot doing. First, he is employing some
implicit criterion of what constitutes scientific activity and who is
to be considered a scientist. Second, he is advancing a complex
explanatory theory to account for the activity he has circumscribed.
85 Kuhn, T.S. (l?72) p237
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It seems to me that the general argument advanced by Popper that history
of science cannot explicate the nature of science and is dependent
on conventions or criteria provided by a philosophy of science, is
correct. Different historians produce very different accounts of the
♦same1 episode. A historian who holds a philosophy which views
successive scientific theories as a continuous, series of more and
more comprehensive viewpoints with each earlier one merely an
approximation to the later version, will produce a cumulative historical
account of science. Similarly, we can read in Agassi a historiography
of soienoe generated by Popper^ fallibilist epistemology. Kuhn'a
history of science with its revolutionary, relativist conclusions
similarly reflects the conventions he implicitly adopts. Histories of
science are based on philosophies of science whether the historian is
conscious of the fact or not; the historian cannot escape the need
to implement seleotional and evaluative criteria before he starts his
research. The root of Kuhn*s relativism and of his revolutionary thesis
lies in the imposition of paradigms with their built-in relativist
philosophy.
The second part of Kuhn*s argument, as he sees it, is that the
scientific behaviour he describes has the function of promoting the
growth of knowledge - though this entails, he admits, a change in what
we mean by such a conception. Since there is no way by which we might
compare successive, incommensurable paradigms against all-embraoing
objective standards, says Kuhn, •we may well have to abandon the notion,
explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and
those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth.The
growth of knowledge is best understood, by analogy with the Darwinian
86 Agassi, J. (1963)
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-87-
model of evolution, as a devlopment away from primitive beginnings by
A.
'a process whose successive stages are characterised by an increasingly
88
detailed and refined understanding of nature.'^ Like biological
evolution scientific development is, he says, *unidirectional and
irreversible
In the face of Kuhn's admission that different paradigms cannot
be compared and especially his assertion that one paradigm cannot be
said to be closer to the truth than another it is necessary to ask what
sense can be given to the ideas of development, evolution and progress
in this context? In epistemology, to use these terms is to imply that
one theory or paradigm is an improvement over its predecessors and to
say that is to imply that they can be compared. But, acoording to Kuhn,
no such comparison is possible. Hence, his critics asked, is Kuhn
saying that every and any paradigm switch which scientists make is
automatically a progressive change? In the absence of some means of
comparison against common standards is Kuhn*s argument that change is
progressive per se? This has drawn the reply that it is possible,
after all, to compare competing theories or paradigms against the same
criteria to determine which is latest in the evolutionary chain. Now
though this oontradiots Kuhn*s own incommensurability thesis it does
not provide a satisfactory defence of the use of the notions of progress,
development and evolution. Kuhn wrote:
*1 believe it would be easy to design a set of criteria -
including maximum accuracy of predictions, degree of
specialisation, number (but not scope) of concrete
problem situations - whioh would enable any observer
involved with neither theory to tell which was the older,
which the descendant.* 90
Kuhn*s answer is unsatisfactory because he does not provide an aim for
88 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) pl70
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science. A scientist, who aims (among other things) to arrive at a
true theory, will specify criteria which will allow Mm to judge
whether or not any particular theory is helping him acMeve Ms aim.
Thus he will, for example, say that the theory is superior to another
if it passes tests (meets the criteria) which the other lias failed.
The reason why it is an improvement for the scientist is that it has,
in Ms judgement, "brought him closer to acMeving Ms aim than any
other alternative theory. Kuhn argues, in contrast, that individual
scientists do not have aims such as promoting the growth of knowledge
or the pursuit of absolutely true theories? rather, growth of knowledge
is an unintended outcome of community-based normal science. Hence the
criteria wMoh Kuhn introduces as an index of progress are not
criteria wMoh measure the extent to wMch aims are judged to have been
achieved. In fact, he gives no reason why we should accept these
criteria as an index of progress. And since Ms theory is not a
prescriptive one - it does not tell us what science ought to be like -
any criteria such as he introduces will be arbitrary and hence there
is no reason why we should accept them as an index of evolutionary
progress. Thus I reject the second part of what Kuhn takes to be the
structure of Ms argument (see page 80 above) - namely that the
scientific activity wMch Ms essay describes has the function of
promoting the growth of knowledge. If the 1 scientific behaviour* wMoh
he claims to have discovered as historical phenomena were accepted as
correct description then the conclusion would have to be that soience
does not progress by reasoned argument nor is it judged against objective
standards but is, instead, as Feyerabond insists, irrational. If it
is the case that scientists dogmatically commit themselves to a view
to wMoh they have been blindly converted and stubbornly persist with
such narrow-minded intolerance until suddenly converted again then, I
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do not think Foyerabend»s usage is unfair. But I will leave
consideration of his philosophy to a later chapter. At this point,
having rejected the first two planks of Kuhn*s argument, I will now,
briefly, dismiss the final part - the methodological recommendation
that scientists ought to do what Kuhn claims they have, in fact, done
throughout their history.
91
•Acquisition of a paradigm*, writes Kuhn , 'and of the more
esoterio type of research it permits is a sign of maturity in the
development of any given scientific field.* The search for Kuhnien
paradigms in the social sciences, a growth industry during the past
decade, is but the latest manifestation of the traditional envy with
whioh the natural sciences are copied by their struggling counterparts
in social fields. As with Weimer and Palermo this has remained at
the level of after-the-fact appraisal of the state of a discipline, the
reconstruction of past movements along Kuhnian lines; to my knowledge
there has been little discussion of the methodological implications
of Kuhn*s theory for the disciplines concerned. However, since it is
normal science whioh results in progress - through its pursuit of
detailed research on •esoteric* puzzles and indirectly, through its
generation of crises and revolutions, via the inevitable anomalies -
Kuhn recommends that scientists practise normal science. *Scientists
should behave essentially as they do', he says, in the third part of
his argument (p80 above), *if their concern is to improve scientific
knowledge.* They should, that is, put their deeper, philosphical
differences aside and conform to a single point of view whioh thus
becomes dominant.
But there is a difficulty here since paradigms are not so much
something whioh an individual scientist actively embraoes as something
91 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) pll
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which happens to the individual. The scientist is, after all,
converted to the paradigm in an as yet little understood process.
Normal science, thus, is not something which an individual can
consciously decide to practise; it is something which happens to him,
sometiling which he finds himself doing. Maturity comes to a discipline
and it is not at all clear that the maturation process can he forced.
For those disciplines which are judged to already have a paradigm and
an associated normal science tradition there is a similar difficulty
in actually implementing Kuhn's recommendation. Suppose, for example,
that we assume a discipline can he oorrectly said to have a paradigm
and suppose further that it has become diseased by the pile up of
anomalies. Kuhn's recommendation would now be, I take it, to create
and then commit oneself to a new paradigm. However, he tells us that
he has no idea how new paradigms come forward and so we have, again,
to wait until the paradigm appears. He does not tell us what to do
92
if we wish to escape from the old paradigm's orisis. Watkins has
argued that, on Kuhn's own aooount, a scientist belonging to the old
paradigm could never invent an alternative and thus the entire Kuhnian
theory collapses. V/atkins* argument is that since a paradigm is
supposed to have a monopoly on a scientist's thinking, since 'there is
little or no interregnum between the end of the old paradigm's reign
9?
over a scientist's mind'"^ and the start of the new paradigm's reign,
and since the two paradigms are supposedly incompatible or
incommensurable the new one would have to be invented and adopted in
an instant. Says Watkins:
•We must remember that the new paradigm is immediately
powerful enough to induce our scientist to turn against
the well-articulated and unrefuted paradigm that has
dominated his scientific thinking hitherto. This means,
I take it, that the new paradigm cannot begin as just a
92 Watkins, J.W.W. (1972)
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•few fragmentary ideas, but must at the outset be large
and definite enough for its striking potentialities to
be fairly apparent to its inventor.
If that is so, the Instant-Paradigm thesis seems to
me to be barely credible on psychological grounds. I do
not know how much a single genius might achieve in the
middle of the night, but I suspect that this thesis
expeots too much of him.• 94
At any rate there is no method which Kuhn recommends for developing
new paradigms as rivals for the old; his position seems to be that the
best way for scientists to progress is to wait until a first paradigm
emerges or, if it has already emerged and run into crisis, to wait
until a successor appears. Feyerabend, as we have seen, reports that
Kuhn is taken to mean that scientists must take active steps to start
normal science by inducing conformity to one dominant theme. But this
does not, strictly speaking, follow from Kuhn's passive account.
Conformity to a single theory is not sufficient to institute normal
science. But once a paradigm emerges then he can be correctly said to
recommend conformity to the paradigm and, as a corollary, a cessation
of critical debate about possible alternatives. In sum, the methodology
which flows from Kuhn's argument does promote conformity but the main
lesson seems to be that there is little positive action which
scientists can take to force the progress of science. This may explain
the absence of proposals as to how best to develop their disciplines
by thoso scientists who have implemented Kuhn*s theory.
Finally, acceptance of any Kuhnian methodology would depend on
prior adoption of the first two parts of his argument. Since I have
rejected both his claim that he is accurately describing scientific
behaviour and that the function of that behaviour is progress or the
growth of knowledge there is obviously no reason to support methods
based on such claims. However, in discussing Popper's methodology in
94 Watkins, J.W.W. (1972) p55/6
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a later chapter, I will argue that some of the features of normal
science which Kuhn says are •uncritical* and whose continuance he
recommends, can be absorbed into Popper*s theory without difficulty.
95
In common with other historical relativists such as Hanson,"
96
Toulmin and Feyerabend, Kuhn has played an important part in the
destruction of the once orthodox logioal empiricist philosophy of
soience. That philosophy of science determined the course of mainstream
Anglo-American psychology for a quarter of a century and exerts a
continuing influence to this day. In the case study examined below
I will review and critically, though briefly, discuss the origins and
development of the logical empiricist movement and study its
incorporation into behaviourist psychology. I will attempt to assess
the strengths and weaknesses of that philosophy and the lessons to be
learned for future research in psychology from its involvement with
that philosophy. One of the lessons will be that psychologists, if
they were to implement Kuhn*a approach to science and, for example,
urge commitment to cognitive psychology because it is a new paradigm
would be repeating the mistakes of their predecessors. For, despite
Kuhn*s role in the rejection of logical empiricism, there are very
close connections between Kuhn and the early logioal positivists. Both
are subjectivist epistemologies and, later in this thesis, both these
views will be contrasted with their common enemy - the objectivist
epistemology of Karl Popper which I will recommend as providing a
basis for the approach psychology should follow.
95 Hanson, H.R. (1958)
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Part Twoi A Case Study
Logical Positivism and Behaviourism
•With the behaviourist point of view now becoming
dominant, it is hard to find a place for what has
been called philosophy. Philosophy is passing -
has all but passed and unless new issues arise
which will give a foundation for a new philosophy
the world has seen its last great philosopher,1 97
When John Watson wrote these words in 1928 he had good reason to
think that psychology was well on its way to becoming a respectable
natural science of behaviour, free - at last - from the debilitating
and divisive influence of the philosophers. Within fifteen years
following the publication of his •Behaviourist Manifesto1 the
traditional introspective psychologies had largely withered away within
the United States and American psychologists were no longer exercised
by the perplexities of, what he called •those time-honoured relics of
98
philosophical speculation1 suoh as, for example, the mind-body problem,
•Most of the younger psychologists realise,* he wrote, with satisfaction,
•that some such formulation aB behaviourism is the only road leading
99
to science.* However, in that same year, a great philosopher writing
on the other side of the Atlantic published the first of a series of
works for which behaviourists were soon to find a place. The
philosopher was Rudolf Carnap and the works were to constitute the
contribution of the Vienna Circle, a philosophical movement which was
to transform the character of behaviourism and govern its fate for
nearly thirty years. My primary concern, in this case study, is to
illustrate the historical importance of philosophy of science for
97 Watson, J.B. (1928) pl4
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psychology by spelling out the consequences for behaviourism of its
involvement with logical positivism, as the philosophy of the Vienna
Circle was soon to become known, and with that philosophy1 s American
100
descendant, logical empiricism.
To understand the nature of classical behaviourism, which in
common usage covers the period from 1915 to 1930, it is necessary to
discuss two largely independent intellectual traditions which shaped
the movement's initial formulation. These are functionalist
comparative psychology which flourished in America at the beginning
of this century and positivism, a set of philosophical doctrines which
have enjoyed fluctuating support throughout history, at least as far
back as the fourteenth century and, arguably, beyond.
Behaviourism started life as a revolt within American comparative
psychology but very quickly made a take-over bid for the entire
discipline. The background to behaviourism was, in brief, provided by
functionalist psychology which was an American adaptation of the
introspectionist, structural psychology practised in Germany by Wundt,
inhere Vundt had focused on the contents of human consciousness
functionalist psychology was more concerned with the adaptive uses of
consciousness by humans and by other animals. The method employed by
comparative psychologists within the functionalist tradition combined
observations of behaviour, inferences to capacities on the basis of
that behaviour and detailed interpretation of those capacities by
analogy with human experience. Given the aim of specifying what was
going on in an animal's mind when it performed a piece of behaviour the
100 According to Herbert Feigl, one of the early members of the
Vienna Circle, logical empiricism was the appellation preferred by many
logical positivists after their emigration to the United States. It was,
in part, meant to signify a move towards a more realist standpoint and a
rejection of the criticism that in its emphasis on the role of experience
in science this philosophy was "yet another version of subjective
idealism." See Feigl's article, Y/iener Krels in America. (1968) p657.
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functionalist psychologist could not rest content after postulating
capacities which would produce that behaviour but proceeded to
attribute specific conscious states to the animal by analogy with what
a human would feel or experience in a similar situation. 'The method,
as practised by functionalist psychologists from the late 1890•s to
around 1915» has been summed up by Boring. He writes s
♦The rule of functional animal psychology of that date
was that, when you have finished your observations of
behaviour, you use the results to infer the nature of
the animal* s consciousness and then show how those
processes function in the animal*s behaviour.* 101
Since there is no way by which an experimenter can gain access to the
supposed mental states of an animal and thus no means of testing claims
about what the animal, is feeling or thinking the functionalist
comparative programme was doomed from the outset. How British
comparative psychologists, who initially aimed to probe the mental
states of animals, gradually subordinated and eventually eliminated the
♦subjective' or analogical aspect of their investigations and hence
avoided producing a situation such as that which produced behaviourism
102
is told at length in Mackenzie's Blinded with a Great Hope. He
also relates how frustration built up within functionalist comparative
psychology, frustration resulting from the central aim of detailing
the conscious content of the animal mind and from increasing constraints
on uncontrolled speculation in experimental work. In short, if they
were to fulfill their aims or even attempt to fulfill them these
comparative psychologists were forced to indulge in uncontrolled
speculation} if they did that then they violated their growing attachment
to experimental rigour. The upshot was a polemical outburst by a man
raised in the functionalist comparative tradition (and author of the
101 Boring, E.G. (1929) P556
102 Mackenzie, B.D. (1977» forthcoming)
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revealingly titled work, The Psychical Development of the White Rat10^)
in the now famous paper of 1915 - Psychology as the Behaviourist Views
It.
Henceforth psychology would he the science of behaviour and its
goal prediction and control of that behaviour. Mind and consciousness
as studied by the functionalist and introspective psychologists was
to be eliminated from the subject matter of the discipline; behaviour,
however, as studied by the functionalists was retained and therein lies
a feature of behaviourism which was to lead, eventually, to the
movement*s demise. For the functionalists had enforced a rigid dualism
between mind and consciousness, on the one hand, and behaviour on the
other. The former was held responsible to it3 environment; behaviour
itself was a very impoverished notion, stripped of mentality, adaptive
and functional significance and amounting to nothing more than movement
in spaoe. It was this conception of behaviour which Watson passed on
to his behaviourist movement. Behaviourism, Watson later wrote,
*attempted to make a fresh, clean start in psychology, breaking both
with current theories, and with traditional concepts and terminology.*^0^
In his dismissal of mind and consciousness he might be said to have
made a fresh, clean start but there was nothing new in his formulation
of behaviour. Nor, though this is much less important, was there
anything new in his environmentalism, his assertion that 'in a system
of psychology completely worked out, given the response the stimuli
105
can be predicted; given the stimuli the response oan be predicted.*
For this too was inherited from the *passive organism' model of the
later functionalist psychologists, the main difference being that the
105 Watson, J.B. (1905) This was Watson*s doctoral thesis.
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latter argued that behaviour was controlled via the environment* s
relection in consciousness.
In summary, Watson* s behaviourism was at first a revolt against
the view of psychology held by his fellow functionalist comparative
psychologists but a revolt whioh, despite its seemingly radical no-
nonsense flavour was heavily Indebted to its predecessor.
Behaviourism*s claim to fame, however, did not rest on the
expulsion of mind and consciousness from the subject matter of animal
psychology but on the further suggestion and polioy for purging human
psychology of subjective experience. *The position is taken here,* he
wrote, *that the behaviour of man and the behaviour of animals must be
considered on the same plane; as being equally essential to a general
understanding of behaviour. It can dispense with consciousness in a
psychological sense. The separate observation of * states of
oonsciousness* is, on this assumption, no more a part of the task of
the psychologist than of the physicist. *^* A scientific explanation
of human activity will only be obtained, Watson maintained, when we
107
'bury subjective subject matter.* Behaviour, where that is taken
to be publicly observable - and hence, it was argued - objectively
describable movement was asserted to be the only proper subject matter
for a scientific psychology.
To justify the extension of the mentalist purge throughout all
of psychology Watson appealed to the supposed practices of the physical
sciences. He did not carry out a systematic or prolonged investigation
of either the philosophy of soience or of its methodology but merely
contrasted existing psychology with the relatively successful natural
sciences, such as physics and chemistry. For example, Watson arguedi
106 Watson, J.B. (1913) P176
107 M " quoted in Koch, S. (1964) p7
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•Psychology, as it is generally thought of, has
something esoteric in its method. If you fail to
reproduce my findings, it is not due to some fault
in your apparatus or in the oontrol of your stimulus,
hut it is due to the fact that your introspection
is untrained. The attack is made upon the observer
and not upon the experimental setting. In physios
and in chemistry the attack is made upon the
experimental conditions.1 108
Psychology, he went on, could be brought into line with the methods
of natural science by focusing on observables alone.
•This suggested elimination of states of consciousness
as proper objects of investigation in themselves will
remove the barrier from psychology whioh exists between
it and the other sciences.* 109
The appeal to presumed external standards of scientific practice as
justification of behaviourism* s claim to encompass the entire discipline
i
was a very significant step because it linked the behaviourist
programme to positivism, a philosophy of science than enjoying a
revival and soon to be given its most sophisticated expression by the
members of the Vienna Circle. Watson wanted a basis or rationale for
the expulsion of unobservables like consciousness from every branch of
psychology} positivism was taken to provide that rationale and hence
to guarantee behaviourism*s scientific status.
Whether or not Watson and his followers were correct in believing
that positivism backed up their position is not so easy to establish;
it all depends on what we mean by positivism. Today that term covers
a variety of philosophical standpoints whioh reflect the movement's past
and there is a persistent danger, in writing of positivism at any
particular period, that we may attribute to that period *positivist*
arguments whioh were only developed at a later time. 'Each phase of
positivist thought,* says a historian of that philosophy Leszek
Kolakowski, *is a specific variation of a dominant intellectual style.*110
108 Watson, J.B. (1913) pl<$3
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That dominant intellectual style is one which strongly recommends
caution in claims to knowledge, is hostile to speculative and
metaphysical thinking, urges clarity and precision in debate and steers
clear of insoluble problems - preferring to tackle issues of a more
pragaatic character, nevertheless it is possible to identify certain
rules or norms about knowledge which have characterised positivism in
the past. Four such rules are singled out by Kolakowski and a brief
examination of them will clarify the nature of classical behaviourism's
positivism. These are the rule of phenomenalism, the rule of nominalism,
the rule that refuses to call value judgements and normative statements
knowledge and the rule that scientific method shares an essential unity
in all spheres of enquiry.
The rule of phenomenalism states that 'there is no real difference
in
between 'essence' and 'phenomenon'.' This rule was aimed at
metaphysicians who said the observable world of our experience is but
a manifestation of a hidden reality which we can never know. For the
phenomenalist anything which is in principle unobservable can play no
role in science. Says Kolakowski:
•According to positivism, the distinction between
essence and phenomenon should be eliminated from
science on the ground that it is misleading. We are
entitled to record only that which is actually
manifested in experience j opinions concerning occult
entities of which experienced things are supposedly
the manifestations are untrustworthy. Disagreements
over questions that go beyond the domain of experience
are purely verbal in oharacter.' 112
This rule is much less clear-cut than it at first appears for
positivists do not object to all investigations of hidden causes of
observable phenomena. They would not oppose, for example, the search
for the cause of a disease of whioh specific symptoms are a manifestation.
111 Kolakowski, L. (1972) pll
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What they do objeot to is the explanation of phenomena in terms of
ocoult entities which are in principle inaccessible to human
investigation. The rule is vague, however, for positivists have never
been able to provide a criterion for distinguishing the occult from
legitimate non-observables.
Watson*s expulsion of mind and consciousness from psychology
and his focus on observables would certainly correspond, I think, with
the spirit (if I may use such a word) of this rule. But whether
psychologists who might subscribe to this positivist rule are forced
to become behaviourists is arguable. This rule of phenomenalism
outlaws the admission of such entities as the Kantian ping an sich for
they are, in principle, unknowable. If mind and consciousness are
held to be similarly occult then they would have to be eliminated in
the same way. But a positivist might argue that consciousness is not
as occult as say, the Ding an sich, on the grounds that each man's
consciousness is capable of being investigated by each man himself.
Go he could consistently subscribe to the rule of phenomenalism and yet
refuse to adopt behaviourism. Such refinements, according to
Kolakowski, did not trouble behaviourists unduly and 'the older
introspective psychology is dismissed as a wob of irresponsible
115
fantasies concerning the 'soul' and 'spiritual' faculties.*
The rule of nominalism, which may bo regarded as a consequenoe
of the previous rule, says 've may not assume that any insight
formulated in general terms can have any real referents other than
HA
individual concrete objects.' Science makes use of a variety of
concepts in its theories to which we may be tempted to award some
existential status. Nominalists permit the construction of theoretical
115 Kolakowski, L. (1972) p220
114 " " " Pl3
•101-
concepts| e.g. the perfect gas, ideal resistance, etc, which may serve
as a more precise and general description of reality, but they argue
that such ooncepts are but human creations, mere aids to the
understanding. Scientific knowledge, they say, is but a record of
observed facts and the abstract concepts science may employ are but a
shorthand notation. To yield to the temptation of regarding such
oonstruots as really existing is to fill the world with metaphysical
fictions. What is important in science is only that which experience
obliges us to recognise.
How this rule is also vague for it fails to provide a criterion
for recognising metaphysical fictions, while permitting some theoretical
concepts to eveni^lly achieve existential status. However it
reinforces phenomenalism's emphasis on observables in science and may
thus be said to support, in a general way, Watsonian behaviourism.
But it does not seem to me that attachment to nominalism entails
acceptance of behaviourism} for a man may admit descriptions of mental
states as legitimate psychological data yet simultaneously assert that
theoretical ooncepts employed in any explanatory theory are merely of
instrumental status. In other words explanations are but summaries of
observed facts and the facts, in this case, are held to be privately
observed mental states.
Nor do the other two positivist themes singled out by Kolakowski
require a psychologist to subscribe to behaviourism. The first of
these denies that value judgements and normative statements are
knowledge; they are but arbitrary decisions. Strictly speaking this
rule follows from a combination of the previous two rules, with
phenomenalism denying that values or norms belong to this world and
nominalism denying that they exist 'in themselves' or in some Platonic
realm. So this rule is also compatible with behaviourism but it might
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equally well be defended by an introspeotionist psychology.
Finally, positivism affirms the unity of scientific method. We
saw earlier that Giedymin has oritioised the identification of a belief
in unity of scientific method with positivism as both parochial and
misleading. (See page 38) His point was that it is parochial in that
many thinkers who hold other positivist viewpoints have not expressed
any view on this topic| it is misleading in that some anti-positivists,
like Popper, also affirm a similar unity-of-method thesis. Hence
while it is true that Watson saw behaviourism as scientific because
it employed a method whioh he presumed all the sciences shared, that is
not particularly positivist in itself.
Positivism, then, as characterised by these four themes provides
only general and uneven support for classical behaviourism. The
expulsion of mind and consciousness is not actually required by this
positivism but in its stress on the primacy of observable behaviour
Watson's move may be fairly said to accord with positivism's general
tenor. And, historically, behaviourism was defended by appeal to
positivist standards. But since those standards were not submitted to
any detailed scrutiny we can conclude that olassioal behaviourism's
relation to positivism was, at first, adventitious and unsystematic.
Only later, as we shall see, did that relation beoome explicit and more
calculated.
For more than a decade after its birth behaviourism defended its
claim to be the objective approach to psyohology by advertising its
anti-mentalism and emphasising its publioly observable data base -
namely, behaviour. Gradually, however, the behaviourists realised
that they needed more than this if they were to emulate the achievements
of psychology's traditional idols, the physicists. As Kooh, who lias
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written about this phase of behaviourism in some detail, puts iti
'By the late twenties, there was muoh •objective'
experimentation but few bodies of clearly stated
predictive principles comparable with the crowning
achievement of physics: its theories. Instead,
experimentation seemed aimless, 'theoretical'
hypotheses but loosely related to date, and debate
idle. The search for a 'decision procedure' thus
became a search for a formulary of techniques for
constructing rigorous theory.' 115
Keobehavicuriam, which covers the period from 1950 to the late 1950's,
was preoccupied with the attempt to attain theoretical advance through
the implementation of a 'formulary of techniques', derived partly from
operationism, an American-based philosophy of science, but mainly from
the logical positivists. Commenting on the psychologists' growing faith
in the philosophers* confident claims to possess the key to scientific
progress Koch adds:
'It should be observed that psychology's selections
from this cluster of commitments were spotty,
adventitiously determined and not supported by
especially expert scholarship in the relevant
sources.' lib
What the neobehaviourists wanted was a set of rules which would
enable them to develop explanatory theories, as successful as those of
physics, but which would preserve the objectivism of early behaviourism
and prevent the readmission of troublesome metaphysical fictions and,
more specifically, of entities which are, in principle, unobservable.
To build explanatory theories they clearly needed to make use of
theoretical concepts. What the psychologists thus wanted from the
philosophers of science and what these philosophers olaimed to provide
was a guaranteed method of discriminating between empirically
significant theoretical constructs and metaphysical ones. The
115 Koch, S. (1964) p9
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psychologists believed that they already possessed an empirically sound
data base but they were also pleased to hear philosophical arguments
which appeared to make that base even more secure.
The picture, however, iB greatly complicated by the fact that the
criteria of empirical significance were constantly modified and, on a
few occasions which we shall examine in more detail in a moment,
radically changed throughout the life of logical positivism and logical
empiricism. So, by way of reply to Kooh, it could be argued that the
psychologists might have been more consistent and adept in their
employment of empiricist oriteria had those criteria been more stable.
Nevertheless we shall see that there is a good deal of substance in
Koch* a charge for psychologists are to be found, even today, defending
positions with arguments long recognised to be inadequate by their
oreators.
The first phase of the Vienna Circle, dominated by Carnap'a
117
her Logische Aufbau der Welt, does not seem to have had any impact
on the behaviourists; the phase was, in fact, abandoned by Caroap
himself even before logical positivism was given this 'international
T1 fi
trade name' and introduced into the United States in 1931 by Feigl
119
and Blumberg as 'A New Movement in European Philosophy'. Despite
its laok of influence on psyohology it is worth looking a little more
closely at this work of Carnap for it throws light on future
contributions within the Circle. In the Aufbau Caraap tried to show
how the entire range of concepts used in the empirical sciences - from
sociology to physios - oould be constructed out of one basic
phenomenalist oonoept or, more accurately, out of moments of unanalysed
and unprocessed experience. In a series of definitional steps he hoped
117 Camap, E. (1928)
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to offer a logical reconstruction of empirical knowledge thus
fulfilling the age-old empiricist promise of reducing all knowledge
in science to an experiential base. Henoe, Carnap'a programme aimed,
at this stage, to reduce not only theoretical concepts of the type the
neobehaviourists wanted to introduce into psychology but also their
believed-to-be-basio, behavioural data to an ultimate, primitive
phenomenal base - to what Feigl and Blumberg were to call 'the ground-
120
floor of knowledge, the given.1
It is tempting to speculate that behaviourists, had they been
exposed to Carnap's phenomenalism would have regarded it as incurably
metaphysical and joined those many critics who, according to Goodman,
regard *those who spend time on phenomenalistic constructions as ...
stubborn and old-fashioned crack-pots who shut their eyes to the facts
of life and science.•121,122
Carnap, who was as opposed to metaphysics as any behaviourist,
embarked on his programme, however, because he wanted to demonstrate
that the superiority of scientific knowledge lay in its absolute
certainty. As he later wrote in his autobiography:
120 Feigl, H. and Blumberg, A.E. (1931) p292
121 For a brief, clear and balanced assessment of Carnap's
Aufbau, see N. Goodman's paper, 'Significance of Der Logische Aufbau'
in Schilpp, P. (1963); in particular his defence of logical constructions
against arguments that these do not accurately reflect our cognitive
psychological methods of thought. Goodman points out that these logical
constructions are not offered as psychology but as, what the name
suggest, logical constructions.
122 The neobehaviourists were not the first psychologists to
turn to philosophers of science for help. In 1892 the English psychologist,
statistician and polymath Earl Pearson published 'The Grammar of Science1
in which the views of Ernst Kach were favourably discussed. Mach, for
Pearson, was an idealist and it is, he said with approval, 'vexy needful
to bear in mind...that an external object is in general a construct -
that is, a combination of immediate with past or stored impressions.'
(p.50) Pearson's idealist interpretation of Mach was later to provide
valuable ammunition for Lenin in his campaign against the Russian Machists.
Mach's philosophy, he wrote in his highly polemical work, 'Materialism
and Empirio-Criticism' (1947)» is 'idealism vainly seeking to hide the
nakedness of its solipsism under the cloak of a more objective
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'Under the influence of some philosophers,
especially Mach and Russell, I recognised in the
Logisoher Aufbau a phenomenalistic language as
the best for a philosophical analysis of knowledge.
I believed that the task of philosophy consists in
reducing all knowledge to a basis of certainty.
Since the most certain knowledge is that of the
immediately given, whereas knowledge of material
things is derivative and less certain it seemed that
the philosopher must employ a language which uses
sense-data as a basis.1 123
Carnap was gradually persuaded, however, that a physicalist attitude
was more suitable. Its leading advocate at that time, Otto Neuxath,
had championed physicalism against the prevailing view of German
contemporary philosophy that there was a fundamental difference between
the natural sciences and the mental or cultural sciences in which the
human mind plays an essential role. He opposed the associated claim
that there were two radically different methods of investigation
corresponding to each - explanation by causes for the natural sciences,
hermeneutical or meaningful understanding for the mental and cultural
sciences. (This was but an earlier, cruder version of the methodological
dualism advanced by von Wright and discussed in Chapter One.) Where
Neurath combatted such views with a blunt retort that psychology and
sociology tried to explain the operations of complex physical systems
terminology.' (p.56) 'The idea of the neutrality of the elements of
experience in relation to the 'physical' and 'psychical* ... is the
basic error of Machism* (p.58)» a basic error shared, says Lenin, by
that idealist and fideist* Vundt. In brief, when positivists endorse
a scientific world-view, Lenin s.aid, they merely contradict their
fundamental idealist premises and smuggle in materialist assumptions.
•Mach and Avenarius, in their philosophy, combine,' he wrote,
•fundamental idealist premises with individual materialist deduotions
for the very reason that their theory is an example of that 'pauper's
broth of eclecticism* of which Engels speaks with Just contempt.' (p.64)
Carnap, like Mach before him, denied that he was offering any
metaphysical theses about reality - whether it was really physical or
psychical. Both men claimed that they v/ere phenomenalistio or
solipsistic only in a methodological sense.
123 Caroap, R. (19&3) p50
-107-
and so was a natural science Carnap preferred to make physicalism a
thesis about language and so he formulated it as the claim that any
sentence of any branch of empirical science could be translated into
124
physical language •without loss of content1. ^ So construed
physicalism is preferable to phenomenalism, he said, because "the
events described in this (physical) language are in principle observable
125
by all users of the language.* Garnap,s aim, however, remained the
same during this second phase of his thought - that of demonstrating
the certainty of scientific knowledge by reducing all concepts to
physical concepts describing observables.
Physicalism, so formulated, has given rise to considerable
confusion and to the mistaken belief that Carnap had condemned as
meaningless statements referring to 1 other minds* or to mental states
in general. Ve can avoid oonfusion if we recognise that this early
version of physicalism rests on the adoption of two different
126
empirioist meaning criteria. The first of these, what Hempel calls
the wider empiricist criterion of meaning, specifies the conditions
under which a statement has meaning or empirical content; the second
narrower empiricist oriterion, as Hempel calls it, tries to state
wherein lies the meaning or content of a statement. Using these
meaning criteria we will see that statements about •other minds* may
have a meaning for Carnap.
The wider criterion states that a sentence is only meaningful or
has empirical content if it is, in principle, testable (verifiable) by
means of observations or, more precisely, if it implies * observational
sentences* or what are called 'protocol sentences' which describe
observable events. By this criterion statements about, for example,
the 'soul*, or 'the spirit of the age*, 'essences*, 'Zeitgeist* are
124 Carnap, R. (1932) pi66
125 " w (1963) P52
126 Hempel, C. (1969) pl77
-108-
all meaningless for they do not imply observational sentenoes and, as
such, are not held to be translatable into physioal language.
The narrower criterion further states that the meaning or
empirical content of a statement is completely determined by its
observational implications. In Carnap's words:
Clearly, the narrower criterion implies the wider one but not vice
versa.
To see how Carnapls meaning criteria apply to psychology let us
consider the statement 'John is angry*. That statement can be
translated without loss of content, according to Camap, into a
sentenoe in physical language which implies the same observational or
protocol sentences. The sentences in the physical language would, in
this case, describe the state of John's body - blood pressure, heart¬
beat, agitated movement etc - and thus point to 'the existence of a
physical structure characterised by the disposition to react in a
1 pft
specific manner to specific physical stimuli.' Further, the specific
manner of bodily reaction would also be described in physioal terms.
Anger is not something over and above this physical structure and its
dispositions, according to Camap, any more than the 'firmness' of a
wooden support - his example - is a property existing over and above
the physical structure of the wood.
Anyone who claims that 'anger* is not to be identified with a
physical atruetors disposed to react in certain ways but possesses some
further non-physical component is, says Carnap, simply talking nonsense.
For that further component would lack any observational consequences
•If the same sentences may be deduced from two
sentenoes, the latter two sentenoes have the same
, and may be
127 Carnap, R. (1932) pl66
128 w " " pl72
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and would, hence, be meaningless - on the wider criterion of meaning;
if it did have observational consequences these could be physically
described, hence the further component would not be non-physical.
With this argument Crnap rebutted to his own satisfaction the objection
that 'meaningful1 behaviour was not identical to some set of mere
movements in space. By way of example, he pointed out that a 'meaningful*
129
term like 'beckoning motion* could be exhaustively described in
physical terms by enumerating the class of arm-movements to which it
corresponds.
Psychological or mental terms were not held, however, to be
analytically translatable into physical language. Just what behavioural
manifestations constitute 'anger*, 'excitement' or any other state is
said to be a matter for empirical investigation, What was asserted
was that for every psychological term there must be some observational
and, hence, physical implication; otherwise the psychological term
would have no content and be meaningless.
In summary, in 1952 Carnap held that mental or psychological terms
were meaningful because they could be fully defined in or translated
into physical terms; such a definition would often require an empirical
investigation. Claims that such terms possessed some 'extra' component
apart from their physical accompaniments were held to be meaningless.
Finally, if anyone rejected this physicalist account of psychological
terms or sentences then, Camap asserted, the terms or sentences are
simply rendered meaningless.
Carnap's entire physicalist thesis was sharply criticised by Karl
Popper whose own philosophy of science, itself partly developed in
opposition to the Vienna Circle, is examined in the next chapter. First,
he argued that Cr-map's demarcation and meaning criterion between
129 Carnap, R. (1952) pl82
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science and metaphysics, sense and nonsense, was untenable. The
difference between science and metaphysios cannot lie in the
reducibility of science to experience, whether that experience is
expressed in either phenomenalist or physicalist language. Carnap had
written, in support of his physicalism, that:
•Chiefly because of the efforts of Mach, Poincare
and Einstein, physics is, by and large, practically
free of metaphysics. In psychology, on the other
hand, the work of arriving at a soience which is to
free of metaphysics has hardly begun.' 130
By 'free of metaphysics1 Carnap meant reduoibility to *observation
statements* based on observations. Psychology, except for radical
behaviourism (which was much less influential in Germany than in America
during this period) was, he maintained, metaphysical in so far as it
admitted mental states which were held to be different from physical
accompaniments i.e. not definable in physical terms.
To this Popper argued that no physical theory could be translated
into statements about observations and hence, on Camap's own criterion,
all science was metaphysics. This is but another way of saying, as
we shall see later, that Popper accepted Hume's view that the problem
of induction is insoluble; scientific theories involve universal
statements which can never be reduced to a series of particular
statements. Popper wrote;
'The point is that all physical theories say much
more than we can test. Whether this 'more' belongs
legitimately to physics, or whether it should be
eliminated from the theory as a 'metaphysical
element* is not always easy to say.' 131
Popper then went on to employ his own demarcation criterion in such a
way that science was not turned into metaphysics. Against Carnap he
simply pointed out that there could be no objection to the use of
130 Carnap, R. (1932) pl74
131 Popper, K.R. (1963) p266
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mental or psychological terms on the grounds that they were not
reducible to physical, behavioural terms. Psychological terms - not
definable in physical terns - were as legitimate components of
scientific theories as theoretical terms in physics. Physicalism, as
outlined by Carnap, swept away too much.
Next Popper argued that in another respect Carnap*s physicalism
was not physicalist enough. For C;map held that the sentences whioh
formed the empirical basis of all tests in science, the 'protocol
sentences1, are reports of our own observational experiences, although
expressed in physical language. In other words Camap attempted to
base all scientific knowledge on experience, just as he did in his
phenomenalist phase.
Popper, by contrast, argued that all scientific theories -
including psychological theories - must be tested 'by first deriving
1*2
from them statements about the behaviour of physical bodies.' These
simple descriptive statements are then compared with statements of
what are taken to be the 'facts', where the latter statements describe
physical facts. Popper adds:
"Thus according to my view we do not, for the
purpose of such basic tests, choose reports (which
are difficult to test intersubjectively) about our
own observational experiences, but rather reports
(which are easy to check) about physical bodies ...
which we have observed.* 133
Popper's view is radically different from Carnap's because he denies
that it is possible to construct the world of science out of private
experience. Now exactly what role Popper allots to experience and
perception in scientific testing is much debated and will be considered
later (in Chapter Four) but the point to note here is that Camap
132 Popper, K.R. (1963) p267
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accepted Popper's criticism of this aspeot of his physicalism. Popper
had presented, Camap wrote in 1932, 'the most adequate of the forms
of scientific language at present advocated ... in the theory of
134
knowledge.•
Finally, to come to a point of great significance for psychology,
the physicalist theory of testing which Popper advocates differs in
a crucial respect from Camap's. For Camap, we have seen, psychological
terms must "be translated into physical language; applied to behaviour
that requires the psychologist to conceive of all behaviour as movement
in space - just like a falling stone. For Popper, on the other hand,
psychological theories are tested by comparing their derivations with
statements about behaviour where that behaviour is always seen to be
interpreted in the light of theories. Hence, where Garnap would
describe a piece of behaviour as, say, 'right arm moves to horizontal
position, right index finger juts forward one inch, makes contact with
button etc*, Popper sees nothing wrong with, nothing unscientific about,
the statement, 'he rang ttebell*. Popper spells out his position thusi
'The behaviour of men, predicted by psychological
theories, nearly always consists, not of purely
physical movements, but of physioal movements which,
if interpreted in the light of theories, are
•meaningful'. (Thus if a psyohologist predicts that
a patient will have bad dreams, he will feel that he
was right, whether the patient reports *1 dreamt
badly last night', or whether he reports *1 want to
tell you that I have had a shocking dream*; though the
two 'behaviours', i.e. the 'movements of the lips* may
differ physically more widely than the movements
corresponding to a negation may differ from those
corresponding to an affirmation.* 135
With this argument against Carnap's physicalism Popper anticipated,
I suggest, an objection that the 'Hew Mentalists' were to make against
behaviourism, especially as defended by Skinner. There is no
134 Camap, R. (1932) pp223-8
135 Popper, K.R. (1963) p267
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obligation on a psychologist, mentalists argued, to classify behaviour
merely in terms of movement; to demand that it be so classified is
to condemn psychology to sterility for the significance of a piece of
behaviour lies in the fact that it is meant to satisfy some mentalist
description, to fall under some concept, plan or rule. The task of
the psychologist is then to advance a theory which will characterise
the concepts, plans or rules and explain the production of the
behaviour which is taken to fall under them. Popper* s argument was
that any and every description of behaviour is an interpretation in the
light of theory. And it is futile to attempt to find some basic, non-
theoretical description such as movement. Since all descriptions
involve the use of universal terms the descriptions are irredeemably
theoretical; and this holds for description-as-movement just as much
as for meaningful or mental descriptions like, *he rang the bell.*
(incidentally, physicalism and behaviourism in their retreat to a
presumed atheoretical level of description are rejected by Popper as
subjectivist - despite their claim to be the objective approaches to
psychology. They are subjectivist, he says, because they accept a
subjective theory of knowledge, the view that scientific knowledge can
be reduced to subjective experience.)
Despite Popper*s criticism, however, and despite Carnap*s partial
acceptance of it logical positivism in this physicalist version
gradually filtered into American behaviourism providing the psychologists
with what they took to be a sound methodology enabling them to
implement their •objectivism* at the theoretical level. Where classical
behaviourism's emphasis on observables was, as we have seen, positiviat
in an unsystematic way neobehaviourism*s rationale and methodology
waa increasingly based on explicit logical positivist recommendations.
This is not to say that these recommendations were implemented in their
-114-
entirety; rather they were incorporated piecemeal, adapted to the
behaviourists* own requirements. But they were certainly taken to
provide general support for the behaviourist tradition and to provide
the key to further advance. Referring,in 1939, to Carnap*s physicalism
the influential American behaviourist S.S. Stevens summed up its presumed
message:
•It is the Logical Positivist*s way of saying that ,,,
psychology must be operational and behaviouristic.*
This *new view* of science, as Stevens called it, was taken to support
the original emphasis on the need for a public, •objective*, data base -
namely, behaviour. So this emphasis was preserved in the transition
from classical to neobehaviouriBm. Next, it seemed to provide what
the psychologists had been looking for, a guaranteed method of
building theories without importing unobservable, metaphysical notions
which would undermine the objectivity of the discipline; in contrast
to Watsonian behaviourism it was now admitted that unobservables were,
after all, legitimate components of psychological theories. As
demanded by Camap these theoretical entities or dependent variables
had to be fully definable in or translatable into physical language.
The immediate effect of this was a relaxation of the anti-mentalist
posture of early behaviourism for it was held that mental terms, suitably
disinfected, could enter theories as legitimate unobservables. The
advantage of this move was that it gave behaviourists an answer to
the common-sense objection that behaviourism was absurd in its denial
of something which everybody knew to exist - namely, their own
consciousness. *Ve do not deny the existence of mind,* the
neobehaviourists could now reply, *we merely say that mind and
consciousness as traditionally conceived is occult and can play no role
in science.'
136 Stevens, S.S. (1939) p240
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By the mid-19501s Carnap started to weaken his physicalist
thesis in line with his recognition that it was impossible to obtain
a full definition of theoretical or psychological conoepts in terms
of observables* Dispositional terms in particular, he realised, oould
not be so reduced. His reasoning was that a dispositional term like,
sya, *brittle* was supposed to be definable in this way:
x is brittle :£ x is struck •> x breaks
Such a definition, however, applies not merely to objects which are
struck and break but to objects whioh are never struck. On this
definition all objects which are never struck are held to be 'brittle* ;
but since some objects which are never struck are not brittle we have
not defined the term correctly. Henoe, explicit full definition does
not work for theoretical terms. Applied to psychological terms this
means that they are not eliminable in favour of observable movements.
Before oonsidering Carnap* s proposals for modifying physicalism
it is worth pointing out that ' operation!Bm1, a philosophy of science
fathered by the physicist P.W. Bridgmen and favoured by neobehaviourists
around 1930, was a variant of this thesis of the full definability of
theoretical terms. Bridgman argued:
•The concept of length is therefore fixed when the
operations by whioh length is measured are fixed;
that is, the concept of length involves as much as
and nothing more than the set of operations by whioh
length is determined. In general, we mean by any
concept nothing more than a set of operations; the
oonoept is synonomous with the corresponding set of
operations.* 137
Henoe, in subscribing to the full definability of terms, operationists
face the same difficulties as did the early physicalists.
To avoid these difficulties Carnap suggested in 1936-37 that the
requirement of full definability be given up and replaced by 'partial
137 Bridgman, P.W. (1927) p5
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definition* via *reduction sentences*.'1''8 In brief - for the
modifications are argued for at length - reduction sentences do not
completely define what it is for an object to be, say, 'brittle*; they
merely specify test conditions whioh apply only when specific
circumstances obtain - in the case above that would be when the object
is struck. With reference to objects for which the oircumstances do
not obtain no criteria of application are given. Applied to psychology
Carnap*s modified physicalism now claimed that for every mental concept
there are publicly observable, behavioural criteria associated with
that concept which allow an investigator to say whether or not a person
is in the state referred to. Not only do I have access to my mental
states via introspection but, in principle, anyone else, Caroap said,
can gain access as well by observing my movements. But Carnap no
longer maintained that it was possible to fully reduce such mental
terms to observables - there is more to such terms than can be defined.
Behaviourists did not react in a uniform manner to these
modifications. Some, in line with Caxnap, changed their views on the
status of theoretical terms. Others continued to defend the initial
physicalist view or indeed only started to embrace that position after
it had been abandoned by its philosophical sponsors. As a result the
pattern of influence of logical positivism within behaviourism becomes
more complicated and, combined with the already noted fact that what
techniques or norms which were imported into the discipline were
adapted to psychology's specific needs, difficult to assess. What can
be stated, however, is that many influential psychologists were, at
least, indifferent to the modifications and changing formulations of
logical positivist and empiricist thought. Typical of such behaviourists
158 Carnap, R. (1936, 1957)
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is B.F. Skinner who has continued to call for full operational
definitions of all psychological concepts and furthermore asserts,
without further argument, that this is the only way to implement a
scientific psychology. In the face of this it is difficult to resist
Koch* s conclusion that psychology's relations with the 'new view' of
science were 'spotty, adventitiously determined, and not supported by
159
especially expert scholarship in the relevant sources* and
'throughout this entire sequence and down to this very day, no great
clarity was achieved about these imported ideas.'140
After their emigration to the United States the logical positivists,
thereafter the logical empiricists, continued to refine their meaning
criteria and in the 1940's and 1950's further liberalized the
associated physical!st doctrines. Partial definition of terms was
no longer demanded and Carnap proposed that mental terms be introduced
by first specifying a set of theoretical principles in which they
function and seoond, a set of 'correspondence rules' which provide
partial observational criteria for some of the theoretical terms. In
short, mental terms are not held to be dispositions to behave nor are
they held to possess necessary or sufficient conditions of application
that can be stated in an observational vocabulary. This has followed
from the fact that the wider and narrower meaning criteria have been
given^
Today Caroap's bold, radical physicalism has given way to Feigl's
physiealistic identity theory which claims - as a scientific hypothesis -
that every mental state is coextensive with some neurophysioiogioal
state, which a future unified science will identify. This physicalism,
159 Koch, S. (19^4) Pl0
140 » " " pll
141 Carnap, E. (195&)
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which is hut a pale, apologetic descendant of the early Vienna
physicalism, no longer dictates to psychology the status it nay award
theoretical terms. As such, as we have seen, it is even adopted by
leading contemporary anti-behaviourists, the modern mentalists.
Behaviourism, we have also seen, has been similarly diluted and has
even been used by Quine1^2 to define the position that psychological
hypotheses must be tested by observations. To which Chomsky has
retorted: 'Qulne's proposal signifies the demise of behaviourism as
143
a substantive point of view, which is just as well.1
To conclude, this brief case study has attempted to show how
important philosophy of science has been in psychology*s history.
Behaviourism as formulated by Watson was shaped and justified by an
unanalysed and implicit positivism that prepared the movement for its
subsequent reconstruction by the logical positivists of the Vienna
Circle and later, the logical empiricists. These philosophers of
science developed and exported to psychology 'decision procedures* or
'methodological rules* whioh, they claimed, would enable the
behaviourists to put their discipline on a secure, objective scientific
footing. I have pointed out that these methodological rules and the
epistemology on which they rested were incisively criticised at the
time of their presentation by Karl Popper with arguments which were
admitted to be destructive by the logical positivists themselves. Yet
Popper's arguments were ignored by the behaviourists who quickly and
somewhat naively implemented the Carnapian phyaioalism. I have then
briefly traced the subsequent dilutions of physicalist dootrlnes and
the increasingly complex implications of those positions for psychology
due to attachment to different philosophical views. Given the size
142 Quine, W.V.O. (1969)
145 Chomsky, N. (1975)
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of the literature on both logical positivism and behaviourism this
case study could not be other than schematic and the main point has
yet to be demonstrated* that psychology, had it been based on the
philosophy of science developed by Karl Popper rather than on the
logical positivism of his opponents, would have looked very different




The Ob.ieotivist Epistemology of Karl Popper
After the lecture there was a discussion, and Ayer
encouraged me to say something. So I said first that I did
not believe in induotion at all, even though I believed in
learning from experience, and in an empiricism without
those Kantian limits which Russell proposed. This statement,
which I formulated as briefly and pointedly as I could with
the halting English at my disposal, was well received by the
audience who, it appears, took it as a joke, and laughed. In
my second attempt I suggested that the whole trouble was due
to the mistaken assumption that scientific knowledge was a
species of knowledge - knowledge in the ordinary sense in
which if I know that it is raining it must be true that it is
raining, so that knowledge implies truth. But, I said, what
we call "scientific knowledge" was hypothetical, and often
not true, let alone certainly or probably true (in the sense
of the calculus of probability). Again the audienoe took
this for a joke, or a paradox, and they laughed and olapped.
I wonder whether there waB anybody there who suspected that
not only did I seriously hold these views, but that, in due
course, they would be widely regarded as commonplace.
Introduction
•The main philosophical malady of our time is an intellectual and
moral relativism, the latter being at least in part based upon the
combat relativism and defend the objectivity of scientific knowledge.
Perhaps his greatest achievement has been to provide a method for
fighting relativism successfully, an antidote to a malady which has
threatened to turn into an epidemic in recent years.
Traditionally philosophers have come to espouse relativism with








with a conviction that some beliefs, at least, were superior to others
and had a rational basis which it was their task to make clear.
However, these attempts to promote some beliefs to the status of
*knowledge* as opposed to mere 'opinion* quickly led, as ue shall see,
to an even deeper relativism. Popper's strategy for avoiding this
unfortunate consequence was to adopt more modest epistemological
standards than previous anti-relativists. In particular, he embraced
fallibilism and recognised that every claim to knowledge may be
completely mistaken. His move may be viewed as a caso of reculer pour
mieux sauter. a retreat from standards that were unattainable to better
defend the notion of objective knowledge.
Before examining Popper's epistenology in detail T would like to
make my own strategy clear. I have argued that behind each of the
competing approaches to psychology, already reviewed, lie more
comprehensive philosophies, each with its own distinct views on
scientific method, the role of theoretical concepts, the nature of
explanation and understanding, the logic of social action and so on.
These different philosophies provide very different criteria for
assessing claims about whether and how psychology should be praotised.
Different philosophies legitimate different approaches to psyohology.
How I wish to suggest that Popper's • fallibilist absolutist'^
epistemology, discussed below and subject to various modifications and
qualifications introduced in the next chapter, provides the most
satisfactory perspective from which to judge the merits and demerits
of the conflicting arguments about psychology. It provides an
enlightening analysis and vigorous defence of the rationality of
scientific enquiry and enables us to affirm, in principle, the viability
3 Popper, K.R. (1945) Vol.2 p377
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of a scientific psychology. So, after explicating Popper*s philosophy
of soience in this chapter I shall, in the next, review criticisms
and objections which have been levelled against it. Then, after
recognising the force of some of these arguments and rejecting others,
I shall employ this modified Popperian philosophy to evaluate the
worth of the aspirant psychologies. Finally, I will discuss in the
last chapter of this thesis, the implications for psychology of Popper's
more recently published metaphysical theories, theories which he has
developed in his efforts to further strengthen his defence of objectivity
in science.
Protagoras is usually credited^ with the classic statement of
relativism when he asserted that man is the measure of all things.
What is true depends, on this account, on what the individual chooses
to believe; he makes his own truth. More commonly, relativism is the
term used to refer to the doctrine that groups, communities or
societies deoide what is to constitute truth for them. In neither
case is there any sense to the notion that the beliefs of either an
individual or a society can be measured against some external,
objeotive standard. It i3 nonsensical, relativists maintain, to say
that a belief is true or false independent of what any person or
community thinks about it. In up-to-date psychological language
relativism may be expressed like thiss *Each person is a member of a
community or social group, conditioned throughout hi3 life by an
intricate web of positive and negative reinforcements which shape his
norms, expectations, values and principles. What anyone therefore
values or chooses to call true or false, good or bad, ugly or beautiful eto
4 Trigg, R. (1973) P3« According to Plato, says Trigg,
Protagoras held that anything * is to me as it appears to me and is to
you as it appears to you.*
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is completely determined by the social forces and authorities in his
group or society. Therefore what is good, true, beautiful eto is simply
a matter of social convention. Furthermore no group or community is
privileged in being exempt from the operation of such sooial mechanisms.
Scientific communities, despite claims to the contrary and a camouflage
which tolerates dissent of a purely conformist kind i.e. arguments,
have no less effective power structures than other highly organised
communities and such power structures enforce the law - determine what
5
is true, what is false - as rigidly as any other. Finally, any
epistemologist who believes in the existence of objeotive truth and
say, the superiority of scientific knowledge is himself the product
of a social framework and hence his belief is as socially determined
as any other. All beliefs are socially produced and hence derive what
value they have from the individual, group or community for which they
function; they have no value independent of the social unit which
created them.*
Justificationism
The history of epistemology can be reconstructed as a series of
attempts to overcome relativist arguments of this kind. And in fact
Popper has reconstructed traditional epistemological debate so that
he could both identify the source from which relativism has sprung and
prevent future thinkers from, as he sees it, sinking into the
relativist mire. Historically, philosophers who often disagreed among
themselves on whether knowledge of any kind was possible have, in his
view, shared one fundamental assumption. They agreed that if any
5 'The authority of truth is the authority of society.' Thus
writes a sociologist of science, David Bloor, in his 'Popper's
Mystification of Qbjective Knowledge'. 1973 pl7» Bloor's argument is
examined in Chapter Six.
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belief could be justified then it was absolutely or objectively true
and could be legitimately awarded the title •knowledge•. Which is to
say that the traditional epistemologists shared, in Popper's view, a
• justificationist' theory of knowledge. If a belief could not be
justified or proven or established or found indubitable or made certain,
either totally or partially, then it remained a mere belief.'
Adoption of justificationism is a disastrous way to fight
relativism, Popper argues, for it quickly plunges its proponents into
an even deeper relativism. To see that this is so let us briefly
consider how justificationists tried to combat the sceptical, relativist
claim that there is no knowledge, that no belief can be justified, that
7
every belief is on a par with every other. Sceptics started off by
pointing out that a statement of belief could only be justified by
producing another statement in its support. The latter, in turn,
obviously requires a further statement in its support - or so the
sceptics argued. The uncomfortable consequence of this, they
triumphantly asserted, is either an endless regress or a circular
argument. But it is not knowledge.
To overcome this argument some dogmatists abandoned the view that
a statement of belief could bo justified only by another statement and
proclaimed instead that the regress of justifications could be ended
by tracing all beliefs to some fundamental self-evident first principles.
That is to say they took some subjective or psychological property
which they associated with the belief to either guarantee or even define
6 Popper, K.R. (1972) pl28
7 Following Musgrave * s usage let us call those who deny that
any belief can be justified the * sceptics'. Sceptics were usually
justification!sts in that they equated knowledge with justified belief;
they merely denied that any beliefs could be justified. For reasons
that will soon become obvious those who assert that beliefs can be
justified are called 'dogmatists1. Musgrave, A. (1974) P5&1
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its objective truth. In other words they employed a subjective theory
of truth in that a subjective experience was held to guarantee or
define the truth of the statement. All other beliefs and statements
were then held to be justified relative to these * fundamental* first
principles.
To the delight of the sceptics the dogmatists exhibited considerable
variation both in the beliefs which they took to be fundamentally
true and in the subjective attributes of belief which were held to be
infallible criteria of truth. Rationalists typically opted for such
subjective feelings as clarity, distinctness and indubitability
8
resulting from the contemplation of some belief or statement;
empiricists, on the other hand, preferred feelings of obviousness or
perceptual assurance generated by sensory experiences.
The sceptics in fact had very little difficulty in coping with
these dogmatist variations. Is it not a fact, the sceptics asked,
that what is clear, distinct, indubitable, obvious and certain to one
man is none of these things to another? Rationalists and empiricists,
they pointed out, disagree not only with each other but differ among
themselves over which beliefs are to be held to be true. And these
feelings of conviction, these psychological impressions vary from person
to person, time to time and for the same person at different times.
Surely truth, the sceptics asked, is not held by dogmatists (of all
8 Descartes illustrates this type of argument:
'After this I considered in general what is requisite to the
truth and certainty of a proposition; for since I had just found one
that I knew to have this nature, I thought I must also know what
this certainty consists in. Observing that there is nothing at all
in the statement *1 am thinking, therefore I exist* whioh assures me
that I speak the truth, except that I see very clearly that in order
to think I must exist, I judged that I oould take it as a general
rule that whatever we conoeive very clearly and very distinctly is
true; only there is some difficulty in discerning what conceptions
really are distinct.* (1954) P32.
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people) to be dependent on such unreliable and whimsical phenomena?
Par better, they replied to their own question, to admit that there
are no fundamental, universally agreed first-principles at all nor are
there any infallible criteria which can be employed either to guarantee
or define the truth of beliefs. Let us admit, they concluded, that
what •first-principles1 or 'starting points* we take to be true and
relative to which we 'justify* our beliefs are nothing but arbitrary,
irrational assumptions. Let us not delude ourselves that we possess
genuine knowledge. Since no beliefs can be justified, nothing can be
known.
What the sceptics in this reconstruction are rejecting, in
Popper's eyes, is what rationalists and empiricists have traditionally
subscribed to - what Popper calls the dogma that truth is manifest.
'By the doctrine that truth is manifest I mean ... the
optimistic view that truth, if put before us naked, is
always recognizable as truth. This truth, if it does
not reveal itself, has only to be unveiled or discovered.
Once this is done, there is no need for further argument.
We have been given eyes to see the truth, and the
'natural light' of reason to see it by.
This dootrine is at the heart of the teaching of both
Descartes and Bacon. Descartes based his optimistic
epistemology on the important theory of the veracitas dei.
What we clearly and distinctly see to be true must indeed
be true; for otherwise God would be deceiving us. Thus
the truthfulness of God must make truth manifest.
In Bacon we have a similar dootrine. It might be described
as the doctrine of the veracitas naturae, the truthfulness
of Nature. Nature is an open book. He who reads it with a
pure mind cannot misread it. Only if his mind is poisoned
by prejudice can he fall into error.* 9
With this last remark Popper draws attention to a second theory
held by dogmatists, a corollary of the doctrine that truth is manifest
and a reply usually made to soeptics amused by the disharmony within
the dogmatist camp. This is what he calls the 'conspiracy theory of
9 Popper, K.R. (1965) p7
-127-
error' To sceptics who pointed out that not everyone finds the same
beliefs evident, clear, etc and hence, on the dogmatists' criteria, a
•
specific belief must be regarded as true for one man but not for
another, dogmatists often replied that some people are just plainly
wrong. Subjective, psychological guarantees of truth are universal,
they answered, and so everyone ought to find the same beliefs clear,
distinct, etc. The fact that they do not do so only shows that some
minds are biased, prejudiced, misled or otherwise impure. Hence
dogmatists were forced to employ what Musgrave calls a psychotherapy, a
method 'to cleanse the mind of bias and prejudice so that it could
receive the truth i.e. so that their subjeotive criteria should never
deceive.'11 Other dogmatists preferred to argue that the disagreement
over which beliefs aire self-evident, fundamental, etc is due to the
fact that some people only think they have employed the criterion of
truth correctly. Hot every belief which is clear and distinct to the
person who holds it is actually clear and distinct. 'Hence,' the
sceptics were quick to respond, 'we need a further criterion for
distinguishing genuine psychological feelings from erroneous ones.*
And this leads either to an endless regress or plain dogmatism, to an
authoritarian faith in one's own feelings reinforced by a psychotherapy
which would make these feelings 'self-evident* to everybody else.
In summary, dogmatists set out to combat relativism by attempting
to justify specific beliefs, thereby affirming their truth and turning
them into genuine knowledge. Justification!am leads directly to
subjectivism, the claim that a subjeotive psychological feeling supposedly
invariably associated with a belief provides its ultimate justification.
Not only does this fail to embarrass the relativist but it defeats
10 Popper, K.R. (1963) p7
11 Musgrave, A. (l974) P563
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the dogmatists aim of defending the power of rational argument. For
if two people disagree over •first-principles1, if they have different
feelings about beliefs, then the difference cannot be settled by
discussion - feelings cannot be argued about so the disagreement invites
an authoritarian settlement. One person must be led to a •correct1
view of things. Further, by insisting that rational discussion is only
possible between people who share the same *first-prinoiple8* dogmatists
12
are actually saying that we cannot discuss genuine disagreements.
If two people genuinely disagree, no discussion can ever get started.
Henoe, dogmatists set out to defend the power of argument and end up
by sharply constricting its role - and to no avail because the dogmatists
fall back on the very relativism they tried to avoid.
Knowledge> Subjective and Objective
To fight relativism effectively Popper challenges the assumption,
shared by both dogmatists and sceptics alike, that knowledge worthy of
the name consists of beliefs which have been or may be Justified. He
develops a method whereby it makes sense to talk of beliefs or, more
accurately, of statements meeting objective standards even though we
cannot Justify our claims about their epistemological status. Popper
rejects Justifioationism because it conflates two areas of enquiry which
ought, he says, to be kept distinct. We may, for the moment, call these
the areas concerned with the genesis and Justification of beliefs
respectively. Questions such as •How did this man oome to believe this?1
12 This claim that rational discussion is only possible between
people who share the same •first-principles1, •assumptions1, etc. is
what Popper calls 'the Myth of the Framework* which is 'in our time the
central bulwark of irrationalism.• (1970) p56« Despite its 'revolutionary'
guise (see Kuhn*s theory of science, already discussed) this claim is
but one consequence of the traditional Justifioationist conception of
knowledge.
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or 'Why does this man find this belief so obvious or certain?' are
very different from and call for a very different kind of investigation
from the question which asks 'Is this man's belief true?' or 'Despite
the fact that nobody seems to believe this statement - is the statement
true?'
Dogmatists do not make this distinction which Popper recommends
because they believe it is possible to establish the truth or falsity
of a statement by examining its genesis or source. This reflects their
twin attachments to the theory that truth is manifest and to the
conspiracy theory of error. Both of these theories are false, Popper
argues, because most human conjectures are false:
•For the simple truth is that truth is often hard to
come by and that once found it may easily be lost again.
Erroneous beliefs may have an astonishing power to
survive, for thousands of years in defianoe of experience,
with or without the aid of any conspiracy.' 13
Identifying knowledge with beliefs of a certain kind obscures, he
suggests, the ambiguity of that word. A belief can refer either to the
contents of a proposition or statement, or to the psychological act
by which it is either generated or understood. It is perfectly legitimate,
Popper says, for a man to concern himself with either or both of these
fields of enquiry. The contents of a belief may, for example, be
studied to find out whether they support or contradict the contents of
some other belief; or to find out whether they are true or false; or
whether they are self-contradictory. On the other hand, that same
belief in the mind of a speoific person may be investigated to establish
whether it is held with conviction, whether it is liable to be discarded
on a whim or whether it is part of a more complex belief system. What
is not legitimate, Popper argues, is to attempt to answer questions
13 Popper, K.R. (1963) p8
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about the status of knowledge by studying the source of knowledge or
vice versa. In short, he draws a sharp distinction between the logic
of knowledge and the psychology of knowledge.
Armed with this distinction between knowledge considered as a
subjective belief in a person*a mind and knowledge viewed as the contents
of statements Popper reformulates and then dissolves Eume*s Problem,
the problem of induction. Knowledge, for Hume, was a species of belief -
beliefs which oould be justified. When, after due reflection, he
conoluded that no beliefs could be justified he was held to have
undermined all claims to knowledge and dealt a lethal blow to human
rationality. Beliefs men must have, Hume admitted, but they are the
result of blind habit - they are not established by reason.
•If I ask you why you believe any particular matter of
fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason;
and this reason will be some other fact connected with
it. But as you oannot proceed after this manner, in
infinitum, you must at least terminate in some fact,
which is present to your memory or sense; or must
allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.
What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? A
simple one; though, it must be confessed, pretty remote
from the common theories of philosophy. All beliefs
of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely
from some object, present to the memory or 3ense, and a
customary conjunction between that and some other object.
Or, in other words; having found, in many instances,
that any two kinds of objects - flame and heat, snow and
cold - have always been conjoined together; if flame or
snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried
by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe that
such a quality does exist and will discover itself upon
a near approach. The belief is the necessary result of
placing the mind in such circumstances.* 14
In modern parlance Hume here rejects the principle of induction
and denies that it is ever justifiable or rational to reason from
instances of which we have experience to instances of which we have no
experience. Beliefs about the world, including beliefs to whioh science
14 Hume, D. (1902) p46
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has led us, have - he says - no rational basis. What beliefs we do
hold about the world are but the result of associations or repetitions;
our minds are conditioned to expect future events simply because the
same kind of events have occurred on the same occasions in the past.
But such beliefs are not justified; they are not knowledge.
The consequences of Hume's argument were not always aocepted by
later empiricists or, indeed, even by Hume himself. Though not answered
the sceptical conclusions were conveniently forgotten. Bertrand Russell,
however, stated them with characteristic lucidity:
'The growth of unreason throughout the nineteenth
century and what has passed of the twentieth is a
natural sequel to Hume's destruction of empiricism.
It is therefore important to discover whether there
is any answer to Hume within the framework of a
philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical. If not,
there is no intellectual difference between sanity and
insanity. The lunatic who believes that he is a poached
egg is to be condemned solely on the ground that he is
in a minority, or rather - since we must not assume
democracy - on the ground that the government does not
agree with him. This is a desperate point of view,
and it must be hoped that there is some way of ©soaping
from it.' 15
Popper's unique contribution to epistemology has been to offer an escape
from Hume's depressing and pessimistic legacy. He dissolves Hume's
Problem by arguing that induction is not the method of science.
Fallibilism
Translated into the logical mode of speech Hume's logical problem
of induotion is presented by Popper thus:
•Can the claim that an explanatory universal theory is
true be justified by 'empirical reasons'; that is by
assuming the truth of certain test statements or
observation statements (which, it may be said, are
•based on experience').' 16
15 Russell, B. (1948) p699
16 Popper, K.R. (1972) p7
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His answer is the sane as Hume's. No, such a claim can never be
justified) a finite number of particular statements can never entail a
universal theory. Induction, he agrees, is not logically possible.
Unlike Hume, however, he does not oonclude that scientific knowledge
is thereby deprived of a rational basis. Instead he proposes that we
locate the rationality of science in the attempt to disprove universal
theories. Popper exploits the assymmetry between verification and
falsification to propose that the logic of science lies in the
vulnerability of universal theories to refutation by just one counter-
instance. With this proposal Popper breaks the age-old identification
of knowledge with justified belief. Scientific knowledge, he proposes,
consists of those theories which are judged not to have been refuted.
Popper then employs the distinction between the logic and the
psychology of knowledge to attack the justificationist (and in particular,
the empiricist) account of the relation between science and experience.
Traditional empiricists had tried to reduce all scientific knowledge
to an *empirical base*. On this view all statements in science were
justified by the perceptual experience of the 'knover'. Perceptions,
observations, experiences were held to justify or establish perception
or observation statements. These statements in turn were the basis from
which all other scientific statements were deductively inferred. We
have seen that this was the view of the logical positivists of the
Vienna Circle; they wanted to make scientific knowledge secure and
prevent future revolutions or upheavals by making certain that all
theoretical statements could be reduced to observation statements,
themselves based upon or justified by experience.
Popper denies that perceptions or experiences can be taken to
justify the decision to accept an 'observation statement'. The
traditional empiricist view overlooks a simple logical point. It is
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this. Every scientific statement contains universal terms which go far
beyond immediate experience.
•Every description uses universal names (or symbols,
or ideas)} every statement has the character of a theory,
of a hypothesis. The statement, *Here is a glass of
water* cannot be verified by any observational experience.
The reason is that the univarsals which appear in it cannot
be correlated with any specific sense experience. (An
•immediate experience* is »only onoe* • immediately given*}
it is unique.) By the word *glass*, for example, we
denote physical bodies which exhibit a certain law-like
behaviour, and the same holds for the word *water*.
Universale cannot be reduced to classes of experiences}
they cannot be *constituted*.* 17
Perceptions, observations and experiences are psychological affairs}
observation sentences are logical entities and so their truth or falsity
cannot be established by experience. Hence, says Popper, observation
statements are conjectures, conventionally (and tentatively) agreed to
be true by a scientist or group of scientists. Since they cannot be
justified by experience( or in any other way) we must admit that they
may well be false. It is at this point that Popper* s logic of science
18
becomes irredeemably fallibilist. As this part of his argument has
been much criticised let us see what he says about the role of
experience in science.
•And finally, as to psyohologism: I admit, again,
that the decision to accept a basic statement, and
to be satisfied with it, is causally connected with
our experiences - especially with our perceptual
experiences. But we do not attempt to justify basic
statements by these experiences. Experiences can
motivate a decision, and hence an acceptance or
rejection of a statement, but a basic statement
cannot be justified by them - no more than by
thumping the table.* 19
17 Popper, K.R. (1959) P95
18 It is at this point, say his critics, that Popper*s theory of
science becomes non-empirical. If we cannot rely on our senses as
justification for observation statements then talk about •scientific
knowledge* is pretence. A.J. Ayer*s criticisms of what he takes to be
a fundamental flaw in Popper* s analysis are examined, together with
other objections, in Chapter Pour, Part Two.
19 Popper, K.R. (1959) pl05
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Where the empiricist justifioationists tried to defend the
objectivity of science by resting all theoretical statements on a hard-
20
core of observables or certain perceptions, on what Feigl and Blumberg
call 'the ground-floor of knowledge, the given1 and consequently fell
into relativism Popper tries to defend the objectivity of science
without having to olaim that any specific empirical assertion is true.
Fallibilism may be viewed as the price paid for avoiding relativism.
What happens in science then, on this view, is that the scientist
advances a conjecture about the natural or social world. How the
scientist came to think up the conjecture is deemed to be a problem for
empirical psychology, not for the epistemologist whose sole oonoerns are
the logical analysis and appraisal of theories. Just as it is not the
psychologist's job, qua psychologist, to explain the logic of science
so it is not the epistemologist*s role to explain why someone produced
21
a particular theory. Popper's work, The Logic of Scientific Discovery,
is thus oddly named for he holds that there can be no logic of discovery.
To search for a logic of discovery is to violate the distinction he
draws between the logic and the psychology of knowledge.
Once a conjecture is advanced it is, henceforward, to be assessed
independently of its source. The scientist deduces a prediction from
the conjecture together with a statement of initial conditions and
possibly with the help of auxiliary background theories. Next, the
scientist carries out an experiment to test the prediction and, indirectly,
the initial conjecture. On the basis of the observed outcome of the
experiment the scientist accepts an 'observation statement' or 'basic
statement* which either falsifies or corroborates the prediction. To
20 Feigl, H. and Blumberg, A.E. (1931) p292
21 Against this view of Popper's Medawar argues that there is
some 'internal censorship* which eliminates absurd hypotheses from any
consideration. Hence, psychology has an epistemological function.
Medawar, P. (19^9) P53* See Chapter Four, Part Two.
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acoept this •basic statement* is, in effeot, to cease criticising it
for the time being; the philosophy of soienoe which Popper advocates
thus incorporates a conventional component at the level of these
singular observation statements. But it is a critical conventionalism,
says Popper, (in oontrast to the conventionalism of Poinoare and Duhem)
for there is no question of any 'basic statement* being beyond repeal,
beyond refutation. The quotation marks simply mean that the accepted
statement is not basic in the traditional empiricist sense. Though
the scientist is led to adopt suoh a *basio statement* by his experiences
he cannot use his experience as a logical justification for his
acceptance.^
Now it is important to realise that if the scientist regards the
prediotion (and hence, the conjecture) as falsified by the 'basic
statement* which he has accepted, he may well be mistaken. The original
conjecture may be a true theory and the scientist's mistake may lie in
his decision to accept the 'basic statement*, So science is, in Popper*s
eyes, fallible to the core. Neither conclusive proof nor conclusive
23
disproof is possible in science. We can never know for certain that
we have not made an error when we either accept or reject a theory.
Everything that we call scientific knowledge may well be false. This,
therefore, is the argument behind the long quotation at the beginning
of this chapter and behind Popper*s famous statement about the
foundations of objective knowledge:
22 Popper writes: 'My term, *basis* has ironical overtones: it
is a basis that is not firm.' (1959) pill
is 23 Popper repeatedly stresses the fallibilism of his logic of
science. However it must be said that he sometimes writes as if we
know for certain that we have made the right decision. For example, he
suggests that a theory which has failed severe tests is false. See (1963)
p235» paragraph one. Given his argument for fallibilism he ought to
conclude that the theory may be false. This may help explain the mistaken
but widespread assumption that he takes faleifiability to be decisive -
an assumption made, for example, by Bronowski (1974) p6l6/7.
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•The empirical basis of objective science has thus
nothing •absolute' about it. Science does not rest
upon rock bottom. The bold structure of its theories
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building
erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above
into the swamp, but not down to any natural or •given'
base; and when we cease our attempts to drive our piles
into a deeper layer, it is not because we have reached
firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that
they are firm enough to carry the structure, at least
for the time being.' 24
In terms of the reconstruction of epistemological debate developed
earlier Popper can be seen to side with the sceptic in his denial that
any belief can be justified. Knowledge in the traditional sense is
unattainable. However we can see his affinity with the dogmatist in
his insistence that the notion of objective truth plays an essential
role in science. We shall see too that Popper sides with both kinds of
dogmatist, both rationalist and empiricist, in that he gives a role to
both the intellect and the senses in conjectures and refutations
*
respectively. It is not, of course, the role which the rationalists
and empiricists traditionally defended. So, then, scientific knowledge
emerges from this account as a series of theories which have not yet,
as far as we can judge, been falsified. Scientific theories are seen
25
to be, in Iyer's phrase, on 'indefinite probation'.
Ob.ieotlve Standards
The fallibility of scientific knowledge thus undermines the
justificationist defence of its objectivity. How, then, does Popper
defend his claim that science is objective? How does he defend the
view that scientific theories, though all equally fallible, are not all
equal? The answer is that he does so by developing objective standards
in the light of whioh theories may be appraised, standards which make
24 Popper, K.R. (1959) pill
25 Ayer, A.J. (1974) P&38
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it possible to rationally evaluate and ohoose between competing theories,
without justifying the chosen theory as the true one. His epistemology
is thus dependent upon an elaborate logical analysis of both theories
and the ideals which they should approach. The two most fundamental
standards in this analysis are those of content and truth, standards
which are now examined in turn.
Given that he takes a basic aim of science to be the growth of
knowledge Popper proposes that, other things being equal (such as the
degree of empirical support, an issue which will be examined later),
that theory is to be preferred which tells us more, which has the
greater amount of empirical information or content. Empirical content
of theories is a logioal notion and Popper has developed a measure of
content which allows us to say of a theory even before it has been
tested whether, should it pass speoific tests, it would be an improvement
on its predecessors and oompetitors.
•To put it a little differently, I assert that we know
what a good scientific theory should be like, and -
even before it has been tested - what kind of theory
would be better still, provided it passes certain
crucial tests. And it is this (meta-scientific)
knowledge which makes it possible to speak of progress
in science, and of a rational choice between theories.1
A good scientific theory has high content and a better one has more
content still. Popper has shown that the higher the content the more
improbable the theory which means, in turn, a higher probability of being
07
falsified.*" If we take science to have as its aim the growth of
knowledge, then we must admit, he argues that we want our theories to
be highly improbable and thus highly falsifiable or testable.
Testability, he suggests, is a criterion of progress (or potential
satisfactoriness) in that we prefer a more testable theory - even before
26 Popper, K.R. (1963) p217
27 " " (I959) Sections 31-46? appendix IX.
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we submit it to criticism and testing.
But high content is not enough. Science would not progress very-
far if scientists were content with content alonej if they just dreamt
up more and more improbable theories, indifferent to their truth and
indulged in a rapid demolition of their own wild ideas science would
soon appear, Popper argues, as a pointless and time-wasting activity.
He thus does not hesitate to demand that scientific theories ought to
aim at truth. We want both highly informative theories which will
hopefully stand up to critioism and which may thus be true. In his
20
early writings Popper avoided any lengthy discussion of this demand
for truth but since learning of Tarski's objective or correspondence
theory of truth he has made free use of it as a regulative idea in his
logic of science.
Tarski's theory of truth dovetails with Popper's analysis of
science for it separates the question of what it is for a statement to
be true from the question of how we know whether in fact a particular
statement or theory is true. To talk of a statement or theory being
true or 'corresponding to the facts' without simultaneously generating
various semantic paradoxes it is necessary, Tarski points out, to
distinguish between two sorts of statement found in natural languages -
such as English. Statements which refer to the world, such as 'Snow
is white*, he calls statements of the objeot-languagej statements which
refer to linguistic entities, such as 'The statement 'Snow is white' has
three words', he calls statements of the metalanguage. How the notions
of 'truth* and 'falsity', which apply to statements and theories, must
occur in the metalanguage if we are to avoid contradictions and paradoxes.
28 Popper, K.R. (1959) p275/4« 'In the logio of science here
outlined it is poseible to avoid using the concepts 'true' and 'false*.'
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Such problems do arise if these notions are expressible in the object-
29
language. Using a metalanguage we can then refer to both the
statement in the object-language and the facts to which it refers.
This enables us to define or give a complete account of what it is for
a particular object-language sentence to be true. It is this:
The statement 'Snow is white* is true if and only if snow is white.
This theory of Tarski's has given rise to various criticisms which
include the claim that it is not a version of the correspondence theory
50at all, the objection that it is circular and/or that it is trivial.
None of these criticisms have been accepted by Popper who applies
Tarski's version without qualification. The criticisms themselves have
51
been examined at length by Musgrave who, before he dismisses them,
explicates the confusions on which they are based. Incidentally, he
also isolates the 'rational kernel* in the later Wittgenstein's view
that it is not possible to speak about but merely to show the relation
between language and the world, the view behind his famous dictum:
52
•What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. • '
The rational kernel is the claim that the relation between a language
and the world cannot be discussed in the same language. From there,
however, Wittgenstein proceeded to relegate, says Musgrave, the entire
29 Tarski's theory of truth emerges from his solution of the
well-known Paradox of the Liar. Any language which can be a metalanguage
of itself and which contains the notions 'true' and 'false' will give
rise to the paradox. By introducing the rule that 'no language must
be a metalanguage of itself' and thereby modifying natural language by
making the object-language/metalanguage distinction Tarski allows us
to avoid the paradox and retain the objective theory of truth from
which the paradox seemed inevitably to arise. For a full and dear
account of Tarski's theory and the objections which have been made
against it see Musgrave's chapter on 'The Objective Theory of Truth' in
his Objective Knowledgei A Criticism of Subjectivism in Bpistemology (19&9)
50 Black, M. (1949) pl05
31 Muscnrave, A, (19&9) pl63ff
32 Wittgenstein, L. (19&1) pl51
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theory of meaning and truth to the ineffable and to inspire a school
whose theses could be indicated but not stated. Tarski*s distinction
between the object-language and the metalanguage paves the way, in
contrast, to an explicit investigation of the relations between
language and the world, including the theories of meaning and truth.
In other words Tarski paves the way to semantics where Wittgenstein
falls into irrationalism - the assertion that such relations cannot be
openly stated nor rationally discussed. As Musgrave puts it:
• Semantics speaks where Wittgenstein said we must
be silent.* 33
Tarski*s theory reinforces the distinction between the objective and
subjective dimensions of knowledge. Whether or not a theory is true
or false is now seen to be completely independent of whether or not
anyone thinks it true or false. A theory may be true even though nobody
believes it; or it may be false even though it meets with general
assent. Tarski provides no criterion for recognising true theories;
what his theory does is give a precise account of correspondence and
thus allows the idea of truth to play a regulative role in science.
Says Popper:
•The status of truth in the objective sense, as
correspondence to the facts, and its role as a
regulative principle, may be compared to that of a
mountain peak usually wrapped in clouds. A climber
may not merely have difficulties in getting there -
he may not know when he gets there, because he may
be unable to distinguish, in the clouds, between the
main summit and a subsidiary peak. Yet this does not
affect the objective existenoe of the summit; and if
the climber tells us *1 doubt whether I reached the
actual summit*, then he does, by implication, recognise
the objective existence of the summit. The very idea
of error, or of doubt (in its normal straightforward
sense) implies the idea of an objective truth which we






Fundamental though truth in Tarski»s sense is to Popper's logical
analysis of scientific knowledge it is very remote, Popper admits, from
the situation that confronts the scientist when he has to choose
between competing theories - all of which may eventually turn out to be
false. With a view to clarifying the logic of such a situation Popper
has recently combined the two objactivist notions of truth and content
(or logical consequence) in his theory of verisimilitude, a theory
which enables him to talk precisely of one theory being closer to the
truth even though both theories may eventually turn out to be false.
It is meaningful to say that a new theory, though false, is closer to
the truth than its (false) discarded predecessor.
Verisimilitude, which is a logical as opposed to an epistemological
notion, is based upon the fact that every false statement has true
logical consequences. If a statement 'a1 is true, then the class of all
the logical consequences of 'a* - the content of 'a' - consists only of
true statements because the truth is always transmitted from a premise
to its conclusions. Now, since a false statement will always have both
true and false consequences, we can say that in every statement there
may be more or less truth in what it says. Popper calls the class of
the true logical consequences of 'a* the truth-content of 'a'; the class
of the false consequences of 'a' is the falsity-content of 'a1.
If v. oonporo two theories ^ end T2 we can say that ^ has less
verisimilitude than if (l) their truth-contents and falsity-contents
are comparable (2) the truth-content of T^, but not the falsity-content,
is smaller than that of T^, or else (3) the falsity-content of but
not the truth-content, is sroater than the falsity-content of Tj. In
other words, the theory T? is said to be nearer to the truth if, and only
if, more true statements follow from it than from - but provided more
false statements do not follow from than
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The ideal theory on this account, the one with maximum possible
verisimilitude would be, Popper agrees, both true and comprehensively
true - it would correspond with all facts. But the point behind the
entire theory of verisimilitude is not to specify an ideal theory;
rather it is to defend the olaim that, in comparing competing theories,
which may both turn out to be false, we are appraising an objective
property with the same regulative character as the idea of objective
truth itself. In Popper* s words*
•This comparative use of the idea is its main point;
and the idea of a higher or lower degree of
verisimilitude seems less remote and more applicable and
therefore perhaps more important for the analysis of
scientific methods than the - in itself much more
fundamental - idea of absolute truth itself.* 55
Popper* s logic of science thus allows us to say whether or not a
theory, by virtue of its content, would constitute an advance upon its
predecessors if it were to stand up to test. His theory of verisimilitude,
which is still undergoing further development, allows ub to talk of a
refuted theory being nevertheless an advance on a previous refuted
theory, by virtue of being closer to the truth. Now it is important
to stress that this is a logical analysis of the notion of progress in
science; we can say, in the abstract, that a theory with a higher degree
of verisimilitude is an advance on a theory with a lower degree.
Popper* s analysis spells out the sense in which there can be progress
in scienoe.
However, just as Tarski provides no criterion for recognising
true theories or statements so Popper insists that we have no means of
knowing for certain whether one theory has greater verisimilitude than
another. Appraisal of the verisimilitude of competing theories remains
a fallible conjecture of an objective property based upon the severity
55 Popper, K.R. (1965) p254
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of the tests the theories have withstood to date. So when we choose
between competing theories, preferring one because it has, or is
conjectured to have, a higher degree of verisimilitude we may well be
mistaken. Despite his elaborate logical analysis of theories and the
standards they are said to approach Popper has never provided nor
attempted to provide a criterion for deciding correctly between competing
theories.
Explanation
Popper* s acoount of explanation is heavily dependent upon the
logical analysis of theories and standards as discussed thus far. By
linking the notion of the explanatory power of a theory to its content
or testability he is able to give an objective formulation of the
relation between explicans and explicandum in terms of the logical
37
relations between them. In his important paper The Aim of Science^'
he argues that if an explicans is to be neither circular nor ad-hoc
it must be rich in content, which means that it must have a variety of
testable consequences - some of which are different from the event to
be explained, the explanandum. These different testable consequences
then allow independent testing of the explicans. However, independent
testability of the explicans is not alone sufficient to ensure that the
explanation is not ad-hoc; for it always is possible to explain an
explanandum such as *The sea is rough today* (his example) by deducing
it from the independently testable but nevertheless ad-hoc conjunction,
'The sea is rough today and those plums are juicy*. Henoe, he argues:
36 Thus Ayer is mistaken in oriticising Popper for failing to
provide such a oriterion - for to have even tried to do so would have
run counter to his entire programme. Ayer, A.J. (1974) p691
37 Popper, K.R. (1972) pl91ff
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•Only if we require that explanations shall make use of
universal statements or laws of nature (supplemented by
initial conditions) can we make progress towards
realizing the idea of independent, or non ad-hoc
explanations. For universal laws of nature may be
statements with a rioh content, so that they may be
independently tested everywhere, and at all times.
Thus if they are used as explanations, they may not
be ad hoc because they may allow us to interpret the
explioandum as an instance of a reproducible effect.
All this is only true, however, if we confine ourselves
to universal laws which are testable, that is to say,
falsifiable.* 38
So a good scientific explanation would be one, he suggests, in
which the event to be explained or, more accurately, a statement
describing it is deducible from a testable and falsifiable universal
statement or law together with a statement of initial conditions. It
would be a good scientific explanation if, and only if, it had been
severely tested and had survived such tests. In line with Popper1 s
fallibilism, as I have now repeatedly stressed, an explanatory theory
which has survived such tests must be recognised as possibly false;
similarly, an explanatory theory which has not survived such severe
tests may nevertheless be true.
Now every explicans - i.e. universal statement, law or conjecture -
may itself be further explained by being deducible from theories of a
higher and higher level of universality. Hence every scientific
explanation may itself be further explained and this implies, Popper
argues, that there is in principle no end to science. •Thus the task
59
of science,* he says, *constantly renews itself.* ' At this point we
can see how his account of explanation dovetails with Ms theory of
38 Popper, K.R. (1972) pl93
39 He rejects the *essentialist doctrine* that there are ultimate
explanations not in need of further explanation. (1972) pl95/6. He
does accept that he may be called a •modified essentialist* in that he
does *not doubt that we may seek to probe deeper and deeper into the
structure of our world or, as we might say, into properties of the world
that are more and more essential, or of greater and greater depth.*
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verisimilitude. The latter combined the two fundamental aims of science,
high content and truth, specifying the ideal to which our theories
ought to approach as that of maximum verisimilitude. Scientific
explanations are now analysed as progressive (but fallibly appraised)
approximations to that goal. We hope that by continually developing
conjectural theories of higher and higher degrees of universality and
submitting them to the severest tests we can devise that they will probe
deeper and deeper into the struoture of the world and that the secrets
they reveal will be true.
Popper's analysis of explanation is not, however, as neat and
tidy as it may appear from this discussion. Though he has given a clear
sense to the notion of one theory providing a better explanation than
another he recognises that there is much more to be said. He talks of
the depth of a theory as a guide to our intuitions but doubts if it is
ever likely to be given an exhaustive logical explication. Despite
this, however, he offers a partial logical analysis of depth on the basis
of which he advances regulative standards to help us ohoose the better
of two competing theories; as I understand him, these new standards are
compatible with the view already discussed whioh recommends that we
choose the explanatory theory with higher oontent and which has survived
severe tests. But they go further - they are, he says, even better
standards which we ought to try to attain.
In brief, he argues that a good explanatory theory will not only
explain the problem (explanandum) which gave rise to it; it will
actually contradict or correct it. By way of example he shows that
Newton's dynamics contradicts Galileo's and Kepler's laws.^ This
allows him to claim that progress in science is revolutionary. On the
40 Popper, K.R. (1972) p202
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other hand, he can claim that progress - although revolutionary - is,
in a sense, conservative for a new theory must always be able to fully
explain its predecessors? success.
•In all those cases in which its predecessor was
successful, it must yield results at least as good as
those of its predecessor and, if possible, better
results. Thus in these cases the predecessor theory
must appear as a good approximation to the new theory;
while there should be, preferably, other cases where
the new theory yields different and better results
than the old theory.1 41
And so we can say that a theory which contradicts its predecessor in
some way and yet which can explain why its predecessor had at least some
success will, if it passes severe tests, constitute a better explanation.
This provides, says Popper, a criterion of progress and means that
theory-change in soience can be rationally assessed. In that sense
scienoe is a rational enterprise.
Popper*s objective or logical analysis of explanation contrasts
sharply with the notion of explanation that results from adopting a
subjective approach to knowledge - a position whioh is, we shall see,
no stranger to psychology. From a psychological standpoint we may be
said to explain an event to another person if we reduce or eliminate
his perplexity or feelings of puzzlement, if we can make the person feel
that he understands the cause of the event that troubled him. What is
wrong with this approach, in Popper's view, is that what will reduce
one man13 sense of bewilderment may increase another man's and vice
versa; or what dissolves my puzzlement tonight (when I am tired) may
not do so tomorrow (when I am wide awake). A good soientifio explanation
in the objective sense, an abstract high-content theory that meets the
standards discussed above is more likely, he argues, to cause
considerable confusion and bewilderment - just because it is a creative
41 Popper, K.R. (l974a)pQ5
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leap into the dark, a break with commonsense or common knowledge.^
A corollary of this analysis which insists that the objective
dimension is much more important for the appraisal of scientific
explanation is the recognition that problems too can be looked at from
two perspectives; again, it is the objective side of problems that is,
says Popper, the more important. This point is stressed in his more
AX
recent work where he talks of Bpistemology Without a Knowing Subject.
But the objeotive problem-situation that faces every student in every
scientific field has been a central theme of his philosophy right from
the start. Indeed this is clear from the opening lines of the preface
to the first edition of the The Logic of Scientific Disoovery.
*A scientist engaged in a piece of research, say in
physics, oan attack his problem straight away. He can
go at once to the heart of the matter; to the heart,
that is, of an organised structure. For a structure
of scientific doctrines is already in existence; and
with it, a generally accepted problem-situation.* 44
Only when he acquaints himself with the objeotive problem-situation will
the student, perhaps, manage to feel puzzled or perplexed and thereby
motivated to produce an objective explanation. But puzzlement in itself
is of no real consequence here for, after all, there may be rauoh
puzzlement where no objective problem exists; in that case we talk of a
pseudo-problem. Conversely, as Musgrave points out, a genuine problem
may fail to provoke feelings of puzzlement for years; *One mark of a
42 Perhaps the classic statement of the thesis that explanation
in soienoe is reduction to the familiar, reduction of the unknown to the
known is that of Sir William Thomson (later Lord Kelvin). He wrote:
*1 never satisfy myself until I oan make a mechanical model
of a thing. If I oan make a mechanical model I oan understand
it. As long as I cannot make a mechanical model all the way
through I cannot understand it.*
Quoted in Hempel (19&5) P434 Popper, on the other hand, takes the
opposite point of view:
•Thus scientifio explanation, whenever it is a discovery, will
be the explanation of the known by the unknown.* Popper, K.R.
(1972) pl91
43 Popper, K.R. (1972) pl06ff
44 " H (1959) pl3
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The method which Popper recommends to the scientist, if he wishes
to fulfill his aims of discovering highly informative theories which
are also true or, at least, oloser to the truth than their predecessors
is that of conjectures and refutations. The scientist is advised to
advanoe bold, imaginative hypotheses about the natural or social worlds -
for Popper is a monist in this respect, as Giedymin pointed out (p39 ) -
and then submit them to a policy of ruthless criticism and testing.
Now, in a sense, this is not a method at all. We have already
seen, in the case study, that the logical positivists of the Vienna
Circle claimed to have a method which would, if followed, guarantee
success and progress in science. They offered a •blueprint* for the
growth of knowledge. In contrast, Popper*s methodology is a much less
ambitious affair. First of all he admits that there is no method for
dreaming up, discovering or otherwise arriving at successful, true
conjectures or theories. Every hypothesis is a wild leap in the dark
and the wilder the leap the more significant will be the advance - if
and only if that hypothesis resists the most severe tests we can devise
against them. So, as I have already said, Popper admits that there is
no logic of discovery; there is no *blueprint* for success. (Attempts
at explaining the amazing success of science are, he says, in danger of
45 Misgrave, A. (1974) p572. A leading advocate of the
subjective approach to knowledge, says Mhsgrave, is Polanyi, for whom
•nothing is a problem or discovery in itself; it can be a problem only
if it puzzles or worries somebody, and a discovery only if it relieves
somebody from the burden of a problem.* Polanyi (1958) pl22
46 Perhaps I should say may be an advance for passing severe
tests is no guarantee of a theory* s truth.
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proving too much. By which he means, I take it, that the 'amazing
success' may turn out to be failure - the believed-to-be-true-theories
may well be false. I shall return to this issue in Chapter Five where
I examine Chomsky's suggestion that there may be a 'acience-forming*
capacity which it is the task of the cognitive psychologist to explain.^)
So his methodological recommendations are really concerned with
what happens once the scientist has produced a conjecture. Popper's
advice is to then attempt to falsify it by constructing the most
stringent tests we can think of. Again, in line with his objectivist
account, he stresses that the severity of tests is an objective matter.
Whether or not tests are severe is totally independent of such
psychological matters as whether the scientist thinks them to be or
wants them to be severe.
'The severity of our tests can be objectively compared;
and if we like, we can define a measure of their
severity.' 48
The objeotivity of tests, incidentally, is one reason why the claims
of such sociologists of science as Kuhn about the commitment scientists
allegedly make to their theories fails to impress Popper. Even if it
is the oase, he can reply, that scientists are deeply committed to the
truth of their theories and have a strong faith that they will triumph
they may nevertheless manage to submit them to tests which are, from an
objective standpoint, severe. On the other hand, if Kuhn exaggerates
the narrowmindedness of the scientific community and scientists do try
to criticise and test them may, from an objeotive standpoint again,
fail to do so. They may wish to test them severely but never manage to
invent a severe test.
47 Chomsky, N. (1976) p24
48 Popper, K.R. (1963) p388
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Now Popper has written extensively on the method of science and
as with the notion of verisimilitude there is a lively, ongoing debate
about how we can measure the severity of tests. To review these issues
in full would require a long digression and so I shall restrict myself
to what I take to be his main recommendations.
Once the scientist has arrived at a theory he should, first of all,
ask himself whether it is falsifiable. If it is not falsifiable either
49
because it is, in principle, compatible with every and any eventuality^
or because there is no method of testing it (at present) then it is not
to be regarded as scientific. If the theory is falsifiable then the
scientist should state, prior to any experimental tests, the conditions
under which he will give it up. And should the experiments refute the
theory* s predictions then he should not try to immunise it by resorting
to what Popper calls *conventionalist stratagems* or ad-hoc theories
which would explain away the embarrassing results. So Popper lays down
a supreme methodological rules
•It is the rule which says that the other rules of
scientific procedure must be designed in such a way
that they do not protect any statement in science
against falsification.* 50
Prom a methodological point of view - as opposed to a logical one -
no theory is clearly falsifiable. Even when we have ruled out evasive
ploys by the adoption of the above rule we must recognise, says Popper,
that when we test a high-level (i.e. high content) theory we never
test it alone. We test a conplex of the initial high-level theory,
initial oonditions and auxiliary theories. And when we obtain an
49 This was the case with Adler*s psyohology, Popper decided.
It was one of the inspirations for his proposal that falsifiability be
adopted as the oriterion of demarcation between science and non-soienoe.
See Popper (1974) P?1
50 Popper, K.R. (1959) P54
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experimental refutation we must decide which part of the complex is
responsible; such decisions are, again, fallible conjectures and so
we may mistakenly abandon a true (high-level) theory or mistakenly
aooept a false one. 'We can never,' he says, 'be certain that we
challenge the right bit (of background knowledge); but since our quest
51
is not for certainty, this does not matter.'^ This provides,
incidentally, Popper's answer to Quine who (following Buhem) argues
that 'our statements about the external world face the tribunal of
52
sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body. • '
To which Popper replies that while this is true it does not embarrass
a fallibilist - though it might turn a positivist or verifioationist,
who wants to know for certain which part of the complex-under-test is
responsible for the refutation, into a sceptic.
Finally, as I have now stressed perhaps ad nauseam, Popper
accepts that we can never justify any theory i.e. a claim that it is
true, no matter how severe the tests it has withstood nor for how long
it has been successful. What we can do is justify our preference for
a theory by choosing the one which has emerged from the struggle for
survival, the one which has best stood up to our attempts to destroy
it."^ And if we choose to aot on this theory in the future we do not
assume that it is true - in which case we would, as Popper's critics
imply, be appealing to a tacit inductive principle; we simply hold
51 Popper, K.R. (1963) p238
52 Quine, W.Y.O. (1953) P41
53 After a theory has survived a severe test that test passes
into background knowledge and will, henceforth, not constitute a
severe test. We may come to feel that a very successful theory, after
much severe testing, after many failures to find falsifications, is
nothing but a set of implicit definitions or conventions - as, for
example, Poinoare felt about Newton's theory. But once we do find a
refutation we know that it was indeed empirical. 'De mactuis nil nisi
bene; once a theory is refuted, its empirical character is secure and
shines without blemish.' Popper, K.R. (1963) p240
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that the most rational course we have is to act on the hest corroborated
hypothesis - in the hope that it is true. In Popper's wordss
•To put it in a nutshells we can never rationally
justify a theory - that is, a claim to know its truth -
but we can, if we are lucky, rationally justify a
preference for one theory out of a set of competing
theories, for the time being; that is, with respect to
the state of the discussion. And our justification,
though not a claim that the theory is true, can be the
claim that there is every indication at this stage of
the discussion that the theory is a better approximation
to the truth than any competing theory so far proposed,' 54
Evolutionary Bpistemology
I have tried in this chapter to show how Popper defends the
objectivity of scientific knowledge without resorting to dogmatism.
By embracing fallibilism he shows that there is no necessary connection
between dogmatism and absolutism. Scientific knowledge, as he
characterises it, can be viewed as a system of tentative conjectures
which we guess not to be false and hope to be true. It has to be
recognised that this is indeed a considerable retreat from the
traditional idea of objective knowledge. On that view objective
knowledge was not only definitely true but it was known to be definitely
true. We might say that where the justificationist3 sought objectivity
by reducing knowledge to solid foundations, to a 'ground-floor*, Popper
seeks it by reaching higher and higher to a 'ceiling' of truth.
But his analysis is not so rarefied that it is beyond the reach
of working scientists. For with his account of content, truth,
verisimilitude and his associated methodology he offers both a precise
analysis of progress in science and a set of rules as to how best to
try to achieve it. Ve will only achieve it when we recognise that
knowledge has an objective dimension in its problems, tests, explanations,
aims and standards. If we ohoose to ignore this dimension and look at
54 Popper, K.R. (1972) p82
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knowledge from a subjective, - psychological or sociological - perspective
then we will fall into relativism.
Recently Popper has emphasised this objeotive dimension of
knowledge by distinguishing between three levels of reality, a
metaphysical theory which recognises World 1 (the world of physical
objects), World 2 (the world of subjective, mental states or mind) and
World 3 (the world of the objective contents of theories, statements etc).
It is World 3 which is, from an epistemological point of view, of
decisive importance. It takes priority over World 2 so that, for
example, before we could have a psychology of knowledge we must have an
epistemologioal analysis of the kind Popper has developed. What we take
to be knowledge, in his case - unjustifiable conjectures - results
from a decision: knowledge is a normative idea. Only when we have
decided what we are to value as knowledge can we have an empirical
55
study of how such knowledge is possible. So Popper remarks:
•I suggest that one day we will have to revolutionise
psychology by looking at the human mind as an organ
for interacting with the objects of the third world
(World 3) » for understanding them, contributing to
them, participating in them; and for bringing them
to bear on the first world (World l).* %
The concentration on the objective aspects of knowledge, I have suggested,
is a natural development of a distinction Popper made from the start.
(See page 148) Just how this distinction, as developed in the Three
Worlds theory, would •revolutionise* psychology is further considered
in the last chapter of this thesis where I discuss Popper* s evolutionary
epistemology.
55 Similarly, a psychology of creativity is dependent upon a
normative analysis of what is to be considered oreative. For a
discussion of this see L.3. Briskman (1977» forthcoming).
56 Popper, K.R. (1972) pl5&
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Before turning ray attention to Popper* b orlties, however, I
would like to forestall confusion by recognising that the term
•evolutionary epistemology* is ambiguous. It can refer to the evolution
of knowledge in the objective sense, the process described in this
chapter in which * scientists try to eliminate their false theories,
57
they try to let them die in their stead.• *" Or it can refer to the
fact that evolution itself can be viewed as a knowledge process. That
is to say we can look upon the increasingly complex sense-organs with
which animals, as they ascend the phylogenetic scale, adapt to their
environment as •theories* which have not yet been falsified. In this
case the inborn dispositions, expectations or knowledge is knowledge
in the subjective sense; it is something which the organism contains
or believes (unconsciously). Most important, this subjective or
a priori knowledge is not a priori valid. It is a set of expectations
which, unlike human conjectures in science, have not been explicitly
formulated and criticised, and which - should environmental change
occur - may well be disappointed. So, finally, we can say that when
a scientist investigates these inborn expectations or *innate knowledge'
what he is doing is framing fallible objective theorj.es about
subjective theories. And if successful, if his theories stand up to
test, he will have objective knowledge of what we might call subjective
knowledge.
57 Popper, K.R. (1972)
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Chapter Four
For and Ajasainst Popper's Bplstemology
(l) Introduction
Popper* s theory of soientifio knowledge has been at the oentre
of a vigorous and wide-ranging debate which has become increasingly
cantankerous and confusing during the past few years and which shows
little sign, as yet, of satisfactory resolution. Some writers have
focused on particular aspects of his position which they believe to be
inadequate, while others have attempted to dismiss the entire theory as
a complete irrelevance to any reasonable account of scientific enquiry.
Some have chosen to employ descriptive arguments drawn from the history
of soience or from the alleged practices of contemporary scientists,
while others have advanced explicitly normative considerations of
supposedly deadly import, A few contributors have generated confusion
by relying on historical arguments while ostensibly making a normative
point; conversely, others have employed tacit definitions or proposed
conventions while claiming to be merely presenting historical discoveries.
Further confusion has arisen because there has not been unanimity
of intention among critics using one type of argument. Thus we find
among the historians and sociologists deep disagreement over whether
history or contemporary practice shows science to be a rational
enterprise; and among those philosophers who have considered history of
science a pointless diversion there are similar disputes over Popper's
claim to have demonstrated the rationality of scienoe.
Nevertheless, the debate has served a number of useful functions.
Specific issues have been examined in detail and some problems have
been clarified; the debate has led to a discussion of what criteria a
satisfactory methodology should meet; and the clash between Popper and
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Ms critics has shown that no pMlosophy of science is sufficiently
problem free to be immune from the objections of competitors. Popper's
theory of science, I will argue in tMs chapter, constitutes a
significant advance on its predecessors but must be substantially
modified and supplemented if it is to show that science can be a
rational enterprise and if it is to be of praotical benefit to working
scientists.
To begin, I propose to divide criticisms of Popper's epistemology
into two categories. First, I shall consider the issues raised by Ms
'Mstorical' opponents and their attempts to either modify or destroy
Ms position. Then, after assessing the relevance of Mstory of science
to Popper's pMlosophy of science, I shall turn my attention to the
much more important arguments and objections of Ms 'normative* critics.
(2) Historical Objections
Kuhn's Critique
Just when Popper's pMlosophy of science was beginning to weaken
the support for induotivist views of science came, in 1962, the
publication of Kuhn's famous essay, wMch sought to sweep away all
attempts to understand science by building abstract models, logics of
research or rational reconstructions. Only by close study of specific
episodes in the Mstory of science could we understand the mechanism
and dynamics of the scientific process. Kuhn's theory has already been
examined at some length and so I shall now merely summarise the
descriptive, Mstorical olaims wMoh he made and contrast them with the
prescriptive, normative proposals advanced by Popper. Then I shall
trace the development of tMs debate through the writings of Lakatos
and Feyerabend. Before that let us, however, remember that Kuhn has
said, in response to Feyerabend, that he is not just making descriptive
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claims but also methodological recommendations based upon them.
Above all, science for Popper is a critical activity, a never-
ending search for error in our theories. For Kuhn, by contrasti 'in a
sense, to turn Sir Karl's view on its head, it is precisely the
abandonment of critical disoourse that marks the transition to a
science.'* The central aim of science, for Popper, is maximum
verisimilitude, the discovery of true theories with the highest possible
content. For Kuhn, on the other hand, individual scientists do not have
aims at all. Once committed to a paradign the scientist's 'motivation
2
is of a rather different sort* , namely the blinkered activity of
puzzle-solving. The scientist must spell out, Popper demands, the
conditions under which his theory will be given up - riskily - as false;
in advance of experimental testing he must specify those 'basic
statements* or 'potential falsifiers' which will refute his theory.
According to Kuhn, however, real science does not work that way at all:
•No process yet disclosed by the historical study of
scientific development at all resembles the methodological
stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with
nature ... The decision to reject one paradigm is always
simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the
Judgement leading to that decision involves the comparison
of both paradigms with nature and with each other. • 5
Contra Popper, says Kuhn, counterevidence does not and must not, by
itself, falsify theories. The scientist, wedded to his paradigm, merely
sets discrepancies between theoretical predictions and experimental
evidence aside as problematic instances or anomalies whioh will, his
convictions assure him, fade away in the end. Theory-change, for Popper,
as we have seen, is rational in that it is always possible to make a
direct comparison of two competing theories with the same evidence and
1 Kuhn, T.S. (1972) p6
2 " » (1962; p38
3 " " " p77
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judge which of the two has better survived empirical testing. What
characterises paradigm-change for Kuhn, on the other hand, is the
•incompleteness of logical contact'^ between the paradigms and the fact
that each paradigm is judged by different evidence and standards.
Hence, para^dfera-change cannot be explained in purely logical terms and
Kuhn falls back on sociological and psychological explanations of
opinion change? paradigm switches are, typically, conversion processes.
Finally, to complete this survey of the major differences between Popper
and Kuhn, they also disagree over the nature of progress in science.
Ideally, as theories with higher and higher content survive more and
more stringent teats they hopefully, for Popper, approach the truth;
therein lies progress. For Kuhn, «we may, to be more precise, have to
relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradign
carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to
5
the truth.Nevertheless, Kuhn claims, science does progress but in
such a way that we have to reinterpret the notion of progress.
Popper* s Reply
In 1934 Popper had already declared his opposition to any attempt
to understand the methods of science by appeals to history. (Ch.2 p82)
Such an approach failed to realise, we have seen him argue, that what
facts it uncovered were but a reflection of the philosophy of science
or, less grandly, the evaluative criteria the historian employed.
Popper1s speoific reply to Kuhn was, in effect, exactly that which we
6
found Shapere arguing as well. Kuhn's historical discoveries, with
their relativist consequences, were not discoveries at all but the
4 Kuhn, T.S. (1962) pllO
5 " " " pl70
6 Shapere, D. (1964)
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consequence of his attachment to the logical thesis of relativism.
History of science, Popper suggested, can only begin after a philosophy
of science has been proposed, for only then can we decide who is to be
deemed a scientist and what activities are to constitute scientific
enquiry. He replied:
'... to me, the idea of turning for enlightenment
concerning the aims of science, and its possible
progress, to sociology or to psychology (or...to the
history of science) is surprising and disappointing.
...How can the regress to these often spurious sciences
help us in this particular difficulty? Is it not
sociological (or psychological, or historical) science
to which you want to appeal in order to decide what
amounts to the question •What is science?1 • 7
Kuhn's Reply
These remarks puzzled Kuhn for he thought that in this area -
namely, the relevance of history of science to philosophy of science -
he and Popper saw eye to eye. He replied:
•If he means that the generalizations which constitute
received theories in sooiology and psychology (and
history?) are weak reeds from which to weave a
philosophy of science, I could not agree more heartily.
My work relies on them no more than his. If, on the
other hand, he is challenging the relevance to the
philosophy of science of the sorts of observations
collected by historians and sociologists, I wonder how
his own work is to be understood. His writings are
crowded with historical examples and with generalizations
about scientific behaviour ... He does write on historical
themes, and he cites those papers in his central
philosophical works. A consistent interest in historical
problems and a willingness to engage in historical
research distinguishes the men he has trained from the
members of any other current school in the philosophy Q
of science. On these points I am an unrepentant Popperian.•
I have quoted Kuhn at some length because I have some sympathy with his
puzzlement. Popper does not make it entirely clear how his philosophy
7 Popper, K.R. (1972a) p58
8 Kuhn, T.S. (1972) p235/6
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of science relates to history of scienoe or the actual practices of
working scientists. But that is not to say, as Kuhn suggests, that
there are no differences between them in this area. Popper* s
falsifiability criterion did not result from an extensive, historical
investigation of how scientists have actually behaved; nor when he
advises us, for example, to prefer a theory with greater * empirical
content* than its predecessors does he do so because that is what
scientists have typically done. All Kuhn*s methodological recommendations,
on the other hand, are abstracted from the alleged practices of
scientific communities.
How then are we to regard Popper* s frequent excursions into the
history of science and his reconstructions of past theory-changes in
terms of his own model of science? I will later argue that they are
but illustrations of the relevance of Popper* s theoiy to the concerns
of working scientists; they do not provide a warrant for his
methodological prescriptions, as Kuhn's historical examples are intended
to do for his. We will see that Popper*s definition of science or
falsifiability criterion and the associated methodology are based on
an epistemological argument, on what McMullin calls a 'general theory
9
of rationality*. Whether that argument succeeds and whether Popper
provides a satisfactory defenoe of his methodology is thus an issue
which must be considered independently of what methods scientists have
or have not used in the past. And I will consider that issue later in
this chapter. So even if Popper*s illustrations were, as Kuhn claims,
historically false that would not, I will argue, be a very serious matter.
If there were independent considerations favouring Popper's theory it
would not be very embarrassing if those whom we choose to call past
scientists did not obey Popperian rules.
9 McMullin, E. (1970) p31
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Lakatos's Attempted Resolution of the Popper-Kuhn Debate
•Philosophy of science without history of science is empty;
history of science without philosophy of science is blind.*10 With
this paraphrase of the Kantian dictum one eminent member of Popper*s
school, Imre Lakatos, sums up his own response to Kuhn, a response very
different from that of Popper himself and from the argument I intend
to develop and alluded to above. In a series of long papers11 Lakatos
has tried to present a philosophy of science which would preserve the
advances he finds in Popper - especially his objectivism, fallibilism
and his conventionalist-empiricist criticism - while abandoning those
features he finds unacceptable in the light of Kuhn»s critique. Then,
after elaborating his own theory of science, what he calls a
•methodology of scientific research programmes*, Lakatos develops a
further metatheory for the assessment of competing philosophies of
science. On that metatheory, which he chooses to call a •methodology
of historiographical research programmes*, he attempts to demonstrate
that Popper*s •methodological falsificationism* (as he terms it) is an
advance on such philosophies of science as inductivism, conventionalism
12
and • dogmatic falsifioationism*, but is in itB turn superseded by
his own methodology of scientific research programmes - henceforth MSRP.
Lakatos, therefore, claims to have provided not only a theory of science
superior to both Popper*s and Kuhn»s but to have provided a criterion
for recognising progress at the metatheoretical level. Let us, therefore,
see how he develops his rather complex position.
He begins by recalling how Popper, according to his own account,1^
arrived at his falsifiability criterion. Newton* s theory, though
refuted, was a major achievement in Popper*s eyes as in those of most
10 Lakatos, I. (1971) p91
11 M " " J (1972); (1974)
12 " «• (1971) p95
13 Popper, K.E. (1974) P31/2
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scientists of his day; so too was Einstein's general theory of relativity.
On the other hand, Popper was unimpressed by the ability of Marxists,
Freudians and Adlerians to find easy verifications of their theories.
These latter theorists had a ready explanation for everything that might
occur while Einstein, Popper noted, argued very differently. He did
not have an explanation for everything that might happen and, in
contrast, even stated that he would reject his general theory if
specific experimental results were obtained. Popper's problem was thus,
says Lakatos, to find a definition of science which would yield his
•basic judgements' about these theories, which would define as 'scientific*
those he admired and as 'unscientific' those he did not. Popper's
solution, says Lakatos, was falsificationism.
Lakatos next exploits what he has decided was Popper's strategy,
to propose a provisional metaoriterion for the assessment of theories of
scientific rationality. He suggests that, 'a rationality theory - or
demarcation oriterion - is to be rejected if it is inconsistent with
the accepted 'basic value judgements* of the scientific community.'1^
He argues, in support of this proposal, that though there is little
agreement over a universal criterion of the scientific character of
theories there is considerable agreement concerning single achievements
in science during the last two centuries. He writes:
•While there has been no general agreement concerning
a theory of scientific rationality, there has been
considerable agreement concerning the rationality of
a particular step in the game - was it scientific or
orankish? A general definition of science thus must
reconstruct the acknowledgedly best games and the
most esteemed gambits as •scientific*; if it fails to
do so it has to be rejected.' 15
'Quasi-empirical• is the label that he hangs around his metatheory of
science, a metatheory to be contrasted with the apparently 'aprioristic*
14 Lakatos, I. (1974) p24&
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Popperian approach and, I presume, the empirical approach he would
attribute to Kuhn. What Lakatos is denying is that it is possible to
understand science either by laying down abstract rules against which
the "game of science1 (as he repeatedly calls it) is adjudged or by
recording the activities of scientists as historians and sociologists
try to do. In adopting this procedure which we will see him modify in
a Socratic manner in the next few pages, Lakatos argues that in fact
his is the very same procedure as Popper's. Though Popper appears to
propose an 'apriori* definition of science, says Lakatos, he is - were
he aware of it - a quasi-empiricist too. For, as we have seen Lakatos
note, Popper starts by observing and assessing the claims of scientists,
loosely characterised, and then proceeds to propose a sharp demarcation
criterion which will support the judgements he has already made about
these claims. The major difference between the two approaches, on this
reading, is that the 'basic value judgements' Popper's definition of
science must reconstruct are his own, while those which Lakatos*s theory
demands of an ideal definition or demarcation criterion are those of
the scientific community.
Once we accept the above metacriterion we must, says Lakatos,
reject Popper's criterion because in its light the best scientific
achievements in the past were 'unscientific' and because 'the best
scientists, in their greatest moments, broke the rules of Popper's
16
game of science.* In other words, Popper's definition of science
fails, he suggests, to reconstruct as rational the 'basic value judgements'
of the scientific community. Ve must reject Popper's theory first and
foremost, he says (echoing Kuhn), because no theory in the history of
science has ever been falsifiable at all. 'Exactly the most admired
16 Lakatos, I. (1974) p24^
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scientific theories simply fail to forbid any observable state of
17
affairs.1 1 So if Popper denounces Freudian theory as unscientific
because criteria of refutation have not been laid down before any
experimental investigations are carried out then he must also agree
that Newtonian theory, which similarly lacked such criteria, was
1 fl
•unscientific* as well. Lakatos defends this claim with a
•characteristic story* in which a typical soientist continually refuses
to abandon his pet theory even though its predictions clash with
experimental evidence. Such a scientist will continue to invent
auxiliary theories which, together with the initial theory and initial
conditions of testing, will account for the evidence. Lakatos argues
that since a scientist always tests an initial theory in conjunction
with initial conditions and auxiliary theories he always has the option,
on the appearance of apparently *falsifying* evidence, of saving his
pet theory and replacing either the initial conditions or any (or all)
of the auxiliary theories. Lakatos, therefore, agrees with Kuhn that
the history of science is a history of theories which are not falsifiable
in the way which Popper demands.
Should Popper retreat, in the light of this criticism, to the
demand that systems of theories, including initial conditions and
auxiliary or observational theories, be falsifiable, we will, says
Lakatos, still have to reject his criterion. For the fact is, he says,
that all theories in the history of science have progressed amid an
19
ocean of *anomalies*. Where Popper demands that some part of the
system of theories under test be conjectured to be false what has
actually happened, says Lakatos (in complete agreement with Kuhn), is
17 Lakatos, I. (1972) plOO
18 " " (1974) P247
19 " " (1972) pl35
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that refuting instances or counter-examples have been either set aside
as anomalies to be solved at a later stage - or else they were dissolved
with the help of ad hoc solutions which violate Popperian rules. And
even when anomalies which have been set aside pile up and resist repeated
efforts to remove them, they eventually only •falsify1 the initial
theory or paradigm, Lakatos argues (again, in full agreement with Kuhn)
if an alternative was proposed which was able to explain them. He
concludes:
•That in their choice of problems the greatest scientists
•uncritically* ignore anomalies (and that they isolate
them with the help of ad hoc stratagems) offers, at
least on our metacriterion, a further falsification of
Popper*s methodology. He cannot interpret as rational
some most important patterns in the growth of science.*^0
Moreover, Popper*s methodological demand that we ought not to work on
an inconsistent theory (because it fails to forbid any observable state
of affairs) is, says Lakatos, also •falsified* by the history of science.
And he provides numerous examples where research programmes progressed
on inconsistent foundations. Only by breaking the rules which Popper
demands, he says, were scientists able to let their theories outgrow
such 'infantile diseases* as inconsistency, anomalies, ad hoc
hypotheses etc. Accordingly, Lakatos concludes that Popper*s demarcation
criterion fails to reconstruct as rational many of what he believes to
have been crucial moves made by scientists in the past, judges our most
admired theories 'unscientific* and, consequently, must be rejected.
When we reject Popper's theory we have, Lakatos continues, two
alternatives. We may abandon the attempt to give a rational account of
the success of science on the grounds that every *logic of science* to
date has been a caricature of the actual course of scientific history.
Inductivism, the attempted reconstruction of science in terms of hard
20 Lakatos, I. (l97l) Pll2
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facts and proven theories was, he says, • falsified* by - among others -
21
Duhera, Popper and Agassi ; conventionalism, the attempted explanation
of scientific revolutions as the replacement of cumbersome frameworks
by simpler ones, has been, he says, historiographically falsified by
22
Kuhn ; and now Popper*s falsificationism has been, he adds, undermined
both by his own and by Kuhn*s historical studies. Instead of proposing
yet another * logic of science* we may follow the paths of Polanyi, Kuhn
and the sociologists of science who merely explain, as he puts it,
*changes* in belief. For reasons very similar to those I have used in
evaluating Kuhn Lakatos concludes that this approaoh results in a view
23
of science as a basically irrational enterprise and eventually it
results in scepticism.2^ Consequently he chooses the second alternative
and tries to develop an improved methodology which offers a better
reconstruction of science than its predecessors are said to have provided.
Conventionalism plays a key role in Popper*s theory of science,
at the level of *basic statements*; these are provisionally accepted and
awarded falsifying power by convention. They are not, as we have seen
Popper claim, justified in the least degree by experience. In Lakatos*s
KSBP conventionalism plays an even more important role for not only are
singular 'basic statements* accepted by convention but universal
statements are accepted by convention as well. The unit of appraisal
in MSRP is not an individual theory or series of theories but what
Lakatos calls a 'research programme* with a conventionally accepted
•hard core' - a universal statement which is, *by provisional decision,
25
irrefutable* ; thus the hard core has, temporarily, a metaphysical
21 Lakatos, I. (1971) P114/5
22 " " M pll5
23 " " (1972) pll5
24 " M " pll5» footnote 2
25 " " (1974) P24S
-167-
status. It is not falsifiable by accepted basic statements. (For
example, Newton*s research programme, according to MSBP, consisted of
his three laws of dynamics and his law of gravitation.) Every research
programme also possesses, he says, a 'positive heuristic* which
•consists of a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how
to change, develop the 'refutable variants* of the research programme,
2o
how to modify, sophisticate, the *refutable* protective belt* of
auxiliary theories around the hard core. I,Tien discrepancies arise
between the hard oore*s predictions and (conventionally accepted basic
statements describing) experimental results the positive heuristic, in
effect, provides a strategy for research. It promises to turn these
apparent anomalies into eventual victories for the programme and thus
simultaneously provides a rationale for setting anomalies temporarily
aside and explains the relative autonomy of theoretical science in a
way which, says Lakatos, Popper's theory cannot. The positive heuristic
27
generates more and more complicated 'models simulating reality* ,
predicts that anomalies almost inevitably arise - since false simplifying
assumptions are nearly always made - and spells out a programme (to
varying extents) for digesting them.
•It should be pointed out,* says Lakatos, *that the methodology
of scientific research programmes has more teeth than Puhem*s
conventionalism! instead of leaving it to Duhem's unarticulated common
28sense' to judge when a framework is to be abandoned, I inject some hard
Popperian elements into the appraisal of whether a programme progresses
29
or degenerates or of whether one is overtaking another.' We can thus
26 Lakatos, I. (1972) pl55
27 f» ft ft »t
28 Duhem, P. (1954)
29 Lakatos, I. (l97l) pll5
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see that this MSRP is designed to wed Kuhn*s •discoveries* to Popper*s
objectivity demands. The hard core and positive heuristic correspond
loosely to Kuhn*s concept of paradigm but the introduction of criteria
of progress and degeneration allows Lakatos to claim to be defending
the rationality of science via comparative appraisal against objective
standards. As long as a research programme's theoretical growth,
(i.e. theoretical growth where the hard oore is modified by the positive
heuristic), anticipates its empirical growth, that is, continues to
predict *new facts* with some success it is progressing; a research
programme is degenerating if it either gives post-hoc explanations of
chance discoveries or facts predicted successfully by a rival or even
if it predicts novel facts successfully *in a patched-up development
30
rather than by a coherent, pre-planned positive heuristic.*x
Lakatos differs further from Kuhn in that the former recommends
that a scientist ought, if possible, to work on rival programmes -
especially if one of them is vague. The scientist may expose a
programme*s weakness by working on it, giving it a precise formulation
and then showing a rival* s superiority. * Simultaneous work on rival
programmes, of course, undermines Kuhn*s thesis of the psychological
31
incommensurability of rival paradigms.* Another reason for Lakatos*s
support of simultaneous work by scientists, either individually or as
a group, on rival research programmes is that *the progress of one
32
programme is a vital factor in the degeneration of its rival.* If a
research programme successfully predicts a *new fact* which its rival
can only *explain* in an ad hoc manner then the rival is, by definition,
50 This last kind of degenerating science is typical of much work
in the social sciences, Lakatos maintains. (1971) pl25l the work of
Meehl, P. and Lykken, D.T. illustrates, he says, how it is possible to
predict *new facts* with some empirical success but in a non-progressive
way. Meehl, F.E. (1967)
31 Lakatos, I. (1973.) pl25» footnote 57
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degenerating. Thus the more the first progresses the more its rival
degenerates.
According to Lakatos MSPJP is, at once, both more strict and more
tolerant than Popper's philosophy. It is more strict in its standards
in that a programme is not progressing if it merely predicts some new
phenomena whioh are subsequently corroborated. MSHP further demands
that auxiliary hypotheses added to the initial hard core and resulting
in successful predictions be 1largely built according to a preconceived
idea, laid down in advance in the positive heuristic of the research
33
programme.It is more tolerant in its appraisal of whether a
research programme is meeting its standards; for the research programme
is allowed to outgrow such *infantile diseases* as inconsistent
foundations, anomalies and ad hoc manoeuvres. Where Popper's code of
scientific honesty demands, as Lakatos supposes, the rejection of a
34
falsified theory at once his MSHP permits such signs of degeneracy
for a time. They do not lead to the immediate rejection of a research
programmes
•The old rationalist dream of a mechanical, semi-
mechanical or at least fast-acting method for showing
up falsehood, unprovenness, meaningless rubbish or
even irrational choice has to be given up. It takes
a long time to appraise a research programme: Minerva's
owl flies at duBk.' 35
Since MSHP does not demand that a research programme make progress at
every step it is very difficult to decide when it has so degenerated
that it should be abandoned. For a seemingly hopeless research programme
can always, Lakatos insists, make a comeback and triumph against all
expectation. Conversely, a research programme which haB been much more
progressive than its rivals may suddenly start to degenerate and be
33 Lakatos, I. (1974) p249
34 " " (1972) pl08
35 " M (1974) P249
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superseded by a competitor. Henoe, in MSHP, there are no •crucial
experiments*, no •decisive refutations', no 'instant rationality'.'^
And if we should choose to identify some particular experimental result
as crucial, as the result that turned the tide in favour of a programme,
we could only do that, Lakatos suggests, long after the event when we
have seen how the battle between the programmes turned out.
In contrast to Popper, therefore, Lakatos does not offer advice
tc the scientist who, aiming for maximum verisimilitude, is faced with
two competing research programmes and wishes to know how to proceed.
Where Popper recommends the fallible elimination (as a contender for
the truth) of the theory which has been falsified (by an accepted basic
statement) Lakatos insists that it is perfectly legitimate to stick to
the degenerating programme in the hope that it will recover; and it is
equally legitimate (rational) for him to do the opposite if he wishes,
namely to abandon the degenerating programme for its more progressive
rival. That is what lies behind Lakatos's statement that 'philosophy
57
of scienoe is more of a guide to the historian than to the scientist.
All that the philosopher of science can do, he says, is enable an
objective appraisal to be made of the comparative progress of rival
programmes; he does not tell the scientist how to proceed, 'Thus
methodology.' he says, 'is separated from heuristics, rather as value
•ZQ
judgements are from ought statements.'
This provoked a retort from Feyerabend that Lakatos's objective
59
standards were but *verbal ornaments' and that he had so modified
Popper's initial position that this new MSKP was now compatible with his
own epistemologioal anarchism. In other words, Lakatos is saying,
56 Lakatos, I. (1974) p249
37 " " " p252
38 " » (1971) P123
39 Feyerabend, P. (1972) p215
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Peyerabend remarked, that: 'Anything goes.To which Lakatos replied:
•This does not mean as much licence as might appear
for those who stick to a degenerating programme. For
they can do this mostly only in private. Editors of
scientific journals should refuse to publish their
papers which will, in general, contain either solemn
reassertions of their positions or absorption of
counterevidence (or even of rival programmes) by ad
hoc, linguistic adjustments. Research foundations,
too, should refuse money.1 41
How Feyerabend dealt with this claim will be discussed in a moment but
first I will complete my review of Lakatos*s methodology and
metamethodology.
V/e have seen that Lakatos constructed his methodology so that it
would evade the criticisms which •falsified* Popper*s falsificationism
on his metacriterion. So MSEP is, in effect, an amended demarcation
criterion: the •game of science1 is defined in such a way that it
•squares* with history of science as Kuhn and Lakatos describe it.
The problem which faoas us, Lakatos next suggests, is how we are to
know that the •game of science', played in line with MSEP, helps us
promote the growth of knowledge? This is the very same problem which,
he says, Popper has never solved for his •game of science1. Popper has
never given any reason for believing that his methodological rules best
help him achieve his aim of detecting genuine error in his theories.
Accordingly, Lakatos baldly states: 'Popper's demarcation criterion has
nothing to do with epistemology. It says nothing about the epistemologioal
AO
value of the scientific game.' We shall see, in the second half of
this chapter, that Lakatos has indeed put his finger on a major weakness
in Popper* s position - his ultimate failure to provide a rationale for
his methodological rules. However, v/e shall see that Lakatos*s proposed
solution for Popper1s and his own problem, a conjectural * inductive
principle* relating methodological appraisals with verisimilitude, is
40 Feyerabend, P. (1975) p28
41 Lakatos, I. (1971) pl05
42 " (1974) P254
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unsatisfactory but that a solution can be developed more in line with
the spirit of Popper's philosophy - but a solution that will necessitate
substantial modifications both to the aims and the methodology we give
to scienoe.
Lakatos's next move in his argument in defence of the rationality
of soience is to use his metacriterion to assess MSBP. Very quickly,
he says, he realised that MSRP, like all previous definitions of science,
does not square completely with the 'basic value judgements* of the
scientific community. methodology too - and any methodology
whatsoever - can be 'falsified*, for the simple reason that no set of
judgements is completely rational and thus no rational reconstruction
43
can ever coincide with actual history.' ' The 'common scientific
wisdom*^, embodied in the judgements which the scientific elite make
about particular theories is not - he concludes - as wise as it might
be. Therefore, instead of eliminating his methodology, MSHP, he
suggests that we modify his metacriterion - 'and then replace it
45
altogether with a better one.* First, he says that if a universal
rule should olash with a particular 'normative basic judgement' we should
allow the scientific community time to reflect on the clash: they may
give up their judgement and submit to the rule. He then proposes a
new metacriterion, abandoning what he calls naive falsificationism in
meta-method just as MSEP abandons it at the level of method. He
continues:
•While maintaining that a theory of rationality has to
try to organise basic value judgements in universal,
coherent frameworks, we do not have to reject such a
framework immediately merely because of some anomalies
or other inconsistencies. We should, of course, insist
that a good rationality theory must anticipate farther
43 Lakatos, I. (1971) pll6
44 " " H pl21
45 " " M pll6
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•basic value judgements unexpected in the light of
its predecessors or even that it must lead to the
revision of previously held basic value judgements.
We then reject a rationality theory only for a better
one, for one which, in this quasi-empirical sense,
represents a progressive shift in the sequence of
research programmes of rational reconstructions.
Thus the new - more lenient - metacriterion enables
us to compare rival logics of discovery and discern
growth in •meta-scientific• - methodological knowledge.*4°
So, on this new metacriterion, Popper*s falsificationism is not
rejected just because it is •falsified* by some *basio judgements* of
leading scientists. Lakatos rejects it because his own MSEP allegedly
reconstructs as rational more of the actual historical judgements of
the scientific elite. However, though rejected, Popper*s falsificationism
can be seen to have been an advance on previous methodologies such as
induetivism and conventionalism. For he rehabilitated as rational,
scientific activity which previous methodologies dismissed as irrational.
For example, phlogiston theory, though false, was a scientific theory -
rationally held for some time - from Popper's persepctive} inductivism
had deemed it pre-scientific. On the other hand, Lakatos says that
MSEP can reconstruct as rational many actual scientific judgements which
Popper*s theory can only see as irrational. These include, he says,
scientists* frequent defence of degenerating research programmes,
selective blindness to embarrassing evidence (falsifications), tolerance
of inconsistencies and recourse to ad hoc hypotheses. These moves are
'irrational* for Popper but not for MSEP, says Lakatosj and thus the
latter methodology constitutes *yet a further step forward.*^
Finally, Lakatos argues that the lesson to be learned from all
this is that both aprioristic approaches to methodology - such as
46 Lakatos, I. (1971) pll6/7
47 " " " pll7
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Popper's48 - and empirical approaches - such as Kuhn's and Polanyi's -
are mistaken. Against the aprioristic position he says that it has
been scientific standards as applied 'instinctively' by the scientific
elite that have been the main yardstick of the philosopher's universal
laws. 'Methodological progress ... still lags behind common scientific
49wisdom.'^ Against the empirical approach we have seen him argue that
50
it is not 'completely rationaland, he adds, 'the philosopher's
statute law may occasionally be right when the scientist's judgement
51
fails.* And so his new metacriterion - the methodology of
historiographies! research programmes - implies, he says, a pluralistic
system of authority between aprioristic statute law and empirical case
law; and it 'specifies ways both for the philosopher of science to
52
learn from the historian of science and vice versa. •
Feyerabend's Critique of Lakatos
Lakatos's strategy was to defend the rationality of science by
loosening up the defintion of science introduced by Popper so that it
would be immunized against the kinds of criticism made by Kuhn. A
definition of science must, he proposed (initially), 'square' with the
faots of history. Accordingly he developed a definition, MSBP, which
is allegedly closer to the reality of actual soience than any other and
is therefore the best available methodology} and it demonstrates, he
adds, that soience can be a rational enterprise.
48 Popper's strategy can, he admits, be taken two ways. Popper
insists that his is an aprioristio approach and it is in that sense that
it is opposed by Lakatos. However, we have seen that Lakatos argues
that it is in fact a 'quasi-empirical' approach - an interpretation
Popper would reject as naturalistic and, therefore, mistaken.
49 Lakatos, I. (1971) pl21
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His efforts, however, have failed to impress, at least in the
intended manner, the self-proclaimed epistemological anarchist Paul
Feyerabend who holds that science follows no methodological rules
whatsoever and generates results which are in no way epistemologically
superior to the findings of magicians, astrologers, witchdoctors and
those who are otherwise dismissed as •cranks* by our allegedly intolerant,
science-obsessed society. Indeed, Feyerabend goes so far as to argue
that Lakatos, malgre lui, has produced the most ingenious defence of
epistemological anarchism to date. And so he recommends that
epistemological anarchists, if they exist, ought to adopt Lakatos*s
position because his 'irrational theory falsely interpreted as a new
account of reason will be a better instrument for freeing the mind than
an out-and-out anarchism that is liable to paralyse the brains of
55
almost everyone.'^
Feyerabond begins his critique with an attack on Lakatos*s
definition of science, MSRP. We have seen that this methodology does
not offer advice to a scientist, much less instruot him how to prooeed.
All it does is provide standards for the appraisal of moves already
made. So any choice which a scientist makes, when faced with two rival
research programmes - one progressing, the other degenerating - is
rational, for it is compatible with the standards of MSRP. Since a
degenerating programme may recover at any time a scientist may choose
it, use it and defend his choice by saying that the degeneration is
only temporary and not a sign that the programme's hard core is false.
So Feyerabend concludes:
•Reason as defined by Lakatos does not directly guide
the actions of the scientist. Given this reason and
nothing else, *anything goes*.* 54
55 Feyerabend, P. (1975) p214
54 " " " pl86
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So liberal is MSRP, he says, that it is compatible with anarchism.
We have seen earlier that Lakatos, in reply to Feyerabend, said
that his methodology does not legitimate every and any decision a
scientist may make. And so he recommended that journal editors and
research sponsors should refuse publicity and money for degenerating
research programmes* supporters. Such advice is not irrational,
Feyerabend concedes, for it does not conflict with the standards of
I'ISEP; but since no advice would conflict with those standards - they
do not, after all, forbid anything - it would not have been irrational
for Lakatos to have given the opposite advice. He oould equally well
have encouraged support for degenerating programmes alone, without
violating his standards. If we should, however, acoept Lakatos»s
advice to withdraw support for degenerating programmes we should realise,
Feyerabend asserts, that this policy is not based on reasons or
arguments.
•Briefly, but not at all unjustly* research programmes
disappear not because they get killed in argument but
because their defenders get killed in the struggle for
survival.* 55
That such a procedure is •rational* for Lakatos, in that it does not
conflict with hi.s 'rationality standards*, simply shows how liberal
those standards are; this theory of rationality, Feyerabend concludes,
is anarchism in disguise.
Nor has Lakatos shown, as he claims, 'rational change* where
56
•Kuhn and Feyerabend see irrational change.' Historical data impress
upon us inescapably, says Feyerabend, that theory-change in science
is nothing but a *power struggle' pure and simple, full of * sordid
57
personal controversy.Kuhn's researches bear out this interpretation
55 Feyerabend, P. (1975) Pl97
56 Lakatos, I. (1971) pll8
57 Feyerabend, P. (1975) pl99
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too, he says, despite Kuhn's attempts to evade the consequences.
Paradigms triumph not because their arguments are overpowering but
because of •mob psychology* and because the defenders of rival paradigms
58
just fade away. But this is exactly the picture painted by Lakatos,
Feyerabend insists, a picture that is *rational* in name alone.
The critique continues with a two-pronged assault on Lakatos*s
basic strategy, the attempt to make *basic value judgements* of the
scientific elite or the •common scientific wisdom* the measure of method.
First, Feyerabend argues that Lakatos exaggerates the degree of
agreement in the history of science over speoific achievements. *He
believes that uniformity of basic value judgements prevailed *over the
last two centuries' when it was actually a very rare event,' argues
59
Feyerabend, who lists numerous disagreements which, he says, undermine
that claim. Second, he suggests that even where there was uniformity
of judgement on a particular theory those judgements were 'rarely made
60
for good reasons.* So he concludes that*'common scientific wisdom'
is not very common and it certainly is not very wise.*"1 Further,
he points out - rightly in my view - that Lakatos fails to provide any
argument at all to show that these *basic value judgements*, even if
they were commonly held, would be worthwhile. Lakatos just assumes
that suoh judgements establish the superiority of modem science over
other fields of enquiry, he adds, when that is far from obvious.
•'Rational reconstructions* take 'basic scientific
wisdom* for granted, they do not show that it is
better than the *basic wosdom* of witches and
warlocks. Nobody has shown that soienoe (of *the
last two centuries*) has results that conform to its
own *wisdom* while other fields have no such results ...
To find the right method, one must reconstruct the
right discipline. But what is the right discipline?* 62
58 Feyerabend, P. (1975) pl99
59 " « « p20J
60 " " » p202
61 " n ** p205
62 M « " p205
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Incidentally, it iB Lakatos and not Popper who, according to
Feyerabend, fails to realise what he is in fact doing in his theory of
science. Lakatos, we have seen, argued that Popper1 s approach could be
taken two ways, either as an aprioristic or as a quasi-empirical one;
and Lakatos suggested it was in reality quasi-empirical like his own
MSRP. Hot so, says Feyerabend. Despite appearances, he says, Lakatos's
methodology is a traditional •logic of science1 because the •common
scientific wisdom* is admitted to be a fallible judge of methodologies
and can, in the last resort, be ignored. History of science does not
play a decisive role after all, says Feyerabend - a point which has
been independently made by McI-Iullin: *the uneasiness the reader feels
with the over-all methodology of (Lakatos's) monograph is due mainly
to the equivooal role assigned to history of sci%oe, at once emphasised
and called upon as evidence, yet systematically •reconstructed' in the
63
service of a prior theory of rationality.'
To sum up, Feyerabend rejects Lakatos's claim to have demonstrated
that science is a rational method of enquiry whose consequence is the
growth of objective knowledge. First, he claims to have shown that
Lakatos, in his liberalisation of Popper's theory so that it would be
immune to Kuhn's historical criticisms, has in fact embraced an
anarchistic conception of science in which 'anything goes.* And second,
he denies that Lakatos has shown that the consequence of pursuing his
methodology is objective knowledge. Lakatos merely asserts, without
supporting argument, that science as practised is rational; whereas
Feyerabend argues that real science is irrational because the orucial
factors in actual theory-change are not reasons or arguments but social
pressures, psychological trickery and propaganda. Historical
63 McMullin, E. (1970) p34
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considerations do play a decisive role for Feyerabend as epistemological
anarchist in contrast to the equivocal and ultimately inessential role
they play for Lakatos, the merely illustrative role they are given by
Popper and to Feyerabend*s earlier position when, as an arch-Popporian
critical rationalist he dismissed them as impotent criticisms of
philosophy of science.
Historical Objections Assessed
Popper's demarcation oriterion, the principle of falsifiability,
is based - as I suggested earlier - on an epistemological argument. It
is this: We must assume that most of our conjectures about the world
(or any set of phenomena we are investigating) will be false} to assume
otherwise is to hold that we are epistemologically privileged (in that
we have, for example, innate a priori valid knowledge or that there is
a pre-established harmony between Hind and Nature). Therefore, if our
aim is to find out the truth about the world (phenomena), we ought to
try to detect falsity in our conjectures. The best way to do that
is to make them experimentally refutable. For we can then eliminate
false theories by observation and experiment. And while we cannot know
for certain that the remaining conjectures, which have resisted attempts
to refute them, are true, we can hope that they are: they are the best
'knowledge' we can ever attain.
In the second part of this chapter I shall argue that there are
serious flaws in Popper's defence of falsificationism via the above
argument. But those flaws can be, we shall see, repaired in a way
which, thou^i it calls for major changes in Popper's theory, can
nevertheless be said to conform to the spirit of his philosophy. Now
I want to oonsider the historical objections already discussed.
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Popper*s demarcation criterion was proposed as a convention based
on the above argument} it was not advanced as a conjecture about theories
in the history of science. To undermine Popper*s position, therefore,
it is necessary to show that there is a flaw in the argument; one must
challenge either the premises or the reasoning. Some philosophers
have tried to do just this, as we shall shortly see. The objections
drawn from the history of science, on the other hand, do not challenge
either the premises or the inferenoe of the argument. They do not
attack falsifiability as convention but as alleged historical fact.
But since Popper is not claiming that all or most theories in the history
of science, however defined, were or must have been falsifiable the
alleged historical discoveries, even if true, are simply irrelevant.
For Popper could accept that no theory in the history of science was
ever falsifiable"^ and yet still maintain- that the best method for the
scientist, who aims at discovering true theories, is to propose
falsifiable theories and then try to find out if they might be true by
seeking to refute them. Whether Popper could, in the circumstances,
continue to call his logic and methodology an analysis of science is
debatable. We might decide to reserve that term for whatever aims and
methods we believe we have uncovered via historical research - an
approach whioh Popper dismisses as naturalistic (for reasons already
given). Or we might decide that the aim of science which Popper
recommends, the discovery of maximum verisimilitude, is the aim which
science ought to pursue and accordingly we may choose to call * scientific*
the associated methodological recommendations which he makes. Or we
might decide that a different aim ought to be pursued, such as the
64 We are, thus, not obliged to agree with the claim that
•Popper*s view of science slides on to its history like a glove.*
Magee, B. (1975) p28
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discovery of theories which are not only resistant to falsifying tests
but which are also coherent, simple, intelligible etc, and we might
then devise our methodology in order to have the best chance of
achieving our aim; and then that methodology would be held to be
•scientific1. But in any case, whatever we call the methodology, it is
to be defended not because it was in fact used in the past but because
it best enables us, we believe, to achieve our aims.
So how are we to interpret Popper1s frequent discussions of
previous debates in science or of live issues in contemporary science?
They should not, I suggest, be interpreted as saying that scientists
were or are imbued with Popperian principles, selecting the most
testable theory, shunning ad hoc hypotheses, dismissing theories on the
appearance of counterevidence and so on. They should be seen, instead,
as attempts to illustrate the relevance of Popper's convention and
methodology to the assessment or evaluation of past debates in what
we loosely call •science1. Past theory changes are rational, in Popper*s
view, because they can be reconstructed in terms of his own theory of
science and shown to conform to his normative proposals, not because
the participants are held to have been unwitting Popperians.
Where Lakatos goes wrong, I believe, is in ignoring the
epistemological argument on which Popper's convention is based and in
concentrating, instead, on the letter's motivation in putting forward
his proposal. Falsification!am is not to be defended because it
supports personal feelings or judgements Popper had or mrde about Freud's
and Einstein's theories but because it allegedly opens up a route to the
discovery of error and to the possibility of progress towards the
truth, to the achievement of aims which are held to be worthwhile.
Lakatos, we might say, overlooks the objective, epistemological defence
of falsifioationism for a subjective, psychological aocount of its
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origins. And it is this which leads him to develop a motamethodology
in which methodologies are judged in terms of their correspondence with
•basic value judgements1 of the scientific elite; but, as Feyerabend
has correctly pointed out, agreement with such judgements (where they
exist) does not speak in favour of a methodology unless we have
independent reasons for thinking that they are sound; and, as Feyerabend
has further and equally correctly argued, no such reasons are given by
Lakatos. So there is no reason why we should accept his metamethodology.
What does speak in favour of a methodology, I suggest, is that it
provides us with some reason for holding that it gives us a better
chance of aohieving the aims of science than any other methodology; and
for that methodology to be valued we must, of course, be able to say
that the specified aim is worth achieving. But since, on Lakatos'a own
admission, his MSBP does not tell the scientist how best to proceed
if he wishes to achieve the specified aim of science - which is, for
MSEP, maximum verisimilitude - I conclude that we have been provided
with no reason for adopting Lakatos*s methodology either.
Popper*s theory, I conclude, if interpreted in the manner intended -
as a convention based on argument - emerges from Lakatos*s critique
unscathed. Hence we do not need to replace it with his MSRP - which is
just as well. For it offers no guidance to the practising scientist,
a state of affairs that could only appeal to the epistemological
anarchist.
(5) Normative Objections
The Problem of the Snpirioal Basis
Popper gives no logical role to observation in science and has
thus failed both to demonstrate that science is a rational mode of
enquiry and to escape from a radical scepticism. This is, in short, the
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gist of a most important criticism of Popper's theory that has been
developed independently by two philosophers, Ayerand Deutscher"'.
Their diagnosis and cure for Popper's problem are broadly similar and
outlined below.
Statements can be justified only by statements, Popper insists;
they cannot be justified by experience. Since every report of experience -
a statement - oontains universal terms that report, Popper maintains,
inevitably goes beyond or says more than the single experience of the
observer. 'Universals cannot be reduced to classes of experiences; they
cannot be constituted.Experience may instead, he says, cause or
motivate us to accept a 'basio statement*, to agree provisionally and
conventionally that a statement will be treated as 'basic' or
unproblematic. This is, both Ayer and Beutscher agree, Popper's
position.
The consequences of this position, they also agree, are disastrous
for it quickly lands Popper in scepticism. Ayer begins by admitting
that Popper leaves open the possibility that we may decide to acoept a
false statement or reject a true one. Biltthis possibility is entirely
abstract, Ayer rightly adds, because there is no way by which we could
discover that we had been mistaken one way or the other. Should we
change our minds about a basic statement and, say, accept a statement we
had previously rejected that new decision could be no more justified
than the previous one. Experience cannot provide any justification and
65 Ayer, A.J. (1974)
66 Deutscher, M. (1968)
67 Popper, K.R. (1959) p95» This is also, incidentally, Lakatos's
view on the role of 'basic statements' in his MSKP and is, in part, the
reason why he calls for a metaphysical inductive principle linking
•acceptances* and 'rejection* in methodology with verisimilitude in
epistemology. Because his defence of the conventionalist basis of MSRP
contrasts sharply with Ayer's ana Pautscher's criticisms it is worth
noting his argument here: 'No factual proposition can ever be proved
from an experiment. Propositions can only be derived from other
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so, Ayer concludes, there is no reason at all why basic statements
should have to refer to observable events. 'One might have equally
strong motives for accepting basic statements which did not refer to
68
anything observable.* Basic statements may be accepted for all kinds
of motives or causes; in all cases they aire mere conventions and no
basic statement has any more justification for being accepted as true
or basic than any other. Nor, therefore, have we any good reason for
rejecting a universal theory just because it conflicts with an accepted
basic statement.
Deutscher agrees with this and argues that since basic statexaants
are held to be impossible of verification by experience Popper's
demarcation criterion breaks down. 'General statements would be equally
unverifiable and unfalsifiable, if no basic statement could be
69
verified.' And apart from the fact that Popper's conventionalist
account of basic statements is a form of scepticism it cannot be
maintained in any case, he says, without contradicting the view that
experience cannot justify statements. Why, Deutscher asks, should any
individual think he agrees with others over the basic statements he
accepts? (We remember that, for Popper, basic statements are just those
statements we can agree on with others.) Deutscher continues:
•If he has no reason to think this, then Popper's
position oollapses. But if he can have some basis for
thinking that he agrees with others, then his basis
for his belief in basic statements need not reduce to
the fact (conjecture?) of his agreement with others.
If he can have a basis for the belief that he agrees
with others, it can only derive from his own
observations. But if this can be an adequate basis
propositions, tliey cannot be derived from facts: one cannot prove
statements from experience - 'no more than by thumping the table.' This
is one of the basic points of elementary logio, but one which is
understood by relatively few people even today.' Lakatos, I. (1972) p99
68 Ayer, A.J, (1974) p687
69 Deutsoher, M. (1968) p280
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•for such a belief, then why can it not provide at
least part of his basis for acceptance of some basic
statements? Indeed, belief that one agrees with
others logioally involves acceptance of some basic
statements.1 70
Popper, I suppose, might reply to this that a scientist does indeed
have no Justification for believing that he agrees with others. Popper
might Bay it was merely a conjecture by the scientist that he agreed
with others on the basic statements he accepts. This reply, however,
would be unsatisfactory, I suggest, because it does not provide any
good reason or rationale for the acceptance of one particular basic
statement and not others. Unless we have some reason for believing that
we agree with others whatever basic statement we do accept will be
arbitrary. And if we do have reasons for believing that we agree with
others then, as Deutscher argues, those can only derive from observations
and so we do not need Popper* s conventionalist account. Statements in
science will, in short, be justified by experience.
The flaw in Popper*s argument, says Ayer, is 'the assumption that
if what purports to be the record of an observation 'transcends* the
experience on which it is based, we are left with no reason for accepting
71
it.*' The proper inference, he replies, is not that we have no grounds
for accepting the reoord of observation or statement but that we have
inconclusive grounds. The report may be false and the perceiver may
have made a mistake in labelling his experience or he may have been the
victim of a hallucination. 'None of this,* he concludes, 'prevents it
from being true that my having this •observational experience* supplies
me not only with a motive but also with a ground for accepting the
72
interpretation which I put upon it.' There is thus no good reason, he
70 Deutscher, M. (19&0 p283
71 Ayer, A.J. (1974) p688
72 " n n p689
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says, why we should not regard our observations as directly justifying
our basic statements.
Deutsoher comes to the same conclusion as Ayer after locating the
source of Popper's 'difficulty1. Popper, he says, identifies a
truistio thesis with an absurd one and, as it were, having thrown the
baby out with the bath water is left with an even deeper absurdity.
The truistic thesis is that statements can be justified by experience,
the absurd one that scientific statements speak only of our experiences.
So preocoupied, says Deutscker, has Popper been with combatting the
latter sense-datum account of knowledge that he mistakenly thinks that
a man who says we get scientific knowledge by observation is obliged to
hold the further view that scientific knowledge (statements) refer oxily
to experiences. He addss
•Popper repeatedly says that those* who maintain that
perception can justify belief also think that all
apparently objective statements refer mainly to
experiences. While it must be admitted that many
people do clutch these views closely together, I
see no logical reason why they should not be
separated. In fact, their separation would form a
key part of any programme to reconstruct the thesis
that perception can justify belief.' 73
As long as Popper mistakenly believes that to hold the truistic thesis
is to espouse the absurd one he will he unable to give a satisfactory
aooount of the role of observation in science, his demarcation criterion
breaks down and he has failed to demonstrate the rationality of soienoe.
What these critics have shown, I believe, is that Popper has
indeed failed to give an epistemological role to observation in science.
He has failed to explain why we should accept one basic statement rather
than another and why we should deoide to allow such an accepted basic
statement to falsify a theory-under-test. We saw in the first part of
this chapter that his demarcation criterion was based on an argument to
73 Deutscher, M. (19&8) p287
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the effect that we can eliminate false theories by observation and
experiment. The criticisms reviewed in this section show that we have
no good reason for believing this beoause we have no reason for holding
that those basic statements we aoeept enable us to locate genuine
error in our conjectures. We have no reason for believing that the
basic statements we accept are more likely to be true than any others,
given that we cannot justify them in any way by our observations.
Next I want to examine a rather more general criticism of Popper's
philosophy than that developed by either Ayer or Deutscher. This
position, argued at some length in a series of recent papers'^ by
Maxwell will be seen, on the one hand, to support the criticism of
Popper examined in this section but, on the other, to hold that the
solution proffered by Ayer and Deutscher - giving a justificatory role
to perception - is unsatisfactory. For it is highly problematic,
Maxwell argues, how we could ever have good reasons for supposing a
theory to be falsified. Even if we did have good reasons for accepting
basic statements, even if observations could justify statements that
would not give us sufficient ground, he argues, for falsifying theories.
Prom Standard to Aim-Oriented Etapiricism
One way of putting Ayer's and Deutscher's point would be to say
that Popper provides no rationale for the acceptance and rejection of
basic statements, no good reason for accepting one basic statement
rather than another. The oentral argument of Maxwell's penetrating and
fundamental critique of Popper's views is that he fails to provide a
rationale for any of his methodological rules; no good reason is given
for believing that implementing Popper's rules gives us a better chance
74 Maxwell, N. (1972); (1974a); (1974b)
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of achieving Ms aims than any other set of rules. Therefore, says
Maxwell, Popper fails to solve Ms demarcation problem in a satisfactory
manner and he further fails to demonstrate that science is a rational
enterprise. We shall soe that Maxwell does think, however, that a
rationale can be given wMch does not do too much damage to the spirit
of Popper's pMlosophy. If we are prepared to make substantial changes
to Popper's theory of science then we can indeed, he sayB, show the
rationality of scientific enquiry.
Maxwell begins Ms critique with an analysis of the solutions
Popper advanced for Ms two fundamental problems, the problem of
demarcation and the problem of induction. Put crudely, he says, Popper's
solution of the demarcation problem is this: 'The distinctive and
especially valuable feature of scientific theories is that they are
experimentally falsifiable. Palsifiable theories are especially to be
prized just because we can discover that they are false; in this field
we can detect error, learn from our mistakes and so hopefully make
75
progress.• Having solved Ms demarcation problem in this way Popper
then maintains, says Maxwell, that this solution makes it unimportant
that the traditional problem of induction is insoluble. It would only
matter if the feature of scientific theories wMch we especially prized
was their provenness, verifiability or certainty. Once we replace the
inductivist's demarcation criterion by Popper's we can forget about
induction and prize falsifiability because it enables us, at least,
to locate error.
It is clear, Maxwell ooncludes from this analysis, that for
Popper a satisfactory solution of the demarcation problem must explain
why we so prize theories wMch are scientific in the proposed manner.
75 Maxwell, W. (1972) pl38
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Again, we prize falsifiability beoause it helps us to detect error. A
criterion which did not explain why we place such a high value upon
theories to which it applies would, he says, be unsatisfactory. Now
the important point to note is this. The reason why falsiflability is
a satisfactory solution to the demarcation problem, the reason why it
is so valued is that it enables us to achieve an aim for soience whioh
we havo adopted in advance, the aim being that we wish, at the very
least, to detect error. Not every aim for science that we might adopt
would enable us to explain why we place suoh a high value on scientific
theories; not every aim, therefore, would allow us to give a satisfactory
solution to the demarcation problem; and so not every aim would allow us
to dismiss induction as irrelevant to science.
Indeed, Maxwell argues that because of his choice of aim for
science in The Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper failed to solve
all of these problems. In that work Popper took the view that the aim
of science was simply to put forward and reject theories in accordance
with his methodological rules; 'Just as chess might be defined by the
rules proper to it, so empirical science may be defined by means of its
methodological rules.He steered clear of a more ambitious aim suoh
as the elimination of error or achieving maximum verisimilitude, as
pointed out in Chapter Three (pl39. Also, see note 28, Chapter Three).
Having adopted suoh a humble aim Popper obviously had no difficulty .in
providing reasons or, a rationale for his methodological rules. We
employ those rules because that is just what science is, by definition,
about. However, says Maxwell:
•This line of approach cannot provide an adequate
solution to the problem of demarcation. For, as we
have seen, in order to solve the problem of demarcation
76 Popper, K.R. (1959) P54
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•it is not enou^i simply to specify neoessary
and sufficient conditions for a type of enquiry to
be scientific: in addition one needs to show why
we are justified in especially prizing the theories
of a mode of enquiry that is scientific in the required
sense. But dearly, the mere fact that a mode of
enquiry proceeds in accordance with Popper* s acceptance
and rejection rules provides no reason whatsoever for
especially prizing its theories.1 77
Once Popper accepted a more ambitious aim, however, an aim such
as the achievement of maximum verisimilitude he was able to explain why
he placed such a high value on falsiflability. But, at once, this gives
rise to a new problem. What reason has Popper for holding that the
methodological rules he recommends gives us the best hope of achieving
the aims he gives to soience? Only if he can provide reasons for
holding this, only if he gives a rationale for his methodological rules
can he claim to have solved his demarcation problem. We need to know
that by following his methodological rules we have a better chance of
rejecting only false theories than we have by following some other set
of rules. But since, Maxwell rightly points out, Popper provides no
rationale whatsoever *he has failed to give an adequate solution to the
problem of demarcation, and to that version of the problem of induction
he would wish to claim he has solved, namely: What criteria ought to
govern our selection of theories if our concern is to realize the
fundamental aim of scientific enquiry? In addition he has failed to
Vfi
show that scientific enquiry can be viewed as a rational enterprise. *
Maxwell, I have already said, supports the objection, already
discussed, that Popper gives no reason for accepting one basic statement
rather than another. There is, he suggests, no reason for regarding a
high-level theory T which conflicts with an accepted basic statement as
77 Maxwell, IT. (1972) pl40
7Q It II If tl
•191-
false | conversely, there is no reason for looking with any particular
favour upon T if it proves compatible with the accepted basic statement.
Ayer and Deutscher both argued that we could, in effect, provide
a rationale for accepting basic statements and for using them to test
high-level theories, if we were to give a justificatory role to
perception. Maxwoll disagrees with this because he denies that aocepted
basic statements alone are sufficient to overthrow theories. He argues:
•For in accepting experimental results as refuting a
theory one is committed to the possibility of explaining
these results by some future theory. That is, one is
committed to holding, at least as a conjecture, that
the refuting experimental results constitute lawful
occurrences. For if one denies this conjecture one
thereby accepts experimental results which no future
physical theory can conceivably explain - since it is
only lawful occurrences that can be explained physically.
... to assert that a set of experimental results
constitute lawful occurrences is in effect to assert a
somewhat vague -universal hypothesis. Thus singular
hypotheses, however well-corroborated, do not suffice
to refute a theoryj it is only singular hypotheses, backed
up by a universal hypothesis, to the effect that the
experimental results in question constitute lawful
occurrences, that can refute a theory - or rather a
oongLomeration of theories.* 79
To reinforce this argument Maxwell asks us to consider the law, 'All
bits of copper expand when heated* and to suppose that 'This piece of
copper, on the surface of the earth for one year, fails to expand when
heated* is highly corroborated within the limits of space and time
specified. Outside these limits, we can suppose this piece of copper
does expand when heated - as do all other pieces of copper.
How, in these circumstances, we could decide, he suggests, to
retain the low *A11 bits of copper expand when heated' and simply say
that in the above example something was going on which we do not, as
physicists, understand and cannot take into account. That we could
79 Maxwell, H. (1972) pl44
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legitimately do this shows, he says, that a well-oorroborated basic
statement alone does not suffice to falsify a theory. Or we could
conjecture that the anomalous bit of copper was, during the relevant
time, in an unusual state and thus decide to reject the law. The
cruoial point in this oase however, he argues, is that we would here be
rejecting the law not as a oonsequence of accepting the basic statement -
•This piece of copper, on the surface of the earth for one year, fails
to expand when heated* - but 'as a consequence of accepting the somewhat
vague universal hypothesis *A11 bits of copper, when in some specific
unknown state, fail to expand when heated.* It is only if we accept
tentatively some such hypothesis as this that the behaviour of the
anomalous bit of copper can be seen as constituting lawful occurrences,
80
which we may hope to explain by means of some future theory. *
Ayer* 3 and Deutscher* s solution to the problem of basic statement
acceptance is thus inadequate for it does not provide any basis for the
refutation of theories. In any case it is unsatisfactory, Maxwell
implies, because it is not possible to justify theories by experience.
Finally, Maxwell argues that even if we did have a rationale for
accepting basic statements and even if we did have a further rationale
for allowing them to falsify high-level theories Popper* s methodology
would be inadequate. For he provides no reason, says Maxwell, for
preferring one theory T to an infinity of easily constructed rivals
which are just as highly falsifiable and as well corroborated as T,
yet which differ drastically in their empirical consequences both from
each other and from T itself. Maxwell then provides a procedure for
generating rivals to T which are just as empirically successful; the
procedure runs like this. First, select some type of experiment which
80 Maxwell, N. (1972) pl44
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has been performed endless times in the past. Let us next suppose that
a theory T (perhaps, together with auxiliary theories) successfully
predicts that if the experiment is performed the outoome is P. We
then add to the specifications of the experiment 1certain entirely
bizarre, ludicrous details1^ which we can feel pretty sure are
irrelevant to the outcome of the experiment. Thus we might stipulate,
he says, that the apparatus bo painted red or that the sounds *Abracadabra*
be made near the apparatus during the experiment. He continuess
•In this way we specify in tnpely universal terms a
type of < xperimental set-up (essentially, a set of
initial conditions) which we can be reasonably sure
lms never obtained anywhere in the universe. We can
now construct empirically successful rivals to T by
means of the following rule: *As long as E does not
occur everything occurs in accordance with T{ if E
occurs then the outcome is Q.* We are here free to
choose Q, as we please. Q, may differ only slightly
from P (the prediction of T) or Q might be seme quite
drastic assertion such as that all phenomena in the
universe occur in accordance with such and suoh a set
of laws which are very different from our present
physical theories (in which case our rival theory to T
would in effect assert that if E occurs the laws of
nature change.) 3y dreaming up different experimental
set-ups E and different outcomes Q we can easily invent
an unlimited number of aberrant versions of T - as we
may call these theories - each of which will differ in
predictive content from T, and yet will be just as
empirically successful as T.» 82
Popper is unable to provide a rationale for his methodological rules,
says Maxwell, because he makes a crucial mistake when he takes as the
fundamental aim of science, the pursuit of maximum verisimilitude. If
he were, instead, to adopt, as the basic aim of science, the search for
explanatory truth it would open up the way, says Maxwell, to a rationale
and thus to a genuine solution of the demarcation problem. Now Popper
does agree, we have seen, that science does aim to arrive at true
explanatory theories but he believes he can, and has repeatedly tried
81 Maxwell, N. (1974) pl28
32 w w w n
-194-
to reduce this aim to a more fundamental one, namely to the pursuit
of true theories with high empirical content. These attempts are
doomed to failure, says Harwell, *for the simple reason that high
8^
empirical content cannot be equated with high explanatory power.1
It is always possible to inorease the empirical content of a theory by
adding on an independently testable postulate but this will decrease
the simplicity or explanatory power of the theory. Popper is mistaken
in equating explanatoriness with content.
Once we adopt as the fundamental aim of science the search for
explanatory theories - theories which are simple, unifying, coherent,
intelligible - it will be perfectly rational, Maxwell argues, to plan
our strategy on the assumption that our search will meet with sucoess.
How we will only meet with success, given that we have adopted this
aim, if it is indeed the case that the world (or phenomena under study)
are simple. If the world (or phenomena) are inoredibly complex then
there is no way we can succeed, for as we make our theories more and
more explanatory, more and more simple eto, the further they will recede
from the truth. Hence, says Maxwell, it will be perfectly rational,
given our aim, to assume a priori that what he calls the metaphysical
thesis of the structural simplicity of the world (phenomena) is true.
And it will be perfectly rational to evaluate our observations and theories
on that basis.
We have, he admits, no reason at all for thinking that such a
thesis is true. It may well be false and so we may plunge deeper and
deeper into error when we rejeot theories and/or observations which
conflict with our assumption. In that case we will fail to make
empirical progress. If the world is in fact extremely complex and we
85 Maxwell, IT. (1974) pl48
-195-
decide, on the assumption that it is simple, to reject a priori all
complex or aberrant theories we remove the possibility of discovering,
through empirical testing, that we may have hit upon the correct theory.
If, says Maxwell, we have failed after a considerable period to make
any empirical progress at all that, in itself, will suffice to call
the assumption into question.
But how can it be rational to make such a metaphysical assumption,
one may ask, if it is admitted that we have no reason whatsoever for
holding that it is true? Maxwell replies that it is perfectly rational
to search for something whioh may, admittedly, not exist quite simply
because it is extremely important for our survival that we find it.
He uses the analogy of a man dying of thirst in the desert and argues
that his search for an oasis is supremely rational even though the odds
against success are huge. The man has no other choice. Says Maxwell*
•I suggest that the situation is somewhat analogous
to this as far as the search for intelligibility in
science is conoerned. From an intellectual standpoint
(and ultimately also, I would wish to argue, from a
practical, technological standpoint) our need for there
to be intelligibility inherent in the universe is so
enormous, so utterly irreplaceable, that we have no
alternative but to take for granted that intelligibility
does exist even though we have not the slightest reason
for supposing this assumption to be true. To oast doubt
on the existence of intelligibility is idle, not
because wo have such wholly convincing reasons for
holding it to be true (quite the contraryl), but rather
because if intelligibility does not exist at all, then
our case is hopeless, and both science and, ultimately,
life beoome impossible.* 84
Assuming that the world (or phenomena under study) are simple would only
be irrational if we had, he says, any good reason for thinking that the
opposite is more likely to be true.
What Maxwell denies is that the rationality of seeking the aim of
explanatory truth requires that it is more rational to hold that the
84 Maxwell, N. (1974) pl40
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metaphysical thesis of structural siniplicity is true rather than false.
All that is required, he says, is that we do not have any good reason
for holding that it is more likely to he false than true; in those
previous circumstances it would, indeed, he irrational to make such an
assumption. This position is to he contrasted with the effort hy Lakatos
to provide Popper's methodology with a rationale via a metaphysical
inductive principle linking corroboration with verisimilitude. Idfchout
some such principle, Lakatos argued (Chapter Pour see $.7^3), Popper's
methodology is a mere game which has nothing to do with epistemology.
•By refusing to acoept a 'thin' metaphysical principle of induction,'
85
says Lakatos , 'Popper fails to separate rationalism from irrationalism,
weak light from total darkness.' But the trouble with this traditional
attempt to solve the problem of induction, or the problem of providing
a rationale for methodological rules, Maxwell correctly argues, is that
some reason must be provided for holding that the principle is true.
Otherwise we have no reason for making it. And since no good reason can
be provided for holding that such a principle is true rather than false
Lakatos's traditional 'solution* collapses.
Once we adopt the aim of seeking explanatory truth and assume the
metaphysical thesis that the world is structurally simple in some sense
or other - to be discussed in a moment - it is then reasonable to suppose,
Maxwell argues, that those regularities we observe in the world do
in fact arise from or reflect the structural simplicity of the universe.®^
It is reasonable, therefore, to acoept basic statements which we
fallibly believe to accurately describe real regularities on the basis
of both our metaphysical assumption and our observations. And if we
85 Lakatos, I. (1974) p2ol
86 For brevity I refer to 'the world* but that can be read to
refer to any set of phenomena we are investigating.
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have developed a high-level theory to explain those observed regularities
and it either oonflicts with accepted basic statements, which we believe
to describe those regularities, or has to be patched up in a way which
leads to considerable theoretical complexity it will be rational, given
our assumption, to decide that it is on the wrong lines. And finally,
our metaphysical assumption gives us a rationale for dismissing a. priori
the infinite number of possible aberrant rivals which are as satirically
adequate as the simple theory we decide to accept. Maxwell, indeed,
argues that only by making such a metaphysical assumption is it possible
to prevent science coning to an immediate halt. For there is a
potentially endless supply of aberrant, empirically adequate theories
which we must reject in favour of a simple theory, independent of
empirical considerations. If we were to start experimentally testing
such aberrant theories, instead of dismissing them by licence of our
a -priori assumption, then we would be stopped in our tracks; as soon as
one was refuted another would at onoe appear to take its place.
It must bo admitted that Maxwell' s provision of a rationale for
Popper's theory of science represents a considerable modification. For,
as we have seen, Popper insists that it is possible to evaluate theories
in terms of empirical evidence alone. That theory is to be preferred
which best stands up to test. Like other 'standard empiricists', as
Maxwell calls them, Popper denies that scientists do or ought to make
permanent metaphysical assumptions about the world or any other phenomena
the scientist may study. He has, admittedly, stressed the influence
of metaphysics throughout the ages in generating i.deas in science. But
these influences are felt to belong only to the 'context of discovery';
metaphysics is denied by Popper to have influence in the 'context of
justification' or, more appropriately in Popper's case, in the 'context
of criticism.' Lakatos too, incidentally, is a standard empiricist
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despite giving a temporary metaphysical role to the hard core of his
research programmes. He allows us to treat such a hard core as
provisionally irrefutable hut insists that in the end evaluation of
research programmes is a purely empirical affair. Lakatos is, in this
respect at least, fully in accord with Popper. Harwell, in contrast,
argues that science must be recognised to be thoroughly imbued with
metaphysics if we are to have any basis for the rational assessment
of theories.
The fundamental aim of science, says Maxwell, is the discovery
of more and more about an underlying harmony, unity, simplicity or
intelligibility conjectured to exist in the world, or to be inherent
in the phenomena we are investigating. He writes:
•At the very least, there is the metaphysical conjecture
that the phenomena are such that it is in principle
possible to develop theories of increasing simplicity,
unity, coherence or intelligibility which also meet with
increasing empirical success. The fundamental aim of
science is, in other words, to develop successive
theories which progressively articulate and make preoise
more and more of a metaphysical conjecture M (which
asserts, roughly that tho phenomena are intelligible)
in such a way that these theories meet with more and
more empirical success.' Q^
One way of looking at Maxwell's aim is to see it as a revision of
Popper's demarcation criterion. Knowledge, for Popper, was defined as
those theories which have not yet been falsified. Knowledge, for
Maxwell, is constituted by those theories which are compatible with a
metaphysical conjecture M (explained above) and which have not yet been
falsified. Accordingly Ifexwell does not prise or consider to be
'knowledge' any theory, no matter how empirically successful, which is
incompatible with the conjectured metaphysical 'blueprint' for the
science. The methodology which flows from this conception of knowledge,
87 Maxwell, N. (1974) pl41
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therefore, is to favour only those theories which are (a) compatible
with M and (b) empirically successful. The rationale for these rules
is that it is just empirically successful theories compatible with M
that we want. Maxwell can therefore claim, correctly in my view, that
he has provided a satisfactory solution to the demarcation problem and
thereby demonstrated the rationality of scientific enquiry.
A further difference with Popper arises, Maxwell claims, over
the question whether there is a * logic of discovery*. Like the majority
of contemporary philosophers of science Popper denies that there is
any logic in proposing a hypothesis. Thus he argues:
•The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing
a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical
analysis nor to be susceptible of it ... The question
how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man ... may
be of great interest to empirical psychology} but it
is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific
knowledge.* 88
In opposition to this Maxwell asserts that once we accept that
scientific theories must be evaluated, at least in part, in terms of
their compatibility with a conjectured metaphysics - that i3, once we
accept what he calls 'aim-oriented empiricism* - then, 'rational
89
discovery becomes the very heart of the rationality of science.* By
a rational method of discovery, however, Maxwell does not mean that he
has a method for conceiving or inventing a theory. He means that it is
a method for 'choosing rationally between conflicting, more or less
vague metaphysical ideas for future scientific theories, future lines
90
of development.• The aim-oriented empiricist, who assumes that the
world (phenomena under study) are intelligible in a more or less precise
way, is thtus able to eliminate all embryonic theories which do not
88 Popper, K.R. (1959) P?1
89 Maxwell, N. (1974) pl47
90 w w w pi27
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conform to the presumed metaphysical blueprint; and he rejects such
theories a priori. The standard empiricist, Popper included, is unable,
says Maxwell, to do this because he denies that we may make such
metaphysical presuppositions.
To some extent, therefore, the difference between Popper and
Maxwell is not as great as it would seem if we baldly stated that one
asserts and the other denies that there is a logic of discovery.
Maxwell asserts this not in the sense which Popper opposes, namely the
claim that there is a rational method for generating ideas which are
true. But he does claim, and I believe legitimately, that aim-oriented
empiricism provides a rational method for the elimination of an
infinitude of theories before any experimental testing. They can be
rationally dismissed a prlorx. in so far as they do not help articulate
the metaphysical blueprint for the science which the aim-oriented
91
empiricist just assumes at the outset. An important qualification
which Maxwell makes to his claim to possess a rational method of
discovery is the recognition of its fallibility; the a priori elimination
of theories may prove disastrous because the metaphysical thesis that
the world is intelligible may be quite false, either because the world
is in fact very complex or it is intelligible but not in the way the
conjectured blueprint specifies.
91 Medawar sees it as a * defect of the hypothetico-deductive
scheme that it sets no upper limit to the number of hypotheses we might
propound to account for our observations.1 Medawar, P.B. (1969) p53*
Because the hypotheses that do enter our minds will, as a rule, be
plausible and not, as in theory they could be, idiotic he concludes that
there is a critical process, a psychological »internal censorship1
which edits out implausible ideas. Criticism in science is therefore,
lie says (oontra Popper), not •wholly logical*. Maxwell's espousal of
a public, a priori blueprint which editB out hypotheses before testing
makes Medawar* s proposal unnecessary.
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With hindsight we can see, Maxwell points out, that in order to
provide a rationale for Popper*s rules it \fas necessary to develop a
theory of science with something approaching a logic of discovery.
The procedure for generating aberrant theories, at least as or more
empirically successful than existing theories, amounted to, he says,
just such a method of disoovery. 'In order to outlaw such theories,
one has to outlaw certain procedures for the construction of new
empirically successful theories. In other words, one has to place
i priori (that is, nonempirical) restrictions on the field of new
hypotheses worthy of consideration. But to delimit in this a priori
fashion the field of new hypotheses is in effect to provide a more or
92
less useful rational method of discovery.*
Maxwell*s theory of soience, therefore, differs from Popper's in
two quite fundamental ways. Scientists must make some metaphysical
conjecture about the way the world, nature, society, the mind or whatever
is being studied is structured if they are, in Maxwell's view, to have
any rational basis for the assessment of theories. If they do not make
some such a priori assumption and instead adopt, like Popper, the aim
of discovering more and more about the object of study, whatever that
object may turn out to be like, then they will be faoed with an
infinitude of equally empirically successful theories and have no good
reason for preferring one to all the rest. But if they do make such an
assumption then, if they are able to develop an empirically successful
theory whioh articulates the metaphysical blueprint, it will be perfectly
rational to prefer that intelligible, empirically adequate theory to
other aberrant, empirically adequate rivals. The second basic difference
between Maxwell's and Popper's views, as we have seen, is that the first
92 Maxwell, IT. (1974) P14S
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can legitimately claim, in a qualified sense, to have a rational method
of discovery.
Maxwell's aim-oriented empiricism, however, is fully Popperian in
two other, equally fundamental senses. It is both fallibilist and
objectivist. It is fallibilist because, in short, we can never know
we have not made a disastrous series of mistakes. Not only may we make,
what is very likely, the wrong metaphysical guess but even if we should
manage, having made our assumption, to develop an empirically successful
programme of research which articulates that assumption we may still be
mistaken. The metaphysical assumption may be an error and the empirical
success thus only apparent. Maxwell's theory is thus fallibilist both
in the a priori assessment of acceptable theories and in their
experimental appraisal. It is objectivist because, says Maxwell, 'the
demand for objectivity is to a considerable extent to be understood in
93
terms of the more fundamental demand for intelligibility.' He argues,
at length, that the traditional oriticism of the search for simplicity,
intelligibility, etc, in science, the objection that it is irredeemably
9A
subjective is mistaken. ^
The methodological implications of aim-oriented empiricism are
that, first and foremost, we must attempt to develop a metaphysical
blueprint which will spell out the sense in which the phenomena we are
studying are 'intelligible*. Maxwell lists blueprints which have
powered physical research down the ages and which include, for example,
Bosoovioh's point-atomistic view, the corpuscularian view, Galileo's
view that 'the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics* and
the Einsteinian view that the world is made up of one unified field.
95 Maxwell, N. (1974) p271
94 " " " p271ff
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Other sciences must try to spell out some notion of how whatever it is
they are studying is constituted, "Without some kind of agreed aim or
blueprint for a science," Maxwell concludes, "one hardly has a science
95at all. " ^ Only if we have assumed that whatever we are interested in
has a specified structural simplicity will we have any basis for
preferring one theory to another. Having taken the plunge, as it were,
and made our metaphysical assumption we then proceed to devise testable
theories, compatible with that assumption and which we hope will prove
empirically successful. In this way we try to transform our metaphysics
into empirical science. Should we fail to make any empirical progress
then we may take that to indicate that we are working on a mistaken
blueprint which we ought to replace. But we have no choice, in these
circumstances, but to assume that whatever the new metaphysical blueprint
will be it must also be intelligible in some sense or other. Should we
succeed in our efforts to transform the blueprint into an empirically
successful programme however, that is not, Maxwell insists, any basis
for complacency. It could still be the case that another more
intelligible blueprint - a metaphysics which better conforms to our
ever improving standards of intelligibility - would lead to even greater
success.
The implications of all this for psychology ore, I fear, likely
to meet stiff opposition. Metaphysics has been, for psychologists, a
synonym for "unscientific* and has, consequently, been suppressed with
speed and with scorn.^ Or more precisely, explicit debate about the
role of metaphysics in any putative scientific psychology has been
95 Maxwell, N. (1974) p294
96 The behaviourist psychologist, in particular, is often very
hostile. Thus, for example, Eysenck writes: "Philosophy to the
behaviourist is idle speculation about matters either unknowable or
uninteresting or both; in this he would find support in some of the more
able modern philosophers themselves who have relegated metaphysics to an
academic backwater, or legislated it out of existence altogether."
Eysenck, H.J. (1972) p289
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avoided. But such intolerance has not been based on any extensive
investigation of the epistemological difficulties facing philosophies
of science or on any closely argued thesis of the kind advanced by
Maxwell. And it is at least possible that continuing the debate he
has developed may throw light upon the conflicting arguments over the
status of psychology which have already been examined in this thesis.
Ve might even find, as I suspect, that some of the most intolerant
opponents of metaphysics and philosophy will have snuggled in
embarrassing assumptions, albeit unwittingly, into their theorizing.
In which case only a discussion like that we have had in the last two






I now propose to evaluate these two movements together for two
reasons. First because they are, as pointed out in Chapter One, each
defined in opposition to the other with behaviourism asserting and
raentalism denying that each mental predicate employed in a psychological
explanation must be connected to at least one description of behaviour.
The second reason is that I have decided to choose Skinner and Chomsky
as the representatives of these approaches within contemporary psychology
and to examine the clash between their views. Most of what I have to
say about Skinner will be recapitulation of Chomsky and my primary
concern, therefore, will be mentalism.'1" To deflect possible objections
that there is much more - or less - to mentalism than is to be found in
1 Mentalism has at least three different usages in the literature
and since this may easily cause confusion I had better make my own
position clear. Mentalism may refer tot (l) again, the denial that each
mental predicate in a psychological theory must be logically connected
to some description of behaviour; (2) the view that introspective
reports and/or intuitive judgements are admissible as evidence in
linguistic and psychological theories; (3) the dualist/interaotionist
view that mind is both a diBtinct ontological substance and must be
awarded causal efficiency in psychological explanations. Some mentalists
in the sense of (l), accept (2) - e.g. Chomsky - while others do not -
e.g. Sampson (1975;• To make matters even more confusing Sampson calls
his position 'behaviourist'. Throughout this thesis I use mentalism in
the sense of (l), which was the definition adopted by Fodor (1968).
Sampson is, therefore, a mentalist beoause he subscribes to (l) above.
Finally, while it is possible as a matter of logic for a mentalist, in
the sense of (l), to also subscribe to (3) I have suggested that, in
fact, few do so. But see the discussion on p242 footnote 2.
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Chomsky* s writings on mind and language let me add at once that not all
mentalists are Chomskians and that should Chomsky*s scientific theories
fail to find erapirioal support we need not conclude that mentalism
would be thereby discredited. Nevertheless, since Chomsky is arguably
the most important exponent of mentalism and his theories, if true,
would constitute a major discovery about the human mind I shall focus
my discussion on his scientific ideas. But first let us examine the
psychology of language advocated by Skinner for it was against this
behaviourist orthodoxy that Chomsky rebelled.
Chomsky*s Critique of Skinner
In his now classic review of Skinner's Verbal Behaviour^ Chomsky^
launched an attack on the general behaviourist strategy of trying to
explain complex human behaviour by applying the principles and methods
discovered and developed in laboratory experimental investigations of
supposedly simpler behaviours of organisms more primitive than man.
This had been Skinner* s approach to what he called the problem of
providing a •functional analysis* of verbal behaviour. Man* s ability
to speak and to understand language was, for Skinner, an admittedly
complex set of behaviours but one which was, in principle, no different
from the behaviour of the rat in a maze-running experiment or the
pigeon in the Skinner-box. His experimental studies had demonstrated,
to his satisfaction, that these »simple* animal behaviours resulted from
the operation of physical stimuli which could be objectively measured
and manipulated. Human verbal behaviour, he claimed in his book, was
similarly well understood and so he set himself the task of showing that
it could be both predicted and controlled by observing and manipulating
2 Skinner, B.F. (1957)
3 Chomsky, N. (1959), (1964)
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the speaker's physical environment. In other words the principles and
methods employed in the standard operant conditioning paradigm could
be extended to the study of language without significant change.
Chomsky began his review by raising a difficulty that faces any
attempt to extend the concepts of the laboratory conditioning experiments
to real-life situations. Concepts such as •stimulus' or •response*
have, Chomsky conceded, a fairly clear specification or reference in
the laboratory where, for example, a stimulus might be the onset of a
red light and the response say, a bar-press. But it is not clear in
real-life situations, Chomsky argued, how such concepts are to be used.
Is a stimulus, he asked, just any physical object to which an organism
is capable of reacting or is it to refer to joist those objects to which
it in fact reacts; similarly, is any piece of behaviour to be oalled a
response, he wondered, or is it just that behaviour which is lawfully
connected to stimuli.^ If we adopt the former, broad definitions of
stimulus and response we will have to admit that almost no behaviour is
lawful, Chomsky argued. On the other hand, he said, if we adopt the
latter, narrow definitions of stimulus and response - the procedure
5
Skinner employed in his 3ehaviour of Organisms . which dealt with the
animal conditioning experiments - then behaviour is lawful by definition.
Unfortunately, Chomsky continued, applying the narrow definitions to
real-life problems will lead us to conclude that most of what the human
does, including what he says, is not behaviour at all."
Skinner fails to provide a satisfactory solution to the above
difficulty, Chomsky pointed out, because he does not consistently follow
one or other course. Instead he continually switches from the narrow
4 Chomsky, H. (19&4) P551
5 Skinner, B.F. (1938)
6 Chomsky, N. (19&4) P551
-208-
usage to the broad, with the former allowing him to claim scientific
rigour for his system while the latter, amounting to but 'a metaphorlc
extension of the technical vocabulary of the laboratory*^, is alleged
to provide evidenoa of its scope. The reality is, Chomsky maintained,
that with a literal reading (narrow definitions) the book covers almost
no aspect of verbal behaviour while with an analogic reading (broad
definitions) it is not scientific at all. To support this conclusion
Chomsky then submitted a large number of Skinner* s *explanations* of
verbal behaviour to a merciless analysis which showed how little
resemblance there was between Skinner's experimental terminology and
the extension of that terminology to the explanation of language
behaviour.
If a man were to stand in front of a picture for a couple of minutes
8
and then utter 'Dutch* that would he for Skinner, Chomsky oorrectly
9
argued, a response 'under the control of extremely subtle properties*
of the painting. Chomsky continuedt
•Suppose instead of saying 'Dutoh' we had said Clashes
with the wall-paper. I thought you liked abstract work.
ITever saw it before. Tilted. Hanging too low. Beautiful.
Hideous. Remember our camping trip last summer?, or
whatever else might come into our minds when looking at
a picture (in Skinnerian translation, whatever other
responses exist in sufficient strength.) Skinner could
only say that each of these responses is under the control
of some other stimulus property of the physical object.* 10
Skinnerian functional analysis, therefore, explains a wide range
of responses, Chomsky argued, by identifying controlling stimuli,
properties of the object which determine the response. And since it
is possible to attribute an infinity of properties to any object we can
then account, with this functional analysis, for any response a speaker
may make to any object. The trouble, however, with this simple,
7 Chomsky, IT. (19&4) P552
g n n it tt
9 Skinner, B.F. (1957) pl08
10 Chomsky, N. (19&4) P552
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explanatory schema is, Chomsky asserted, that it is not an explanation
at all? nor does it resemble the notion of stimulus control as that is
used in Skinner-box experiments. He argued:
*
... the word stimulus has lost all objectivity in this
usage. Stimuli are no longer part of the outside
physical world? they are driven back into the organism.
We identify the stimulus when we hear the response. It
is clear from such examples, which abound, that the
talk of stimulus control simply disguises a complete
retreat to mentalistic psychology. We cannot predict
verbal behaviour in terms of the stimuli in the
speaker*s environment, since we do not know what the
current stimuli are until he responds. Furthermore,
since we cannot control the property of a physical
object to which an individual will respond, except in
highly artificial oases, Skinner*s claim that his
system, as opposed to the traditional one, permits the
practical control of verbal behaviour is quite false.* 11
The analysis of behaviour in a Skinner-box set-up is, in contrast,
quite different. The stimulus is, at least, specified independently of
the animal*s response and can both be measured and manipulated. (Whether
or not the Skinnerian explanation of such behaviour is the correct one,
is, of course, another matter. It seem3 to me that it is necessary, if
we wish to understand the actions of either rats or men, to develop
theories which characterise, among other things, how the stimulus
appears to the receiver. But that is getting ahead of the argument.)
Skinner's extension of the notion of response to the explanation of
verbal behaviour is equally unsatisfactory in Chomsky*s eyes. The unit
of verbal behaviour - the verbal operant - is defined as a class of
responses of identifiable form functionally related to one or more
controlling variables. But this definition is useless, Chomsky argued,
because *no method is suggested for determining in a particular instance
what are the controlling variables, how many such units have ocourred
12
or where their boundaries are in the total response.* Skinner provides
11 Chomsky, N. (19&4) P553
12 " » " p554
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no indication of how much variation ia permissible between two sequenoes
of behaviour if they are to be identified as examples of the same
verbal operant. 'In short,' Chomsky concluded, 'no answers are suggested
for the most elementary questions that must be asked of anyone proposing
1*
a method for the description of behaviour.'
Even though he did not succeed in his aim Skinner's intention was
to offer a functional analysis of verbal behaviour in terms of publicly
observable and hence, in his view, purely objective stimuli and
responses. Chomsky rightly objected that this concentration on input-
output relations and the exclusion of any consideration of the
•contribution of the organism' to both learning and behaviour amounted,
in fact, to the assumption that the function being investigated was
very simple. Skinner merely assumed what ought to be a matter for
empirical discovery namely, whether the contribution of the speaker is
quite trivial and elementary - just as he assumed that external factors
such as present stimulation and the history of reinforcement are of
overwhelming importance. 'The magnitude of the failure of this atteapt
to account for verbal behaviour,' Chomsky concluded, 'serves as a kind
of measure of factors omitted from consideration, and an indication of
how little is really known about this remarkably complex phenomenon. • ^
Chomsky then proceeded to argue that before a psychologist tries
to develop a causal eixplanation of linguistic or any other behaviour he
should pause to ask himself what it is he is trying to explain. A
'theory of learning' oust begin with a consideration of 'what is learned*
15
and so Chomsky, taking his cue from Lashley , insisted that the
psychologist give a detailed characterisation of behaviour. 'A
13 Chomsky, N. (1964) p554
14 " " " p549
15 Lashley, K. (1951), (1970)
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consideration of the structure of the sentence and other motor sequenoes
will show,* Lashley had argued, 'that there are, behind the overtly
expressed sequences, a multiplicity of integrative processes which oan
only be inferred from the final results of their activity.* Before
he studies the causes of language behaviour, therefore, the psychologist
ought to employ the insights of the linguist for it is the task of the
latter, Chomsky maintained, to devise for each language a grammar from
which may be derived 'a statement of the integrative processes and
generalised patterns imposed on the specific acts that constitute an
17
utterance,1 ' Since Skinner fails to provide even a rudimentary,
preliminary characterisation of the language a speaker puts to use, his
•explanations* should be rejected, Chomsky insists, as not only vacuous
but hopelessly premature,
Chomsky*s attack lias not silenced Skinner who has gone on to
advocate the construction of a behavioural technology allegedly based
on a science of behaviour which, we axe told, reveals that all behaviour
18
is largely under environmental control. This has, in turn, provoked
19
a further critique by Chomsky which consists, in the main, of
repetitions of the criticisms reviewed above and which calls both for
modesty in our claims to understand why people act in the ways they do
and for a more elaborate, indirect programme of research than Skinner
permits. Before examining Chomsky's own positive programme I would like
to add a few further criticisms of Skinner or repeat objections I have
already made.
As suggested in the case-study Skinner's radical behaviourism is
the representative in psychology of early logical positivist and
16 Lashley, K. (1970) pl86
17 Chomsky, N. (1964) P576
18 Skinner, B.F. (1973;
19 Chomsky, N. (1973)
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operationist views of soienoe which require that all behaviour must he
translated into physical language and, therefore, desoribed in terms
of movement in space. Ve have seen that Carnap, one of the'early
advocates of this position, had by 1932 accepted Popper's criticisms
of this translation requirement. It is futile, Popper argued, to seaxoh
for some basic or ultimate foundation for a science, such as 'movement
in space', as a replacement for normal, everyday descriptions of
behaviour. All descriptions make use of universal terms, he pointed
out, and thus are irredeemably theoretical. It is, therefore, no less
scientific to categorise behaviour in terms of the plans, conoepts or
schemas under which it falls. In making this point Popper was
anticipating, I have suggested, the objections of mentalists like Chomsky
that Skinner's methodological prescriptions condemned his enterprise
to sterility and insignificance. Skinner is something of an anomaly,
in my view, for he continues to defend a methodology long abandoned
by its originators in response to criticism and for which he provides
no convincing reasons. Ironically this Carnapian view of science,
stemming as it does from the positivist search for certainty in
scientific knowledge, is a truly subjectivist theory for it holds that,
ultimately, all statements in science can be reduced to experience -
ironic because it was subjective experience that the behaviourist revolt
was supposed to have finally driven out of psychology.
Ultimately the only criticism that will silence the Sk.innerians
will be an empirically successful, theoretically coherent explanatory
account of the mental processes which generate behaviour and it is suoh
an acoount that contemporary mentalists are trying to produce. Until
that far-off day arrives, if it ever does, when the mentalists have
developed a comprehensive theory which is empirically supported the
radical behaviourist will be at liberty to argue that all human behaviour
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is, in principle, understood and to maintain that if we could only
decode the reinforcement schedules in our environment we would have laid
"bare the determinants of action. So even though the Skinnerian analysis
ofeveryday human behaviour is, depending on how it is interpreted,
either irrelevant or vacuous, and even though it insists on methodological
constraints for which it provides no defence it is likely that we will
hear for some time yet that it is 'by far the most promising approach
20
to the understanding of behaviour.*
Chomsky on Language and Mind
21
•Language is a mirror of mind in a deep and significant sense.*
This statement of Chomsky*s sums up the bold, metaphysical assumption
which has inspired his scientific research programme in linguistics and
psychology and which continues to motivate his distinctive doctrines
on human nature and knowledge. Before his famous assault on Skinner*s
work drew him to the attention of psychologists at large he had
attracted considerable interest two years earlier, in 1957» among
22
psychologists of language with his book Syntactic Structures. He
argued there, as he did against Skinner, that the linguist can perform
an essential first step for the psychologist who studies language by
providing an abstract, theoretical account of language which characterises
•what is learned*. Only when that initial investigation has been made
ought psychologists to proceed to study the processes and mechanisms
involved when 'what is learned* is put to use in the perception and
production of speech.
Language is a mirror of mind, in Chomsky*s view, because every
language which humans naturally speak, as opposed to artificial languages
20 Boakes, R.A. and Halliday, M.S. (1975) P375
21 Chomsky, N. (1976)
22 » " (1957)
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like, for example, Esperanto, possess unexpected characteristics which
they have as a matter of biological necessity. He claims that when we
have identified these features which all natural languages share we
will have discovered features which reflect innate structures of the
human mind. Ve will see, later, that Chomsky holds that the study of
language may prove a suitable model for the investigation of other
domains of competence and we will also see that he believes that such
investigations will vindicate the traditional rationalist account of
human knowledge and freedom against the empiricist vision which
allegedly dominates contemporary thought.
Somewhat surprisingly for a theory with such far-reaching and
controversial claims Chomsky*s linguistic and psychological theories
are not easy to pin down and formulate in a way which would satisfy all
Chomskians. As the title of his first book suggests Chomsky's theory
is primarily about syntax, that is, about how words are joined together
to form sentences. Most of his followers would probably agree with that
although there are some who, while adopting the Chomskian label to
acknowledge their intellectual origins, would deny even that basic
claim. One of the difficulties for any expositor of Chomsky's theory of
language is that the position has been substantially changed over the
years and Chomsky has abandoned positions that were characteristically
his own. Fortunately, however, I am not required here to trace these
alterations as iny main concerns are his general strategy for doing
psychology, how that strategy measures up to the criteria of scientific
procedure as those were developed in the previous two chapters and with
the implications he feels his scientific work has for epistemology and
philosophy in general.
Once again, the theory is primarily about syntax. The sentences
of a language are identified with what are called strlngsets of
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formatives, each sentence being viewed as a sequence of basic units or
formatives, which are the steins and inflectional suffixes which, in
English, are run together to form words. Each language, for Chomsky,
amounts to a set of sentences; hence each language is viewed as a
stringset of formatives. What the linguist must do, he continues, is
to construct a grammar which will divide the set of all possible
formatives in each language into two classes, the grammatical and the
25
ungrammatical. To use two examples from Sampson's excellent
introduction to Chomsky* 3 work, a satisfactory grammar of English ought
to place the following two strings in separate categories. She walked
to the door ought to be judged grammatical while Of the of of should be
deemed ungrammatical.
The data against which a grammar ought to be tested is a point of
✓
disagreement among Chomskians. 'The empirical data that I want to
2A
explain,' says Chomsky , 'are the native speaker's intuitions.' The
linguist's initial task, therefore, is - on this view - to devise a
grammar which will classify all possible stringsets of formatives into
two groups such that one group conforms to the speaker's intuitions
about what is grammatical while the other group does not. Why Chomksy
feels that it is the speaker's intuitions that must constitute the data
for both the linguist and the psychologist will be examined in a moment
but at this point I merely wish to point out that some linguists who
otherwise adopt a Chomskian view of language, deny that intuition can
play any evidential role. Linguistic and psychological theories must be
tested against spoken or written utterances in their view on pain of
making those theories unempirical. If Chomksy'3 theories must rely
23 Sampson, G. (1975) P38/9
24 Chomsky, N. quoted in Sampson, G. (1975) p60
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on the speaker's private judgements then those theories are, they
maintain, unscientific; but fortunately, they further conclude, what
people say and what they write suffice as an evidential base for testing
these theories.
Whatever the evidence he uses - utterances or intuitions - the
Chomskian is not concerned merely to construct a grammar for each
language which humans speak. His main aim is to develop a general theory
of language, a body of principles that will divide the set of all
possible stringsets or the set of all possible human languages into two
classes, the natural and the unnatural. His theory of language defines
a class of grammars - the natural class - and predicts that all the
grammars which are actually worked out for contemporary or previously
spoken languages such as English, Chinese, Latin, etc will fall under
the natural class; they will share common characteristics or what
Chomsky calls a •universal grammar». He argues that the grammars of
natural languages and therefore of spoken or what we might call attested
languages fo:m a small sub-class of the class of possible grammars or,
in other words, that there are strong universal constraints on human
languages. We can see that the theory of language, which defines the
class of natural grammars, is to be tested against the evidence provided
by those grammars which have been worked out for the attested languages.
Since these grammars axe themselves based upon either utterances or
intuitions, depending on one's viewpoint, the theory of language is also
based, ultimately, on either utterances or intuitions.
The central claim of Chomsky's theory of language is, in brief,
that the natural class of grammars has an essentially 'constituency
structure' but which can be modified by specific kinds of transformational
operation. Accordingly he claims that the attested human languages can
be shown to have grammars which possess these constitueney-cum-
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transformational structures. Should we find that an attested language
does not have this structure hut possesses, instead, say, a finite-state
grammar then Chomsky would admit that his theory of language has heen
falsified.
His critics might argue that there is little danger of that, given
that the central claim of the theory is so vague. They may also point
25
out, as in fact Searle has pointed out, that there is very little
agreement among transformational grammarians as to exactly what the
constituency and transformational rules which characterise a natural
language actually are. He comments:
•The effort to give a purely autonomous syntax has
been going on now for over twenty years and it is
not getting very far. There is no set of such rules
that all or even most linguists can agree are the
rules of syntax of any natural language or even of
an interesting fragment of a natural language.* 25
He then goes on to argue that Chomsky*s entire programme of attempting
to give a formal account of the syntax of a language in terms of complex
and abstract rules of the kind alluded to above is fundamentally
misconceived and that a simpler and more convincing account of syntactic
regularities can be given if we pay attention to both the function
and the meaning of sentences. But this conflict between Chomsky and
Searle over how best to account for the facts of language is, as the
latter suggests, an empirical one and cannot be settled "by a priori
argument. If Searle could account for these regularities in terms of
function then there would be no need of Chomsky*s postulated rules "but
Searle lias not so far provided any such account and it is Chomsky*s
conviction that he will he unable to do so that convinces him that his
26
own programme is the more promising.
25 Searle, J. (1976) plll9
26 Chomsky, IT. (1976) p57^f
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Chomskians will admit, in reply to their oritios, that they have
not yet provided a complete set of rules of syntax but argue that they
have developed a very elaborate and plausible outline of a grammar for
English and gained sufficient insights into the syntactic structure of
other languages to warrant further research. And they will also claim
that all those languages which have been investigated do turn out to
have grammars which possess constituency-cum-transformational structures;
in other words they will argue that even though there is disagreement
over the details of what these grammars are like there is sufficient
accord to support the hypothesis of universal grammar.
Chomsky explains the existence of the postulated universal grammar
by suggesting that it is, in effect, though he prefers not to use the
27
term , innate. Therefore these alleged linguistic universale exist
not because of 3ome cultural consideration such as their common origin
in our evolutionary past but because the human brain is so constituted
that any language acquired and put to use through its operation must
possess corresponding properties. We learn and speak the languages we
do because of the way we are bom. Chomsky employs a second argument
in support of the •innateness hypothesis*, which runs like this. A
human language is an amazingly complex and abstract entity as our
syntactic analysis makes clear; an infant learns to speak it in a very
short time; therefore, he must have had a head start, a brain richly
endowed with structures amounting to a built-in universal grammar.
Occasionally Chomsky backs up this argument with the claim that the
language-learning child*s exposure to linguistic experience is so
fragmentary and impoverislied that it is only his innate endowment that
makes the achievement possible.
27 Chomsky, N. (1976) pl3
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Confusion has arisen over the status of a grammar in Chomsky's
account of language acquisition and use. When the linguist constructs
a grammar which accounts for those syntactical regularities he discovers,
ore we to take it as merely an abstract characterisation or are we to
look upon it as psychologically real, the specification of a psychological
competence?" It is a mistake, some argue, to look on a Chomskian
grammar as a psychological description. Dismissing as ill-founded
objections that Chomsky* s constituency and transformational rules are
not properly called rules at all (because they cannot be disobeyed)
29
Sampson , for example, argues that 'it is not part of Chomsky's claims
that the formulae describe or regulate whatever psychological processes
result in our uttering individual sentences of our languages (though it
would perhaps be surprising to discover that the psychological processes
bore no relation whatsoever to the formulae).* Chomsky's recent
presentation of his views, however, contradicts this interpretation and
gives a clear psychological role to the grammar. He says that 'the
grammar is put to use, interacting with other mechanisms of mind, in
speaking and understanding languages.'^ (incidentally, I am not
implying that Chomsky's rules ought not to be oalled rules if they are
interpreted as psychologically real. As long as we are clear about their
role in Chomsky's theory it matters little what he calls the procedure
for deriving stringsets from a grammar.) An important phrase in Chomsky's
quotation above is 'interacting with other mechanisms of mind* for his
account of how we put a grammar to use is, we will 3ee, more complicated
than I have suggested.
28 Searle also asks this question when he wants to know if the
postulated grammatical rules 'guide - as opposed to merely describe - his
(the speaker's) speech' and observes: 'I have never seen anything like
an adequate answer to this question.' Searle, J. (1976) pll20
29 Sampson, G. (1975) plOO
30 Chomsky, N. (1976; p28
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He makes it clear in Reflection*1 that his theory of
language, outlined above, is merely the first step in a complex theory
of the mental processes which generate and interpret language. The
linguistic characterisation of 'what is learned' or 'knowledge of
language' or 'grammar' constitutes an advance, he holds, on the
•premature' Skinnerian attempt to relate experience (in the form of what
the child is exposed to i.e. verbal stimuli) to behaviour. What Chomsky
holds we can attempt is to relate experience (in the form of what the
child hears) to 'cognitive structure* or 'grammar' etc; but as to how
that grammar interacts with other cognitive structures such as what he
32
calls * the domain of common-sense understanding' " remains a mystery.
Hot only is it a mystery but it is one that he sees few prospects of
studying scientifically for a very long time.
Finally, Chomsky believes that his work on transformational
generative grammar will, if empirically successful, prove a model for
investigations of other domains of human competence. He does not doubt
that there are other innate facilities of mind which, on exposure to the
relevant experience, construct other competences as abstract and complex
as our postulated 'knowledge of language*, and which may enter into
•the ability to recognise and identify faces on exposure to a few
presentations, to determine the personality structure of another person
on brief contact (thus, to be able to guess, pretty well, how that
person will react under a variety of conditions), to recognise a melody
under transposition and other modifications, to handle those branohes
of mathematics that build on numerical or spatial intuition, to create
art forms resting on certain principles of structure and organisation,
33and so on.' In seeing his psycholinguistic theory as the model of the
31 Chomsky, N. (1576)
32 " " " pl7
33 " " M p2l
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correct methodological strategy for psychology in general he is joined,
as we saw in Chapter One, by others who see it as •something of a test
TA
case for the possibility of an experimental mentalism. *Chomsky
thus endorses the general mentalist programme and views his own theory
of language as a pioneering effort to give it detailed articulation.
•The proper way to exorcise the ghost in the machine,• he writes in
support of that programme, 'is to determine the structure of the mind
35
and its products.•^
--Valuation of Chomsky's Hentalism
•The strongest argument against mentalism in psychology is simply
that by and large it has not worked. • Thus write Fodor, Bever and
36
Garrett^ who attribute the movement's former failures to the equation
of the view that psychology is the soience of mental phenomena with the
view that the proper methodology for that science is one which relies
on introspective observations. In their view it is unnecessary to
spend time defending the epistemological credentials of the introspective
method because, as a matter of fact, most of the mental processes
governing the understanding and speaking of a language and -underlying
other human activities are inaccessible to consciousness. They therefore
proceed to investigate these mental processes, to exorcise the ghost
from the machine, by developing abstract theories to account for
publicly-observable behaviour. And should any of the causal mental
processes be present to consciousness, these mentalxsts say, then they
must be characterised by these theories in the same way as unconscious
mental processes. In short, the 'New Hentalism' need not, these authors
maintain, rely on introspective method.
34 Fodor, J., Bever, T. and Garrett, M» (1974) pxvii
35 Chomsky, IT. (1976) p23
36 Fodor, J., Bever, T. and Garrett, M. (1974) pxi
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Chomsky himself disagrees with this, we have already seen, in that
he thinks a grammar must be tested against the speaker* s introspective
judgements or intuitions about the acceptability of sentenoes. And we
have also seen that there are linguists, meriting the description
Chomskian in that they propose and test constituency-oum-transformational
grammars, who insist that only utterances are acceptable as linguistic
evidence. They argue that the ghost can only be exoroised and
psycholinguistics rendered an empirioal science if only publicly
observable data are admitted as evidence. They then proceed to show
how Chomskian linguistics can be tested without reliance on intuitions.
One of the reasons some linguists - let us call them intuitionists -
argue for intuitions is over the problem of negative instances. If a
man utters a sentence then we can say it is a string belonging to the
•grammatical* set; but just because we have not heard a man utter some
different sentence we cannot infer that that sentence is ungrammatioal.
Maybe we have not waited long enough or searched diligently enough to
find it being uttered. Not all sentenoes which have not been observed
are ungrammatioal. To enable us to distinguish between the grammatical
and the ungrammatical among sentences which have not been observed we
must, intuitionists suggest, only declare to be ungrammatical those
strings which speakers themselves judge to be ungrammatical.
Against this proposal Sampson argues that if we adopt the Popperian
principle that our scientific theories ought to be as strong as possible
through their prohibition of more and moire possibilities we will want a
grammar to exclude as many stringB as possible. We want our grammar to
exclude every string except those we actually hear and this provides us
with a motive, he says, for excluding the unuttered. However, we also
have a motive for classifying some non-observed strings as grammatical,
Sampson correctly argues, if we also adopt the methodological requirement
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that our linguistic theories be simple, in some a priori sense. He
asks us to suppose, by way of example, that we have heard a speaker
utter such strings as Boys like girls. Boys like pets. Girls like boys
but that we have never heard anyone utter Girls like pets. He continues:
•Any English speaker knows that the latter sentence is
fully as grammatical as the other three, but what motive
oan we have for constructing our grammar accordingly?
A grammar which permits the string Girls like pets is
that much less strong than one which forbids it}
apparently we are justified in treating Girls like pets
as grammatical only if we require the grammar to permit
all the sentences whioh the native speaker •knows* to
be grammatical.* 37
But this, he adds, is not the case. Having heard the first three
strings uttered by a speaker it would be plausible to suggest that there
is a rule of grammar in English of the form *A sequence of noun, -s,
transitive verb, noun, -s is grammatical; boy, girl and pet are nouns;
like is a transitive verb.* Bo exclude as ungrananatical the unobserved
string Girls like pets would require that we insert a further clause to
the above rule, reading * except when the first noun, verb and second
noun are respectively girl, like and pet.* Adding this clause would
only be justified if it increased the strength of the grammar; but as
it affects only one string its main effect is not to make the grammar
stronger but to make it cumbersome. In general, the scientist must try
to balance strength against simplicity in his theories and it is in
this, Sampson rightly observes, that he may employ his judgement or
intuition and not in deciding what the facts for the linguistic theory
to explain will be.
Another possible argument in favour of using linguistic intuitions
as evidence is that not all utterances which the linguist observes are
held to be grammatical. Again, borrowing Sampson*s example, we may hear
37 Sampson, G. (1975) P^3
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someone, who was about to say 'If the phone rings, could you answer it?*,
actually say only •If the phone rings* because the person abruptly
broke off in mid-sentence to deal with a boiling-over saucepan. The
linguist ought, Sampson argues, to discount the half-finished sentence
from the set of grammatical strings. But the intuitionist may object
to this on the grounds that if behaviour alone is the evidence for a
grammar we have no grounds for excluding anything that is uttered; he
will argue that we can only exclude the uttered 'If the phone rings* as
ungrammatical if we rely on our intuitive knowledge that it is incomplete.
This argument also fails because a grammar which judges *If the
phone rings* ungrammatical only predicts that it will not be uttered
under normal circumstances. As Sampson points out, quite correctly in
my view, the circumstances are not normal and we know, quite apart from
issues in linguistics, that humans will often interrupt one task when
a higher-priority task intervenes. Ve can therefore expect that we will
sometimes hear the beginnings of strings but not their endings. 'Our
theories confront reality in a body, not one by one; each individual
branch of knowledge,* he says, 'makes prediotions about observable facts
38
only when we take into aocount other relevant pieces of knowledge.*
In sum, general methodological considerations provide ua with a
rationale for assuming that some utterances which we have not observed
are grammatical while, when we take our more general knowledge about
human behaviour into account, we have a good reason for ignoring some
of the utterances we have observed. In neither case do we have to rely
on a speaker*s introspective judgements or intuitions. Chomsky*s theories
can be tested against publicly-observable, albeit theory-laden, behaviour.
Chomsky is not, incidentally, entirely consistent in espousing
38 Sampson, G. (1975) p66
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intuitions as an evidential base for linguistics and psychology because
in his recent writings he stresses that these scienoes share the same
methodology as other natural sciences. .Arguing against Quins*s
definition of behaviourism as simply the insistence that conjectures and
oonolusions must eventually be tested in terms of observations Chomsky
39
remarks that 'any reasonable person is a behaviourist in this sense.•
In his insistence that linguistio theories must be tested against
evidence as in any other science, Chomsky is, for some of his readers
40
such as Gellner , an empiricist. Whether mentalism is empiricist
depends, I presume, on what empiricism is taken to imply but there is
little doubt that many of Chomsky's followers hold mentalism to be
empirical.
Chomsky's research programme comes very close, I think, to the
criteria which emerged in the last chapter as those which an empirical
science ought to possess. The key idea in his theory of language is
that syntactic properties, common to all natural languages, reflect the
innate structural features of the infant brain. This is the first step
in the articulation of the metaphysical assumption that language is a
mirror of the human mind. We have seen that this assumption lends
Itself to articulation in diverse ways and that it allows for considerable
disagreement among Chomskians over exactly what the principles of
universal grammar are. We have also seen that when Chomsky does identify
a grammar for a language he acknowledges that before we can explain
linguistic performance or how the grammar is put to use we have to
identify the other faculties of mind or cognitive structures which come
into play in the generation of action. This makes his theory extremely






even allow Mm to maintain Ms position, I tMnk, in the face of prima
facie embarrassing evidence. TMs is not to say that tlie theory that
the transformational grammarians have developed is unsoientific because
unfalsifiable, merely that its success or failure in ooping with the
evidence will only be judged when the different cognitive structures
are specified in much more detail. Until, for example, we have given
some substance to the cogMtive struoture of •common-sense understanding*,
posited by Chomsky, we will not be able to assess the status of Ms
theory of linguistic performance.
$3y own belief is that further research will not support the olaim
that the child inherits a universal grammar or faculty of mind, specific
to language. The burgeoning literature on language acquisition suggests
instead, I think, that we will have to locate the basis for language
learning in nonlinguistic cogMtive structures. To understand the
acquisition of knowledge of language we will have to begin by analysing
how the cMld determines the meaning of what the speaker intends to
convey.^ TMs is a reflection, in studies of language acquisition, of
an empirical hypothesis about adult language, advanced by Searle^ in
opposition to Chomsky, that if we wish to explain regularities in syntax
we will have to take account of both the meaning and function of
sentences. •The claim is rather that,* he maintains, *so far as we can
tell structure, function and meaning in natural languages interact in
all sorts of interesting and complex ways and it is extremely unlikely
that all of the rules of structure can be stated completely independently
of any of the rules for the use of the structures in question.*^
TMs is not the place, however, to review the research findings in
favour of Chomsky* s theory or against it. Rather I have been concerned
41 Macnamara, J. (1972)
42 Searle, J. (1976)
43 " " " plll9
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to examine the theory in order to see whether, in the words of the
introduction to Chapter One, it complies with the minimal intellectual
criteria demanded of any empirical science. And I have argued that
Chomsky* s mentalism is, in principle, a rational enterprise in that it
meets the standards which I argued for in the last chapter. The
metaphysical assumption which inspires his work, the thesis that language
is a mirror of the human mind, 3ms been translated into testable
scientific theories which have, we have seen, met with some empirical
support. However, as the linguistic research expands into the
exploration of more and more languages it may be that we will have to
either attenuate or abandon the claims for a universal grammar. Or it
may be that psychological research into the child* s acquisition of
language will encourage us, as I have suspected it will, to drop the
notion of an innate language faculty, a cognitive domain relatively
isolated from the rest of the c3iild*s mind and to see language learning
as an activity intimately involved with other mental capacities such as
the capacities for perception and thinking.^ In these oases we would
be advised, I think, to conclude that our metaplaysical assumption is
false, tliat language - as Chomsky analyses it - is not a mirror of
mind. The demise of Chonskian theory, however, would not discredit
mentalism for we would, in such circumstances, be at liberty and indeed
impelled to try to discover some hopefully true thesis about the mind
and give it empirical expression.
Chomsky cn Knowledge and Freedom
45
In Ms Bertrand RubsgII Memorial Lectures Chomsky appropriately
44 In a recent article Bruner supports vhis * integrated' research
proposal and argues further that the reverse holds true for work on
perception. Recent studies on colour perception sliow that tlie
*recognizability of colours to which on© 1ms been previously exposed is
a function of their linguistic codability.* Bruner, J. (1976) pi590
45 Chomsky, N. (1972a)
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considers a question that troubled the British philosopher throughout
his life and to which Chomsky evidently feels his own work in linguistics
and psychology provides a convincing if incomplete reply. 'How comes
it,* Russell^0 asks, 'that human beings whose contacts with the world
are brief and personal and limited, are nevertheless able to know as
much as they do?' Dismissing as 'irrelevant* the possible response
of the soeptio who holds that we do not have such knowledge as Russell
suggests, Chomsky provides the controversial answer that 'we oan know
so much because in a sense we already knew it, though the data of sense
were necessary to evoke and elioit this knowledge.'^ Though, as
indicated already, he prefers not to use the term Chomsky holds that
human beings are born with 'innate knowledge* and claims to have
vindioated the rationalist position against the empiricist in this
centuries-old epistemological struggle.
He arrives at this conclusion, as we have seen, only after a
pioneering investigation of the nature of language and its acquisition
by the child. He builds up his case - here I summarise the logic of
his argument - by first claiming that there are severe, arbitrary
constraints on the diversity of human languages which amount to a set
of linguistic universals. He then argues that these universale are no
historical accident but the biologioally necessary consequences of the
operation of innate structures of mind whioh are, in turn, reflections
of properties of the human brain. The child rapidly acquires a grammar
or knowledge of language because he is bom with an innate universal
grammar, innate knowledge. Chomsky further holds that his linguistic
studies will be a model for the study of other domains of competence and
that we will have to develop novel theories to characterise these
46 Russell, B, (1948)» quoted in Chomsky, N. (1972a) pl3
47 Chomsky, N. (1976) P7
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faculties. Only when such theories have been developed and proven
empirically successful will we have provided, he believes, a satisfactory
answer to Russell's question.
Chomsky's argument is, I suggest, fundamentally mistaken and his
empirical researches provide no basis whatsoever for his claim that
human beings possess innate knowledge in line with the rationalist
tradition. His scientific theories are almost completely irrelevant
to the problem whioh exercised Bussell and epistomologists before and
since. For their1a is an epistamological problem and, as such, is
primarily concerned with the validation of knowledge claims whereas
Chomsky's substantive work is empirical, a psychological theory about
the genesis of beliefs and cognitive structures.
To answer Russell's question properly it is necessary, I suggest,
to draw a distinction between the logic or epistemology of knowledge
and the psychology of knowledge. This is the distinction we saw Popper
argue for against Kuhn when he objected to the latter's naturalistic
treatment of knowledge. For Popper, knowledge is, again, a value and
thus not something which can be empirically discovered} the value he
chose, we have seen, prizes those falsifiable theories which have been
adjudged not to be false. For Maxwell too, knowledge is a value} in
his case only those theories which have an a priori simplicity, unity etc
and whioh, though falsifiable, are adjudged not to be false are prized
as knowledge. Following Popper and Maxwell I therefore suggest that
before we can have a psychological investigation into the origins of
knowledge we must first specify what we take knowledge to be. Which
value we choose will then determine the scope of our psychological
study.
Because Chomsky fails, like Kuhn, to make this distinction he treats
knowledge naturalistically and identifies it with a set of beliefs and
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cognitive structures. But even if his hypothesis that humans attain a
knowledge of language so rapidly because they possess an innate universal
grammar were true and even if it were to prove, as he hopes, a productive
model for the investigation of other domains of human competence that
would provide no support for a rationalist epistemologist who holds that
humans possess a priori valid knowledge. All it would show would be
that humans inherit a priori expectations, beliefs, dispositions etc
with which they categorise their linguistic experiences and which enable
them to quickly achieve a knowledge of language. We would have made a
discovery about humans comparable to the finding by Hubel and Wiesel^
«
that the oat inherits a priori expectations - to the effect that a tiny
blaok object flying rapidly across its visual field is likely to be
nourishing. Such a discovery of innate universal grammar in humans
would not, however, establish the existence of a priori valid knowledge.
It may prove to be an innate disadvantage for the infant if he * knows*,
through his genetic inheritance, that human language has a specific
structurej for if, for some reason, human beings found it desirable to
speak some artificial language with a very different structure to that
which allegedly characterises human natural languages then the infant's
innate 'knowledge' would be the basis of his ignorance. For the cat, a
parallel would arise, say, if due to some environmental change flies
absorbed a substance which transformed them into a deadly poison; then
the oat's *a priori knowledge' would lead to his demise. In short, a_
priori knowledge is not a priori valid and Chomsky's failure to preserve
the fact-value distinction in epistemology leads him to give a factual
answer to a value question, to the mistaken conclusion that linguistic
science vindicates traditional rationalism.
48 Hubel, D.H. and Wiesel, T.N. (19&2) pl06-54
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In so far as Chomsky views mentalism in psychology as a natural
science with no special methodology, a position he has recently favoured
in common with other mentalists like Fodor, he must be bracketed with
the traditional empiricists in epistemology. That rationalist-empiricist
AO
debate, as Searle has noted in criticising Chomsky's 'misuse' of the
terms, is primarily a debate about the validation of knowledge claims
•and not, except derivatively, of how they are acquired.* Chomsky
scarcely bothers to debate the view that scientific theories can only
be accepted if they have evidential support; he agrees that all
cognitive claims must submit to the verdict of experience and the only
discussion is over the nature of the evidence or experience. In
epistemology he is an empiricist. In psychology, however, he calls
himself a rationalist to contrast his theory of language acquisition
with the impoverished behaviourist learning theory which he calls
50
empiricist. This, too, is a misleading formulation because, as Searle^
has also argued, 'the psychology of all of the classical empiricists,
Locke, Berkeley and Hume, was introspectionist, and Behaviourism was
founded by Watson and others at least partly in reaction against the
empiricist tradition of introspectionism.' It would, therefore, be
preferable if, to avoid confusion, Chomsky were to refrain from equating
Skinnerian behaviourism with empiricism. One can perfectly logically
and Chomsky does, very plausibly, espouse empiricism in epistemology
and posit rich, innate mental mechanisms in psychology; but one may,
equally logically, as Skinner does (highly implausibly, in my view)
combine an empiricist epiBtemology with a radical behaviourism.
Though mentalism is, as noted in Chapter One, compatible with both
dualism and materialism most leading mentalists do seem to subscribe to
49 Searle, J. (1976) pll20
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the latter with soma, at least, explicitly espousing the Identity Theory.
Psychological theories, therefore, are held to he ultimately about
physical systems and the mentalists leave open the possibility of mental
capacities being mapped on to the brain. But that does not imply, as
we have also seen, that psychological laws will ultimately be reducible
to the laws of physics. 'The point of reduction,' writes Fodor^, in
the clearest formulation of the mentalist position I know, 'is not
primarily to find acme natural kind predicate of physics coextensive
with each kind predicate of a special science. It is, rather, to
explicate the physical mechanisms whereby events conform to the laws
of the special soiences.' Since this is also Chomsky's position it is
not, therefore, a distortion to maintain that he is not only an
empiricist but a mechanist as well.
The idea that man is a complex machine- is of interest not so much
because of what it conveys but of what it promises. The mechanist is
admired or feared not because he provides a complete, causal explanation
of behaviour but because he asserts that it is possible, in principle,
to provide such explanations. We may look upon Chomsky's linguistic
theories as a tentative step towards the specification of the programme
which governs language behaviour just as a computer programme governs
the output of a machine. The analogy of the computer is appropriate
because of the impetus programming has given to mental ism, as Fodor,
Bever and Garrett point out. They writes 'If contemporary mentalists
are better situated than their forebears to provide an account of the
place of psychology among the sciences, the invention of the general-
purpose digital computer is in part responsible. For even though the
cocputer is undoubtedly a physical system, characterising its
51 Fodor, J. (1975) Pl9» As his argument is a general one we
must, for our purposes, read 'psychology* for 'special science'.
-23>
transformations of information is quite as important as characterising
its changes of physical state in any full description of the functioning
52of the machine.1 Chomsky's programme of research, therefore,
premises - once it has provided formal descriptions of cognitive
structures and detailed their modes of interaction - to identify the
causally necessary and/or sufficient conditions for what a person says
and does. In adopting this aim, therefore, he seems to me to hold out
the possibility of undermining our everyday, common-sense assumption
that we are relatively free agents, largely responsible for our own
actions. This is the point we saw Gellner make against Koestler when he
challenged the latter*s assumption that good science would vindicate
the common man's view of himself, a view which contrasts sharply with
the dehumanised caricature of 'pseudo-scientific' behaviourism. 'The
price of genuine, powerful, technologically enriching science,* Gellnor
observes, 'is that its style of explanation ruthlessly destroys those
53
very notions xn terms of which we identify ourselves.*
Given Chomsky's aim, therefore, it seems to me odd to find him at
the end of his first Bertrand Russell lecture arguing that his researches
will advance the humanistic vision of man. Emphasising Chomsky's
mechanist commitments Gellner remarks that he 'goes out of his way not
to exclude the possibility that La Mettrie's mechanistio programme 'may
5A
be in principle correct'.'^ On tire other hand it is possible to argue
that Chomsky has his doubts that the aentalist or mechanist programme
will ever* get very far. For while discussing the genetic constraints
on man's possible ability to develop theories which would explain his own
actions Chomsky gives favourable consideration to a paper by Stent,
52 Fodor, J. Bever, T. and Garrett, M. (1974) pxiv
53 Gellner, E. (1974) ?101
54 " " " p97? Chomsky, IT. (1966) p81
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significantly entitled 'Limits to the Scientific Understanding of Man'.
The gist of this paper is that the traditional nind-body problem haunts
contemporary psychology in general and Chomsky's programs in particular
in exactly the same form as it was spelled out by Descartes. The concept
of self, says Stent, can neither be exorcised from psychological
explanation nor is it accessible to scientific investigation. Descartes
had argued that no matter how deeply we probe with our physiological
investigations into the visual pathways we must eventually posit an
•inner man' who transforms the visual image into a percept. Stent adds:
•And, as fax as linguistics is concerned, the analysis
of language appears to be heading for the same oonoeptual
impasse as does the analysis of vision. I think it is
significant that Chomsky, who views himself as carrying
on the line of linguistic analysis begun by Descartes and
his disciples, has encountered difficulty with the
postulated semantic component ... for man the concept of
•meaning' can be fathomed only in relation to the self,
which is both ultimate source and ultimate destination
of semantic signals.' 56
57
There is, he concludes, a 'fundamental epistemologioal limitation' to
the human sciences in that they must make reference to a 'Kantian
transcendental concept', the self, a notion v/hich will be forever
resistant to scientific analysis.
If Chomsky were to align himself with Stent then there would
obviously be some Justice in Chomsky's claim to be a modem Cartesian.
But, while he may have his doubts about the ultimate success of his
enterprise, Chomsky's working assumption seems to me to be the mechanist
one discussod above, an interpretation forcibly supported by Gellner.
(Chomsky does, after all, aim to exorcise the ghost from the machine.)
And if we take Chomsky's mentalism to be a form of mechanism, as I think
we ought, then we must conclude that the connection between his technical
55 Stent, G.S. (1973) pl057
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linguistic and psychological theories on the one hand and his wider
conceptions of human nature, on the other, is, as his sympathetic
58
commentator Bracken writes, simply 'tenuous1. Or elsa we must conclude
that he is defending an idiosyncratic humanistic vision.
Apriorisa and Teleology
In endorsing nentalism as an, in principle, rational approach to
a scientific psychology I have, by implication, rejected both Winch's
apriorist arguments to the effect that a science of psychology is a
contradiction in terms and von Wright's assertion that teloologioal
and not causal explanations are appropriate to the study o* intentional
behaviour. Mentalism can be judged rational, 1 maintain, because it
conforms or, more accurately, can be reconstructed so as to conform to
the criteria of aim-oriented empiricism which I supported in the last
chapter.
A constant theme of this thesis has been that different approaches
to psychology are associated with different philosophies of science or
with wider philosophical perspectives which legitimate the respective
claims about whether a science of psychology is possible and, if possible,
how it ought to be pursued. I am prepared to defend mentalism because
it can bo formulated in a way which conforms to those epistemological
and methodological requirements I have been arguing for namely, the
necessity to gamble on some metaphydoal assumption about the nature of
the human mind, to develop testable theories conforming to that
assumption and to test them. Winch's and von Wright's independently
argued but agreed conclusion that a natural scienoe of psychology is
impossible, on the other band, is associated with two very different
58 Bracken, H. (1975) p242
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epistemologies as I tried to .make clear when I introduced their views.
Winch's neo-Wittgeneteinian position has been subjected to an
enormous number of varied critiques and sinoe discussion of thorn would
involve an interesting but unnecessary detour I shall restrict myself
to those observations which are of particular relevance to psychology.
I argued earlier (Chapter One pl4) that we could dismiss Winch's case
if we could show that he held en unsatisfactory theory of science or
that his account of what is involved in understanding social life is
flawed or both. I now suggest that indeed both prongs of his argument
are blunt and that he is mistaken in his conclusion that the logic of
natural science and the- logic of social life are incompatible.
Let us recall that he built up his case by contrasting the kind
of account of social behaviour which he believed a natural scientist is
obliged to offer with what a sociological observer or philosopher ought
to present. Whan the natural scientist describes people speaking,
singing, dancing or whatever people do in social situations he must,
Winch argued, restrict his explanation to be one about organisms making
certain movements and sounds. 'To describe what is observed by the
sociologist in terms of notions like 'proposition' and 'theory' is,'
he wrote, 'already to have taken the decision to apply a set of conoepts
59
incompatible with the 'external', 'experimental' point of view.'*"
Winch then proceeded to recommend that we study social life in terms of
concepts appropriate to the 'form of life' involved, rather than to
subscribe to a kind of scientific imperialism which imposes the 'form of
life' appropriate to science on competing 'forms of life'.
Winch's conclusion is mistaken because he has embraced an excessively
narrow conception of science and of what an 'external, experimental
59 Winch, P. (1958) pllO
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point of view1 entails. It does not entail, as we have seen, that the
psychologist must conceptualise behaviour as movement nor that he refrain
from using terms such as •proposition* or •theory* when describing what
people take themselves to be doing. Logical empiricist meaning
criteria do require that the natural scientist behaves as Winch suggests
but we are not required to employ such criteria to remain scientific
psychologists. Popper maintains, wo have seen, that to insist on
construing behaviour as movement is to subscribe to a verificationist
theory of scienoe which mistakenly aims to base scientific theories on
an atbeoretical, solid empirical foundation. And I have arguod,
following both Popper and Maxwell, that it is a sufficient constraint
on scientific theorising that our theories be vulnerable to theoretically-
interpreted observations. 'To use the example already employed, it is
just as scientific to record as a statement of scientific observation
that *he rang the bell* as it is to say •right ana moves to horizontal
position, right index finger juts forward one inch, makes contact with
button, etc'. And it is, of course, the former kind of statement of
scientific observation that the mentalist or psycholinguist makes in
testing his theories.
Like Winch, von Wright insisted that the application of the methods
of natural science to social phenomena will result in a causal account
of movement and not in on explanation of action. For von Wrigfrt also
holds, as I have already pointed out, a conception of science which is
as positivistic as is Winch's. And it is because he views the natural
sciences in that way that he is led to construct an alternative schema
of explanation for the social sciences. He is, therefore, vulnerable
to exactly the same criticism as that proffered against Winch in the
previous paragraph and to tlie corollary that if he had embraced a
modified Popperian philosophy of science, as outlined in the last chapter,
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ha need not have constructed his practical inference schema. He could
have, as Giedyain indicated, adopted a methodological monism without
simultaneously committing himself to positivism.
Veinryb'a incisive criticisms of von Wright*3 unnecessary
alternative schema have been examined at some length in Chapter One and
we have seen that he showed the case against a causalist account, via
a refined version of the Logical Connection Argument, to be based upon
a non-aequitur. Weinxyto demonstrated clearly that von Wright failed to
substantiate his case for a methodological dualism. Von Wright's
position is, therefore, rejected because the two methodologies he
advocates for the natural and social sciences respectively are
unsatisfactory. Let us now return briefly to discuss ."inch's alternative
for the social sciences.
The second prong of Winch's argument, that since social action
cannot be described by a natural scientist such action or, meaningful
behaviour - along with 'private' mental activity (i.e. thinking) which
is, in reality, allegedly parasitic on public behaviour - must be
inverstigated by the philosopher, is no more convincing. Wo have, in
fact, seen that there is a crucial flaw in Winch's development of his
thesis when he holds that all meaningful behaviour (thinking included)
is rule-following behaviour and therefore essentially bound up with the
-ooial context in which it was learned and is used. We need not concede,
therefore, that to understand social action we must study it as a part
of a distinct 'form of life' - with all the problems that such a
philosophy entails. The flaw was pointed out independently and
effectively by Whiteley and Fodor (Chapter One pp32~34) when they argued
that though we need publio procedures for discovering whether a rule is
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being applied it is perfectly sensible to talk of role-following in
the absence of such procedures. Identifying the flaw allowed Vhiteley
to dismiss the Wittgensteinian objection to a private sense-datum
language, leaving the way open to Ms espousal of a kind of dualism
wMle Podcr considered himself freed to develop the case for an innate,
representational language of thought.
In sum, therefore, I reject the tiro options wMch Winch claims to
be the only alternatives facing the social scientist and, by extension,
the psychologist. And the best answer to Winch, von '.'right and, for
that matter, to Skinner will be provided, I believe, by the development
of testable theories in the mentaliet programme as pursued within the
requirements of aim-oriented empiricism. If we should be able to
discover theories of mind wMch explain the behaviour we observe, even
in a limited, defined sphere then we will have undermined these
apriorisi and teleologies! positions. In the meantime the most we can
do is challenge the assumptions wMch inspire their arguments and focus
on the lacunae in the arguments themselves.
I ended my discussion of Chomsky by noting Goliner's argument that
the former was both a mechanist and a materialist. Should Chomsky find
empirical support, Gellnor wrote with approval, he would have demolished
our everyday self-image, replacing it with a complex, causal account of
behaviour. It is exactly this kind of account, Gellner wrote in an
. rli r papor" , that Winch aims to insnunise human and social life
61
against. Wo ought to view Winch, he wrote , as a 'negative
anthropomorpMst', a man trying to protect the idea of a 'meaningful
moral order* in human affairs against a scientific account which gives
the human no special status in the world.
GO Gellnar, S. (1968), (1974)
61 " « (1974) Pl?0
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•la an important and extended sense,* says Gellnor , 'the
Copemiean revolution is well established; humanity is known not to be
at the centre of things; human requirements are not allowed to limit,
or even create presumptions in, the sphere of scientific theory.* In
the fields of human and social studies, however, anthropomorphism has
yet to be conquered, nan has yet to bo dethroned by science. Winch's
strategy is to avoid any positive anthropomorphic doctrine which would,
says Gellner, spell out what the moral order in the social studies
ought to be and lie resorts instead to an episteaological defence of
human and social life. Winch*b argument, according to Gellner, is 'that
the very nature of knowledge, in the sphere in question, is such that
no non-anthropomorphic theory can possibly be true. This leaves the
field open for anthropomorphic theories, without however at the same
time positively singling out any one of thorn.*05
Gellner's counter-argument is, in part, that Winch's views are
contradicted by a flourishing anthropology and sociology which constantly,
if fallibly, compare cultures, societies and so-called forms of life
and attempt to discover theories which are universally supported. Winch
is further contradicted, he says, by features of human societies
themselves, especially by their pluralist and self-critical characters;
isolated, mutually exclusive, self-satisfied forms of life are, he says,
a myth. Since what is actual is possible x*e ou^ht, he implies, to
regard existing social science and the nature of the societies studied
as refutations of the Winch/.,'ittgonste i.n i an position. He then strengthens
his case with an assault on the epistemological argument itself.
62 Gellner, S. (1974) pl29




I am averse to turning the
greatest miracle we know of
in this universe into an
epiphenomenon.
Karl Popper .
Replies to I3y Critics
Introduction
Interactionistn insist that the conscious mind, at least, exists,
is as ontologically distinct as the material world and, as commonsense
assumes, exerts a causal influence on that world. They therefore
■unite in opposition to nentolism which, they maintain, givos no special
psychological or biological recognition or function to consciousness
or mind, reducing it instead - as Popper*s remark suggests - to the
level of an epiphenomenon. They are especially opposed to a mentalism
which is combined with a materialist ontology, a combination which is,
I have suggested, favoured by the majority of contemporary montalists.
Should a mentalist, however, prefer to espouse a dualist ontology he
would, I suspect, still incur opposition from on interactionist - who
would further insist that the conscious mind be given causal efficacy
m psychological explanations. I am forced to speculate on the latter
because I have not encountered any psychologist who explicitly states
p
an attachment to both mentalism and dualism.
1 Popper, K.R. (1974) P1052
2 P.A. Hayek nay, perhaps, be said to approach such a position in
his paper, gfeg p-hmapy of the Abstract, where he defends the contention
tliat *all the conscious experience that we regard as relatively concrete
and primary, in particular all sensations, perceptions and images are
the product of a ouperimposition of many *classifications* of the events
perceived according to their significance in many respects.® Subjective
experience is the product of abstract mental operations. Hayek, P.A.
(1972) pjll
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Interactionists do not, however, form a homogeneous group, having
arrived at the same conclusion "by identical routes and sharing a common
programme for future research in psychology. The three interactionists
introduced in Chapter One, Beloff, Whiteley and Popper all agree that
the conscious mind is not to he reduced to, identified with or
eliminated in favour of the physical hut they present very different
5
proposals on the hasis of their arguments. Beloff advocates continued
research in parapsychology because he accepts Randall*s redefinition of
that field as *the science of mind-matter interaction.* Whiteley, on
the other hand, proposes that the psychologist ought to investigate and,
if possible, discover generalizations »about the effects in consciousness
of what happens outside it, and the effects of what happens in
consciousness on human behaviour.*^ Popper develops a very different
strategy for the investigation of mind and it is his interactionist
alternative that will be my main preoccupation in this chapter. Before
examining his position, however, I would like to reflect on Beloff*s
arguments for dualism and to assess their implications for mentalism.
5
Beloff identifies three features of mind or mental processes which,
he says, are not found in the physical world and which suggest that
nothing less than a dualist-interactionist psychology will suffice, even
if that thwarts the ambitions of those who are committed to the unity
of science movement. First, we must recognise that human and animal
life in general are consoious, in contrast to material objects and
probably, to plant life as well. The second feature he specifies is
•the referential aspect of the cognitive processes in man and the
6
higher animals* , by which he means that *our thoughts, percepts,
memories and so forth represent, symbolize or otherwise refer to something
3 Beloff, J. (1975)
4 Whiteley, C.H. (1975) pll4
5 Beloff, J. (1976)
6 « M *» pl27
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other than themselves.1 Noting that Brentano and the 'act psychologists*
took this as the cardinal feature of mind he points out that a physical
process, however complex, is .just a physical process and never refers
to anything. The implications of this for the mind-brain identity
theory are, he thinks, very embarrassing. He writes:
•For to claim that two entities are identical implies
that whatever can be said about the one entity can
equally be said about the other entity. However, while
I can say what my thoughts are about, it seems to make no
sense at all to say about the concomitant brain processes
that they are about anything, they just are. But in that
case there appears to be an insuperable difficulty about
identifying my thoughts or my thinking with any set of
brain states or with the electrical impluses in the neural
circuits of my brain.* 8
The third feature of mind distinguishing it from the physical is what
he calls the *intentional or purposive aspect of behaviour which
transforms what would otherwise be a mere sequence of movements into a
9
meaningful action.* Ho purely physical system can, he says, act in a
sense which implies an intention. He asks us to consider a machine or
robot capable of performing some perceptual type task, such as selecting
an object of some shape or colour. We cannot, Beloff maintains, talk
of the robot*s perceiving *because perceiving implies, among other
things, having certain conscious percepts and if anyone were to suggest
that the robot was conscious we would suspect him of prevaricating in
his use of the word consciousness.*^ When we talk of machines 'speaking
a language*, 'reading*, *playing chess* etc we ought not to forget, he
implies, that they only appear to be doing these things; they are, in
fact, merely executing movements without awareness. 'The apparent
intentionality of such performances,* he says, *is not anything intrinsic
but derives from the fact that we invest them with meaning.*^
7 Beloff, J. (1976) pl27
8 " " pl27/8
9 M " " pi28
^0 If W ft ft
11 It It «» ft
-244-
Though I have sympathy with these arguments none of them seems to
me to constitute decisive objections to mentalism. Unlike some
behaviourists mentalists do not deny that consciousness exists; they
simply argue that it is in principle possible to give causal explanations
of behaviour by characterising mental states through the construction of
theoretical models of mind. Some of the characterised states are
conscious while others are not and the mentalist may plausibly reply
that if he is able to explain, predict and control observed behaviour
then he will have been justified in treating consciousness as a kind of
epiphenomenon. It must be admitted, however, that the mentalist
•
programme has not come anywhere near such an achievement and as long
as its achievements are so meagre it can expeot to meet the criticism
that it is consciousness that is, as commonsense assumes, the important
determinant of behaviour and so must be appropriately recognised in a
psychological theory. However, mentalists may respond to that with the
observation that there are impressive empirical discoveries in, for
example, speech perception which show that perception does not imply
consciousness and that various 'mechanisms of mind' are being successfully
studied by his methods.
As for the second criticism the mentalist may reply that the truth
or falsity of the identity-theory is independent of his approach to
psychology. The mentalist might opt for a more full blooded materialism
or for dualism, pluralism or some other motaphysio. Beloff's criticism
may, in short, be accepted without embarrassment. On the other hand
the mentalist may continue to espouse the identity theory and try to meet
the criticism itself. He mi^it argue that it has no force because the
postulated identity relation is contingent and it is well known that for
contingent identity statements there are exceptions to Leibniz's Law
of the identity of indiscernibles. Such is the kind of argument approved
12
by Borst who takes as his example the argument that mental states
could not be physiological states because we can have knowledge of the
former without possessing any knowledge of the latter. He objects to
this and notes, by way of reply, that 'people were able to speak about
genes before anything was known about ENA molecules, but for all that
13
genes are DNA molecules.1 What his argument amounts to is that the
so-called intentional properties (which include such propositional
attitude phrases as 'knows that*, 'believes that' etc) are not genuine
properties at all. He continues:
•It may be true, for example, that Tom believes (or fears,
etc) that the Horning Star is likely to explode, without
its also being true that Tom believes (or fears, etc)
that the Evening Star is likely to explode, even although,
unknown to Tom, the Morning Star is the Evening Star.' 14
•What Tom believes* is not, on this view, a genuine property of the
planet Venus and we cannot, therefore, expect - as Beloff does - that
'whatever can be said about the one entity can equally be said about
the other entity.' Whether this counter-argument removes Beloff*s
objection would then depend upon whether the referential aspect of a
cognitive state is held to be a genuine property of that state. To say
the least Beloff's mythical opponent would have a difficult task if he
were to try to establish the possibility of mental states that need not
refer at all. As I do not wish to get further embroiled in the debate
on the identity theory I shall conolude by again noting that no matter
what the eventual assessment of Beloff's critioism may be it is not
decisive for mentalism, which is compatible with other ontologies.
As will be evident from my discussion of Popper's intexaotionism
I have sympathy with Beloff's third argument which is, in effect, that
12 Borst, C.V. (1970)
13 « " " p25
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it is impossible to provide an explanation of human action in purely
physical terms. We will see, however, that such a priorist objections
are connected with wider metaphysical positions which cannot be settled
with finality. A committed mechanist will dismiss the objections as
based upon arbitrary limitations on the complexity of the robot1s mental
equipment and maintain that there is every possibility of what Beloff
calls mind-like, intentional or purposive behaviour yielding to a
mechanist analysis as he constructs an increasingly sophisticated
representation of the brain and its environment. It is exactly along
15
these lines that the mentalist N.S. Sutherland makes his case.
Popper's Interactionism: World 1« World 2 and World 5
In his fight against relativism Popper has elaborated a metaphysical
theory which reinforces his objectivist position. He begins by
recognising the reality of three distinct entities which he calls
World 1, World 2 and World 3» World 1 is the physical world of material
bodies such as rooks and trees and includes apparently non-material
entities like X-rays and lasers. World 2 is the world of subjective
experiences or mental states, images, perceptions, feelings and so on.
More controversial is his World 3 which refers to the objective contents
of thoughts and which includes not only theories, arguments and the
products of scientific thinking but also such diverse cultural objects
as statues, poems, string quartets, symphonies and paintings; it also
contains theories and arguments which are false or mistaken and, most
important, it contains the infinite number of consequences which can be
logically deduced from all theories. Prom both an epistemological and
methodological standpoint this World 3 is of crucial importance.
15 Sutherland, N.S. (1970) ppl06-109
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Popper admits that his World 3 bears certain resemblances to
Plato*s theory of Forms or Ideas and to Hegel*s theory of objective
spirit but is, perhaps, most oloBely akin to Frege*s objective contents
of thought. In contrast to Plato*s theory, however, World 3 is man made
and had no existence before the emergence of human language; it is,
Popper argues, the distinctive descriptive and argumentative functions
of human language as opposed to the expressive and signalling functions
of both animal and human languages that are responsible for the
appearance of World 3» Unlike the Hegelian spirit World 5 is not, in
any sense, conscious or a kind of 'Superhuman Being*. Popper* s theory
differs from Frege's in that it contains a much wider range of entities
than theories and their consequences - provoking the charge that World 3
is overpopulated.
Popper has advanced three major arguments in support of his
attribution of full ontological status to World 3« First, he asks us
to consider a thought experiment in which we imagine that various
aspects of our culture and civilization are destroyed. Imagine that as
a result of some catastrophe all our industries, technology, institutions,
etc have been wiped out, together with all our subjective knowledge and
memories of these, but that our libraries and books containing the
theories which gave rise to these along with our ability to learn from
them have survived intact. In these circumstances our human civilization
would, Popper maintains, be rapidly, if painfully, rebuilt. Had all
our libraries and books been wiped out as well, on the other hand, he
argues that it would take eons of time to reconstruct our achievements.
He considers this a powerful argument in favour of recognising the
reality of World 3» For since our subjective knowledge of World 3 had
perished, World 3 is not mental; nor is it physical since all physical
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artifacts (except libraries, books, etc) were also wiped out*^; nor
could it be held to be merely social since we have imagined that all
our social institutions have disappeared as well.
Popper*s seoond argument is that World 3 is autonomous, at least in
part. Admittedly it is dependent upon its human creator in that if he
did not exist World 3 would not have existed either. But once a theory
has been produced then World 3 becomes partly independent in that there
are always logical consequences of that theory which, unintended and
unforeseen, are there to be discovered. Popper illustrates this argument
with the example of the invention of the natural numbers. Once they
were invented then the prime numbers, the odd and even numbers and many
other relations were there for the mathematician to discover. Every
scientific, artistic or musical theory has, says Popper, an infinity of
consequenoes which no-one ever thought of before and perhaps will never
think of. Lack of human ingenuity, opportunity or time, however, is
insufficient reason, he implies, for denying the reality of such
consequences and he therefore argues against the identification of
scientific, artistic or musical knowledge with the thoughts that human
beings happen to think. He insists that World 3 transcends the human
minds which produced it and scientific knowledge, in particular, is not
to be identified with what scientists happen to think.
It is with this argument that we can see how World 3 is an
17
extension of the emphasis, in Popper*b early work , on the distinction
between the subjective and objective dimensions of knowledge. (Chapter
16 On this argument World 3 is physical in that it must be encoded
in some World 1 objeot, like a book or photograph. But the same theory
may be encoded on any of an infinity of different physical objects. So,
on this argument, World 3 is not ontologioally independent of all but
it is independent of any physical object.
17 Popper draws attention to the continuity between his metaphysical
theory and the methodological defence of objeotivity, as put forward in
The Logic of Soientlfic Disooveiy. Reply to J.C. Ecoles* comments on
World 3» Popper, K.R. (1974) pl050
-249-
Throe pl29) He there argued that the truth or falsity of a theory was,
among other things, independent of the perception and appraisal of its
truth by anyone or of its reception by any scientific community. His
initial distinction between the two approaches to knowledge was a
methodological one, to be judged in terms of its fruitfulness. His new
defence of objectivism, on the other hand, relies upon a metaphysic
with ontology in the role of handmaiden to epistemology. We might say
that his original proposal was that we treat the objeotive dimension as
if it were real while his new theory is a bold conjecture that it is
just as real as the physical and the mental.
Before introducing Popper1 s third argument for the reality of
World 3 I wish to examine his views on how these three worlds are
envisaged to interact. The human mind, World 2, can interact in a
causal manner with World 1 and vice versa; what happens in World 2 -
beliefs, intentions, decisions, acts of will, etc - can all produce
effects in World 1 and similarly what happens in World 1 can give rise
to such beliefs etc in V/orld 2. Just how this interaction takes place
jLo
remains a mystery though Popper does speculate that there is not a
one-to-one mind-brain liaison, with the brain in the same state every
time a person thinks the same thought. Popper rebuts the traditional
objection to mind-body interaction which, based on the Cartesian admission
that mental states have an intensity but no extension, conoludes that
such mental events cannot causally affect bodily movements. Suoh an
19
argument, says Popper, rests on the false assumption that there is
18 Popper, K.R. (1974) pl052
19 Beloff also argues that this traditional objection to dualism
rests on a false assumption about the monopoly of mechanistic causation
and writes: 'Stated in its simplest terms, we can say that if we are
satisfied that an event E would not have oocurrod under conditions C
but for another event X then, ipso facto, we are entitled to call X the
cause of E whatever might be the nature of X or F, whether one be mental
and the other physical or whatever.' Beloff, J. (1976) pl29
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only one kind of physical causation, namely the action-by-contact
theory presumed to explain the interaction between material bodies.
About this theory of causation and Popper's reaction to it Watkins writes*
•This aimpliste theory of physical causation is, of course,
quite obsolete today; yet many philosophers cling to its
negative implications for mind-body interaction, despite
the faot that both common sense and physios admit many
kinds of causal interaction between empirically different
kinds of thing. One of Popper's examples, here, is light
and matter, light being essentially differentiated from
matter by its velocity. Another example, which has been
adduced in this connection by J.O. Wisdom, is electricity
and magnetism, which seem radically different and
mutually irreducible; yet there is electromagnetic
interaction. (Philosophers seem never to have asked in
this context embarrassing questions like, Just where in
a dynamo does the interaction take place? Electromagnetic
theory has had no pineal gland trouble.)' 20
World 2 does not, however, interact with World 1 alone. Indeed it is
the fact that, as Popper argues, World 2 can causally affect World 3
and vice versa that provides his third argument in support of the reality
of World 3* Once the human mind has formulated a theory in World 3
that 'third world product' can, he saysreact upon World 2 and can
lead eventually to World 2 acting on World 1. I think this way of
talking is quite likely to mislead and, as I understand him, Popper's
intention is not to posit some active World 3 'Being' but to draw out
the implications of the autonomy of World 3» On this reading he is
arguing that a scientist may invent a theory which has consequences
which the scientist - or someone else - may hit upon only a long time
after the initial theory's invention. These unintended and unforeseen
consequences may well prove to be a startling discovery even for the
mind which invented the initial theory and may constitute a solution to
the problem which the initial theory was intended to solve. Hence we
20 Watkins, J.W.N. (1974) P594
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my say that World 3 leads to what DeWitt aptly calls •categorically
novel effects* in World 1, effects resulting from a process which, in
summary, works like this: the human mind (World 2) invents a theory
(World 3) which has unforeseen consequences which constitute a solution
to some objective -problem (both in World 3) and those consequences are
later perceived (in World 2) to be a creative and valued advance in the
field in question. That advance may then be implemented by the human
mind (World 2) which causally interacts with World 1. The discovery may
take place in any of the scientific or artistic fields and examples
of such discoveries, realised in World 1 as categorically novel effects,
would be the discovery of counterpoint in music or the development of
22 23
perspective in art. Popper himself and Gombrich have independently
applied this interactionist schema to both music and art history. In
sum, Popper argues that World 3 can exert a causal effect on World 1 via
the intervention of World 2 and this constitutes his third major
argument in favour of its distinct ontological status.
In support of his interactionism Popper draws upon his previous work
on another metaphysical issue and an associated scientific theory, the
problem of determinism and the theory of quantum mechanics. Prom around
1950 he has championed the radical indeterminisn of quantum mechanics
which holds that there exist microphysical processes which are not
further analysable in terms of causal chains but which consist of what
are called 'quantum jumps* j a quantum jump is an event which is held to
be absolutely unpredictable because it is not determined by causal laws -
21 DeWitt, Larry W. (1975) p205
22 Popper, K.R. (1974) PP47-57* An example of the unforeseen
consequences of a musical invention which Popper provides and of the
effect of the perception of those consequences is that of Haydn. Says
Popper: »There is a beautiful story about Haydn who, when listening to
the first chorus of the Creation, broke into tears and said, *1 have not
written this.* Popper, K.R. (l972) pl81
23 Gombrich, E.H. (1971), (1972), (1975)
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a quantum jump is not causally predetermined to occur before it in fact
occurs. 1Quantum mechanics,1 Popper argues2^, "regards these absolute
chance events as the basic events of World 1."
Popper* s main opponents in this controversy have been scientific
determinists who are convinced, as was Einstein, that behind the
apparently chance events whioh occur in microprocesses there exist
rigid causal laws which determine the events in question. Scientific
determinism is actually composed of two doctrines and Popper rejects
them both. The first doctrine, what is called metaphysical determinism,
holds that every event "that occurs in the universe is causally determined.
The second doctrine is the further epistemological olaim that there is,
in principle, no limit to the scientific knowledge we can obtain about
the already fixed and determined future, from a knowledge of initial
conditions and the laws of nature. These scientific determinists,
therefore, argue that the chance events observed to occur in
mioroprocesses only appear to be chance events because of the imprecision
and incompleteness of our knowledge of both initial conditions and laws
of nature. The ideal they aspire to attain is that of the mythical
Laplaoian Demon who is imagined to have a precise and total knowledge
of the position of all bodies in the universe and of all the forces
acting upon them. Were they to attain such knowledge then for them too,
as Laplace wrote, 'nothing would be uncertain and the future, like the
past, would be present to (their) eyes.*2*'
Popper has consistently fought scientific determinism because, ac.
25
Watkins - drawing on Popper's unpublished postscript to The Logic of
Scientific Discovery - puts it, it 'obliges us to put a special
24 Popper, K.R. (1975) p24
25 Quoted in Watkins, J.W.N. (1974) P575
26 Watkins, J.W.N. (1974) P57&
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interpretation - an essentially anthropooentrio interpretation - upon
(probabilistic) theories? these cannot be taken at their face value as
statements about the world, for in nature (according to metaphysical
determinism) nothing is chanoey or merely probable 5 probabilities reside
in the subjective world of our thinking, not in the objective world
outside.* Because of his attachment to metaphysical determinism the
scientific determinist is forced to interpret probabilistic theories
as, in part, statements about our ignorance.
In opposition to this subjectivist interpretation of quantum
mechanics Popper has pioneered a propensity theory of probability whioh
enables him to give an objectivist interpretation of probabilistic
theories. Such theories are not, on this interpretation, held to be
about our ignorance but about the world itself. Only if he were to
embrace metaphysical determinism would he be obliged, Popper argues, to
accept or make a subjeotivist interpretation, for it is that doctrine
that prevents us from accepting observed indeterminacies as being about
0
what they appear to be about, namely indeterminacies in the physical
world. But since its main consequence, he says, is that it subjeotivises
27
physics Popper recommends the rejection of metaphysical determinism. '
Popper does not claim to have refuted determinism. Since it is a
metaphysical theory that would be impossible. That he does claim is
that metaphysical determinism leads to undesirable consequences in
physics and to various paradoxes, some of them first discovered by the
✓ 20
quantum physicist-philosopher Alfred Land®. Popper is so concerned
to defend metaphysical indeterminism, the doctrine that there exists
at least one event suoh that there was a time prior to its occurrence
27 The metaphysical detexminist may plausibly reply, however, that
subjectivism is not a necessary consequence of his position. His aim,
he might reply, is to provide an objectivist aooount by eliminating
probabilistic theories altogether.
26 Lande' b thought-experiment arguments against determinism are
rehearsed by Watkins (1974) P37Q? further references are cited.
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such that it was not causally predetermined, because he considers it
a necessary condition for World 1 being open to causal interaction by
World 2. He accepts Laplace's conclusion that a physical world which is
causally determined, closed to the intervention of World 2, implies
that there is neither human freedom nor creativity. If World 1 is
determined then everything which humans do is also determined.
Indeterminism, however, is not enough for interactionism which can,
as it were, only get a foothold if World 1 is not closed to World 2.
The admission that there are absolutely chance events in World 1 does
not, in itself, allow either for human freedom or creativity. 'A closed
29
indeterrainistic World 1 would,.* he says , 'go on as before whatever our
wishes or feelings are, with the sole difference from Laplace's world
that we could not predict it, even if we knew all about its present
state: it would be a world ruled only by chance.' He therefore
conjectures that World 1 is not only a metaphysically indeterminist one
but is also incomplete, open towards the causal influence of World 2.
Popper's interactionism, then, is a bold metaphysical thesis about
what there is in the world and is dependent upon the truth of the
further metaphysical thesis of indeterminism. It is upon these two
theories that Popper has built his new defence of objectivism and his
attempt to revolutionise psychology. Once we admit the reality of
Worlds 1, 2 and 3 the proper methodology for psychology is not one which
tries to probe the processes of thinking and acting in the way we saw
the mentalist tries to do. We must instead shift to an analysis, he
proposes, of the modes of interaction between Worlds 2 and 3» *My
central thesis,' he says, 'is that any intellectually significant analysis
of the activity of understanding has mainly, if not entirely, to proceed
29 Popper, K.R. (1973) p25
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by analysing our handling of third-world structural units and tools.
We must, that is, analyse human thinking in terms of the interaction
between World 2, the initial World 3 product, its myriad unintended
consequences and the letter's perception in World 2. This analysis
must then be complemented by an analysis of the interaction of World 2
on World 1. About this level of interaction Popper is admittedly vague
and his account sketchy; but we have seen that he speculates that, in
view of the incompleteness of World 1, physicalism in the sense of
one-to-one mind-brain liaison is unsatisfactory. He conjectures that
the relation between World 1 and World 2 has the character of a genuine
interaction.
For and Against Popper's Interaction!am
Popper's pluralistic metaphysics provoked the sociologist of
science, David Bloor, to launch an attack on what he called the
'mystification' of objective knowledge which such a metaphysic allegedly
oreatas. What is valuable in the notion of World 3 caw be preserved
and unnecessary puzzlement or mystification dispelled, he argued, if
we employ the 'transformative method' as it was applied by Marx to Hegel.
The rule of transformation which Bloor recommended was thisj
'For 'Third World* read 'Social World*
•The method,* he added, 'is based on the assumption that metaphysical
systems are not empty fantasies, but are about something real - namely,
the social realtions between men. It further assumes that such systems
disguise, displace end invert what they perceive; that they make a
32
mystery out of what might be said more plainly. •
30 Popper, K.R. (1972)
31 Bloor, D. (1973) p8» Popper now prefers the name 'World 3' to
•Third World' so I shall follow his usage.
32 Bloor, D. (1973) p8
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Applying this method Bloor then produced a • translation* which
preserved the tripartite pattern of the original but with the individual
now poised between the natural (physical) and social worlds. Thus
instead of saying World 3 acts on World 1 via the intervention of World 2
Bloor writes that * society acts on men, but oolleotive purposes impinge
33
on nature only -through the agency of individuals. • The mistake of
identifying World 3 with World 2 (as Popper would have it) becomes, for
Bloor, 'the more recognisable syndrome of being blind to social
7A
processes.* ^ Proceeding in this way he claims that he can systematically
translate the 'obscure into propositions which are both clear and
35
arguable.' And so we can see, according to Bloor, that Popper's claim
that World 2 processes are anchored in World 3 amounts to nothing but
the claim that 'an individual's subjective acts of thought are anchored
in the social world ... In short, Popper is saying in his language that
36
psychology owes more to sociology than vice versa.•y
Locating the objectivity of scientific knowledge in World 3 turns
it, says Bloor, into a mystery. He continues:
'What exactly is the third world? What mode of being
does it have? To say that it is the world of
propositions, theories and problems still leaves the
issue obscure, because an account is needed of what
sort of entity these are.' 37
We need not bother with such questions, on the other hand, if we apply
the transfonaative method - or so he argues. For, reading sooial world
for World 3, we can see that the individual is a member of a sooial
group, subject to group pressures and so conditioned in his beliefs by
group concepts and norms. Recognising how the social group 'transcends
33 Bloor, 3). (1975) P9
n » it »i
JCj ft tf ft 11
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the individual and constrains him* ve can even appreciate why, Bloor
implies, Popper felt impelled to award some •real* ontological status to
World 3. Group norms - stable, enduring and external to the individual •
appear to have a distinct nature. But once they are seen for what they
are it is clear, he concludes, that they do not inhabit some mystical,
mystifying realm but have a more earthy, accessible abode. 'The
*9
authority of truth,' he concludes, 'is the authority of society.• *"
If all that Popper is trying to say is that society transcends the
individual and that the authority of truth is the authority of society
(whatever exactly that means) then we ought to welcome Bloor's
sociologioal reductionism. For that is oertainly not the message which
I and Bloor's critics took from Popper's writings. But I now suggest
that we ought not to welcome the attempted reduction because it either
ignores or fails to grasp the central point of World 3» whioh is thisi
The objectivity of knowledge is not to be located either in what an
individual, any group of individuals, a community or sooiety either now
or in the future might happen to think. The objectivity of knowledge
lies in the fact that it transcends all social processes; it lies in
the autonomy of World 3* We have seen Popper argue that one of the
consequences of World 3 is that scientific knowledge is independent of
the beliefs of any scientific community. As a consequence of applying
his transformative method we find Bloor arguing, in contrast, that
'phyBics is what physicists (as a group) know.'^0 (tfy- italics) Since
Bloor's transformative method, therefore, results in the denial of the
most fundamental point about World 3 It ought to be rejected. If we were
38 Bloor, D. (1973) Pl7
it w tt it
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to accept Bloor's alleged translation of Popper's pluralism we would,
apart from distorting the objectivist argument, be adopting a view of
science very similar to Euhn's; in particular, we would be committed to
sociologism - the mistaken identification of scientific knowledge with
communal beliefs - and to its relativist consequences.
As for the repeated claim that Popper's pluralism is mystifying,
disconnects us from 'processes that are real and accessible to
investigation*^, is 'opaque' and both 'paralyses the imagination and
stultifies research'^ I find myself in full agreement with DeWitt*s
fear of the authority of society. He writest
•If the objectivity of World 3 is no more autonomous
than the intersubjectivity of the society, then might
not this stultify research in the feared manner? If
'the objectivity of knowledge resides in its being the
set of accepted beliefs of a social group' then clearly
this could, all too easily, stultify progress to the point
of stagnation. That is,what if the social group never
changes any of its accepted beliefs? If we then acquiesced
in this stagnation we would be properly 'objective' (tinder
Bloor's view) and presumably nothing more is to be said.
But obviously we wish to mean more than this by 'objectivity*.
... Objectivity as mere consensus is simply too cheap.
The threat to our imaginations and to progress seems,
therefore, to emanate entirely from Bloor's coiner.* 43
DeWitt makes the further point that Bloor's charge that World 3 is
opaque and inaccessible to investigation arises from the letter's
commitment to a materialist ontology and to his unexpressed presupposition
that a minimi ontology is always desirable. He recommends that we
ought, instead, to favour ontologioal boldness - a companion to Popper's
epistemological boldness - 'provided we have relatively codifiable
procedures for assessing ontological posits.'^ And he replies that
Bloor, D. (1973) pl7
ft »t ft II







what vagueness applies to World 5 applies with equal force to the
physical worldi *What exactly is World 1? What node of being does it
have?*45
Are there agreed criteria for assessing ontological posits? And
does World 3 meet those criteria? If we make the criteria sufficiently
stringent it will always be possible, I suppose, to exclude posits whioh
we do not like. We saw that Popper advanced three arguments in favour
of the existence of WorLd 3 namely, his thought experiment, autonomy
and the causal efficaoy of World 3 on World 2 and, indirectly, on World 1.
Taking these in reverse order, I have already said that I think it
possible that to talk of World 3 causing effects is likely to mislead
and that we can reformulate this claim in terms of World 2 discovering
something unforeseen or unintended in World 3? in other words, World 3
does not alone cause any effects. But I do think, however, that the
argument for World 3* s reality by virtue of its autonomy is sound and
that abstract, logical consequences of theories are there to be
discovered; and they have been discovered, as Popper insists. As for
Popper*s thought experiment I think his point can also be subsumed under
the autonomy argument. Thus I mi prepared, tentatively, to conjecture
that World 3 is as real as the other two.
Popper*s olaim, then, is that World 1 is incomplete and that it is,
in principle, impossible to give a complete causal account in terms of
physical causes. World 1 is open to the intervention of the human mind,
World 2. On that conjecture it will, therefore, be impossible to give
a complete causal account of human action if we rely on any account whioh
excludes, in principle, any interaction by World 2. If the conjecture
is, in fact, correct then mentalism will (together with even more spartan
45 DeWitt, Larry W. (1975) p203
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strategies, like, say, radical behaviourism) be misconceived. If
Popper is correct then, as Beloff argued (for different reasons), it
will be impossible to provide an explanation of human action in physical
terms - where that is taken to imply mentalism, behaviourism and non-
inter&ctionist approaches in general.
Conclusion
A central theme of this thesis has been the claim that different
approaches to psychology are legitimated by different philosophies of
science or wider philosophical perspectives. I have argued that
Popper*s philosophy of science, as modified by Maxwell, provides a
reasoned and tenable account of the rationality of scientific enquiry
and equips us with suitable oriteria for the assessment of the rival
arguments over whether psychology is viable and, if viable, how it ought
to be pursued. In the light of these criteria I have endorsed the
mentalist programme as an, in principle, rational enquiry provided it
recognises the limits of empirical science and does not try to settle
epiatemological questions. Msntalism aims to provide an account of the
necessary and sufficient conditions required for the explanation of
human actions and so promises a mechanistic, causal account of the
determination of actions. In view of the earlier discussion of
indeterminiam in the context of interaction!sm I should, perhaps, point
out that the truth or falsity of determinism as a metaphysical thesis
is of little concern to mentalist psychologists. If determinism is
true then there can be no objection, in principle, to a search for an
explanation of action in accordance with the mentalist strategy. Even
if we are persuaded of the truth of metaphysical indeteroinism there is
no logical absurdity in pursuing the mentalist research programme. For,
■261
as Lucas has neatly argued, it nay be quite profitable for such an
indeterminist to adopt determinism as a methodological principle.^
Be writes!
*".hren if I know I shall not be able to find a
scientifio explanation ofevery event, I do not know
that I shall not be able to find one of this event,
and therefore it is reasonable to go on looking, since
to abandon the search is to resign myself to failure,
while to continue is not neoessarily fruitless.* 47
There is no contradiction, as he puts it, in a Methodist lay-preacher
who, on Sundays, preaches about sin and salvation - and assumes the
freedom of the will - donning, on Mondays, his neuropbysiological hat
and assuming that every mental event has a physical cause. In summary,
then, we can say that if mentalists should proceed to devise cognitive
theories which enable them to explain, predict and control behaviour
they will have turned psychology into a successful natural science in
the sense in which any science, given Popperian arguments, may be called
successful.
However, mentalism is not the only legitimate approach to psychology.
It is at least possible that Popper* s metaphysical conjectures are true
and that the world consists of the physical, the mental and the objective
contents of thought. If that is the oase, if the further metaphysical
thesis of indeteminisa is, as is also possible, a true theory and if
Worlds 1, 2 and 5 interact in the conjectured maimer then we might gain
the most valuable insights into the process of human understanding by
focusing on the interaction between the mind and its products. Just
because Popper's pluralistic philosophy is speculative, unfamiliar and
incomplete that is no reason to abandon it before it has been properly
developed and its implications for psychology drawn out. Though
46 Lucas, J.R. (1970)
47 " " M pi68
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admittedly schematic and novel it does have the valuable feature that
the conscious mind is given a central biological function namely, that
of interacting with the emergent products of the mind itself. And in
comparison with some other forms of interaotionism it has what seems
to me an equally valuable characteristic namely, the recognition that
man, though special, is a part of nature.
In conclusion, therefore, I advocate a methodological dualism of
my own endorsing mentalism for those who seek to explain behaviour in
terms of natural causes and a Popperian interactionism for those who
doubt that man is what the mechanists hope. For, as Popper Ms said
in reply to his physicalist critics Feigl and Meehl, * there are more
things in physics and biology than are dreamt of in all our
philosophies.*^
48 Popper, K.R. (1974) P1078
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